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Chapter 1
Introduction
The ability to foster and maintain cooperation and fairness is a key determinant of (economic)
well-being in human societies. When two or more individuals cooperate, they engage in joint
actions that, even though costly to the individual, create mutual benefits (Bowles and Gintis,
2008). Similarly, fairness decisions require that an individual gives up a part of his or her own
resources and re-distributes it to others (Kahneman et al., 1986). Both cooperation and fairness
decisions have been shown to crucially depend on social information, that is, information about
other people’s behavior. Field studies have shown that people make higher contributions to
public goods (Chen et al., 2010; Frey and Meier, 2004), are more likely to donate to charitable
organizations (Shang and Croson, 2009), and refrain from littering (Cialdini et al., 1991), if others
do so, too. Yet, some interventions have also produced undesirable effects (Schultz et al., 2007;
Fellner et al., 2013; Bhanot, 2017), and the underlying psychological processes remain unclear.
Hence, in a series of economic experiments, this dissertation sets out to investigate how and why
social information impacts cooperation and fairness decisions.
Early advances in behavioral-economic theory have focused on people’s prosocial motivations
to explain reactions to social information (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;
Charness and Rabin, 2002). For example, they modeled prosocial motivations as the result
of payoff-comparisons between direct interaction partners, i.e., ‘social preferences’ for equitable
outcomes (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). From this perspective, social
information affects decisions because it reveals information about others’ resources and people
dislike having less (or more) than others. While the early theories have substantial explanatory
power, they fail to explain the ‘flickery’ nature of social behavior, e.g., why fair-minded people
would actively seek (and follow) information suggesting unfair behavior. Importantly, the early
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theories have abstracted from people’s desire for positive signals about themselves, which are key
in social-psychological theory (e.g., Leary and Baumeister, 2000) and so-called ‘second-generation
models’ of social preferences (Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and
Bernheim, 2009; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011). This dissertation thus presents four economic
experiments focusing particularly on how people’s desires to send positive signals about their
own prosociality, i.e, self- and social signaling, help explain the impact of social information on
cooperation and fairness decisions.
From a social psychological perspective, people look to social information to answer questions
they find relevant for themselves: How should I evaluate my own actions? How will others
evaluate my actions? Where do I stand relative to others? In other words, they use social
information with the purpose of social comparison, i.e., to evaluate themselves and their decisions
relative to their social environment and its social norms (Cialdini et al., 1991; Festinger, 1954;
Taylor et al., 1996; Tesser, 1988).
Self-signaling motives, i.e., the desire to appear prosocial to oneself, might arise because
people lack perfect knowledge about their ‘true’ motivations, so they need to rely on ‘hard facts’
such as their own actions to infer ‘who they really are’. Equivalently, one could say that people
want to see themselves as prosocially motivated persons or that they care about their self-image
(Bem, 1972; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Leary and Baumeister, 2000; Mazar et al., 2008). In this
view, people might behave more cooperatively due to social information because it makes salient
their prosocial identity. Speaking to self-signaling motives, Chapter 2 explores the conditions
under which people try to boost their self-image as a prosocial person by cooperating in their own
team, if their team’s cooperativeness is compared to that of another team (Tajfel and Turner,
1979; Turner, 1975). Relatedly, Chapter 5 investigates whether or not people’s desire for prosocial
identity motivates them to set an example for others.
Social-signaling motives, i.e., the desire to appear prosocial to others, might arise since people
care about how spectators, be they real or imaginary, perceive their motivations (Andreoni and
Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al., 2009; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). An external spectator cannot
know an individual’s preferences, so he or she needs to rely on an individual’s actions to infer his
or her ‘true’ motivations. For instance, people may desire to appear prosocial to others in order
to (i) receive higher social approval (Leary, 2007) or (ii) to be chosen as partners (Barclay and
Willer, 2007). Note that if the desire to send positive signals about oneself enters preferences,
inferences about the own motivations are ‘strategic’ (Bénabou and Tirole, 2016; Kunda, 1990):
Individuals might prefer positive over negative signals about their prosocial motivation. In
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Chapter 3, we therefore test whether people acquire social comparison information strategically,
if it might negatively affect not only their self-, but also their social-signaling. Building on
Chapter 3, Chapter 4 studies when and how children develop the ability to strategically select
social comparison information.
So far, we have implicitly assumed that cooperation and fairness decisions are (perceived
as) socially desirable. Yet, what is perceived as socially desirable crucially depends on the
prevalent social norms in society (Herrmann et al., 2008), and social information can crucially
affect people’s norm perceptions (Krupka and Weber, 2009). Descriptive norms depend on what
‘is typically done’ in a given situation; injunctive norms depend on what ‘should be done’ in a
given situation (Cialdini et al., 1991). In conjunction with the own ‘true’ prosocial motivations,
social norms will affect how self- and social signaling works by affecting which behaviors are
considered as socially desirable and thus how people’s behavior affects their appearance (Mazar
et al., 2008). Accordingly, the impact of social information on normative perceptions will play
an important, yet tacit, role in each of the following chapters.
1.1 Overview and Main Findings
The following section provides an overview of the economic experiments featured in this
dissertation and summarizes their main findings.
Chapter 2, entitled “United we stand, divided we fall: The limitations of between-group
comparisons for fostering within-group cooperation”, is published as Böhm et al. (2018). We
investigate how between-group comparisons affect within-group cooperation decisions. Previous
work has shown that the provision of information about the average contributions of a
payoff-independent comparison group can increase within-group contributions in the public
goods game. This study extends previous work by studying how (the perception of)
between-group asymmetries in the between-group comparison affects within-group
contributions. In particular, one group is disadvantaged because it faces a lower
marginal-per-capita-return (MPCR) to cooperation than its comparison group. To test how the
perception of disadvantages in one group affects within-group cooperation, we vary whether or
not group members are aware of the between-group asymmetry.
We find that participants generally desired to be ‘ahead of’ their comparison group,
providing evidence for the importance of people’s desire for positive (group) distinctiveness.
Yet, in addition, the perception of between-group asymmetries led members of disadvantaged
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groups to respond more sensitively to within-group comparisons, i.e., to how their own payoffs
compared to those of their group members. More precisely, participants more strongly reduced
their contributions when their team members were free-riding. Particularly those participants
who more strongly perceived that contributions are not comparable between groups reduced
their contributions more strongly. Our findings can be explained from a self-signaling
perspective: When the information made salient their group’s disadvantages, members of
disadvantaged groups focused more strongly on within-group comparisons (e.g.,
payoff-comparisons with their team members) to maintain a positive self-image.
Chapter 3 is entitled “The driving forces behind information acquisition in social decisions”.
This chapter is joint work with Robert Böhm and Bettina Rockenbach. We let people choose
which social comparison information they want to acquire (or avoid) before making a fairness
decision – a transfer from their own endowment to an anonymous recipient in the dictator game.
Previous work has shown that people avoid information about the adverse consequences of their
own actions, if the information is available only to themselves. Contrary to previous work, in our
experiment, we varied whether or not the acquired social information could become public or not,
so the social information could not only affect what people think of themselves (self-signaling),
but also what other people think of them (social-signaling).
We find that if the acquired information became public and thus more strongly influenced
people’s prosocial appearance, people were more likely to acquire social information suggesting
low prosocial behavior, and they used it as an excuse for making a low transfer. We also provide
clean evidence that those who acquired information suggesting low prosocial behavior were also
less prosocially motivated per se. In particular, they transferred less than others, irrespective
of the social information they received. This experiment thus shows how prosocial motivation
and social signaling interact in information acquisition. From a policy perspective, our results
suggest that making social information public may produce unintended results, if those with a
low prosocial motivation use the information in a strategic way.
Chapter 4, “Social-Comparison Engineering in Children” is joint work with David
Buttelmann, Robert Böhm und Bettina Rockenbach. Here we build on the finding from
Chapter 3 that adults choose social comparison information strategically: We ask when and
how the ability to choose social comparisons strategically, that is, even against the own
preferences, develops in children. In a field study, children made drawings and, subsequently,
they could choose between low-accuracy and high-accuracy drawings to serve as their
comparison standard. In one treatment, children won a prize if their drawing was more
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accurate than the comparison standard. Hence, children could win and enhance their
appearance by choosing a low-accuracy drawing – making their own drawing appear more
accurate. In another treatment, children won if their drawing was less accurate than the
comparison standard. We also elicited children’s basic preference in a treatment, where there
was no evaluation at all.
Notably, children exhibited a strong basic preference for high-accuracy compared to low-
accuracy drawings when there was no evaluation. As a result, children needed to overcome an
inner conflict in the treatment where choosing the low-accuracy drawing made them win. In this
situation, only children from 6-7 years of age, but not younger children, managed to strategically
choose the comparison standard that made them win. By contrast, children of all ages managed to
win similarly often if choosing the high-accuracy drawing made them win. Children’s developing
abilities to inhibit conflicting impulses, but not their desire to win, or their desire to be liked
by others, could explain the age differences in strategically choosing social comparisons. This
suggests that children’s ability to inhibit conflicting impulses is not only important for individual
decisions, such as resisting temptations, but also for success in social situations more generally.
In Chapter 5, entitled “The desire to set an example: Do people cooperate more if they are
influential?”, I investigate when and how people desire to set an example for others. Compared
to previous studies, this study aims to isolate people’s psychological motives to set an example
for others by focusing on situations where there are no monetary incentives to set an example.
Participants (‘first-team players’) decided on a contribution to their team’s public good, and,
subsequently, their contributions provided information for ‘follower-teams’ that independently
played their own respective public goods games. To vary whether or not first-team players had
social influence via the contribution information they provided, I varied whether first-team
players’ decisions were revealed to follower-teams before or after follower-teams made their
decisions. To vary the salience of social norms, participants either had the opportunity to write
a recommendation about what follower-teams should contribute or did not have such an
opportunity.
I find that only when first-team players had social influence and could write a
recommendation, first-team players reported a higher motivation to set an example and also
made higher contributions compared to first-team players who did not have social influence and
could (or could not) write a recommendation. Hence, only when the opportunity to write a
recommendation made salient injunctive norms, people’s self-image as a prosocial person
became sufficiently salient so that people desired to set an example. As a side-finding, I further
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document follower-team player’s intriguing inclination to follow high (normative) but not low
(counter-normative) contributions.
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Chapter 2
United we stand, divided we fall
The limitations of between-group comparisons for fostering
within-group cooperation
2.1 Introduction
Competition between work teams is a common means to increase team performance. Experiments
with natural groups (e.g. Goette et al., 2006, 2012) and groups formed in the laboratory (e.g.
Abbink et al., 2012) demonstrate how competition between teams can help to overcome the
downward trend in cooperation that is typically observed in public goods games. Yet, not
only competition but also the mere provision of comparison information about an independent
other group can foster within-group cooperation (Böhm et al., 2013; Burton-Chellew and West,
2012; Cárdenas and Mantilla, 2015; Sausgruber, 2009; Tan and Bolle, 2007). The cooperation-
enhancing effect of between-group comparisons can be attributed to increased salience of group
identity, resulting from a desire for positive distinctiveness and self-view (Mazar et al., 2008;
Tajfel and Turner, 1979).1
Previous research has focused on (the benefits of) comparisons between symmetric groups.
However, natural groups differ vastly on various domains. In many cases, individuals in
different groups face different returns from cooperation. For instance, teams differ in terms of
task complexity and team heterogeneity (Jehn et al., 1999). Additionally, an equivalent amount
of cooperation effort may yield greater returns in a team working on tasks with a high stake
than in a team working on routine tasks. Often, group members will know about the different
returns from cooperation in other groups in their environment and, nevertheless, compare their
1Even in a setting with symmetric between-group comparisons, contributions to the public good may
deteriorate if a comparison group provides a bad example, for instance by contributing very little.
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own group’s performance to that of other groups. Importantly, most social comparisons occur
automatically, also to others who are not directly comparable (Gilbert et al., 1995; Verduyn
et al., 2015). Apart from comparisons that occur automatically, a manager might consider
making comparison information salient in order to increase team performance in teams with
different returns from cooperation.
In this paper, we thus ask how information about different returns from cooperation in
different groups affects individual decision processes when between-group comparison
information is available. We thereby provide the first empirical test of how individuals’
perception of differences in between-group comparisons affects within-group cooperation
behavior. Psychological research on the perception of social groups (Ames, 2004; Corcoran and
Mussweiler, 2009) suggests that social comparisons between structurally different groups might
backfire by tainting the own group’s perception, e.g., by increasing the salience of the own
group’s negative characteristics vis-à-vis the comparison group.
We aim at delineating the conditions under which – intended or unintended – comparisons
between structurally different groups could have detrimental effects on within-group performance.
To this end, we experimentally investigate a public goods game with comparison information
about another group with a different return from cooperation, i.e., a different marginal per
capita return. To answer the question of how the perception of differences between groups
affects within-group cooperation, we vary whether or not groups have information about the
structural difference between their own group and their comparison group. We suspect that
only when group members have been made aware of the differences between groups, might this
lead them to perceive between-group comparisons to be inadequate, and, in turn, might affect
within-group cooperation.
Our findings support the view that, when individuals have information about the
differences between groups, within-group cooperation becomes more fragile. We still observe
that the desire to avoid ‘lagging behind’ the comparison group motivates contributions. Yet, we
also find important limitations to between-group comparisons: Having information about
structural between-group differences leads members of disadvantaged groups (i.e., groups with
lower returns from cooperation) to reduce their contributions more strongly in response to
unfavorable within-group comparisons. An analysis of inter-individual heterogeneity reveals
that in particular those individuals who agree that the comparison group is not comparable to
the own group decrease their contributions more strongly in response to unfavorable
within-group comparisons.
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In the following, we first describe our experimental design and derive our hypotheses regarding
comparison processes among structurally different groups. Finally, we present our results in more
detail, which are discussed afterwards.
2.2 Materials and Methods
2.2.1 Experimental Design
We study the effect of between-group comparisons when groups are structurally different in
a public goods game. Two groups, g and h, with four players each, both play a repeated
linear public goods game for 20 rounds (using a partner matching protocol). The groups play
independently, i.e., one group cannot directly influence the other group’s payoff. We assign either
blue or green identities to groups.2 In each round t, all players of both groups receive an identical
endowment of e = 20. Each player i of group g decides on a contribution ci,g,t ∈ [0, e] to her group
account. Aggregate group contributions per round
∑
cj,g,t are redistributed equally to every
group member and multiplied by the marginal per capita return (MPCR) µg. µg < 1 constitutes
free-riding incentives of group members. Player i’s payoff in round t is pii,g,t = e−ci,g,t+µg
∑
cj,g,t.
The same rules apply to players of group h. Players of group g receive information on the average
contributions of their comparison group h, c¯h,t−1, and their own group g, c¯g,t−1, in the preceding
round t− 1, and vice versa.
To implement structural differences, one group faces a high MPCR (µg = 0.8), while the other
group has a low MPCR (µh = 0.4). Empirically, a higher MPCR facilitates higher cooperation
levels although free-riding incentives remain unchanged (Isaac and Walker, 1988). As additional
controls, we have two further treatments where both groups have the same MPCR (µg = µh =
0.4).
To isolate how the perception of differences between groups affects within-group
cooperation behavior, we additionally vary whether players only know the MPCR of their own
group (NOINFO) or the MPCRs of both groups (INFO). In INFO treatments, the instructions
explicitly informed players about the MPCR of the own group and the MPCR of the
comparison group. By contrast, instructions in NOINFO treatments only contained
information about the MPCR of the own group but did not contain any information about the
MPCR of the comparison group. These variations comprise six experimental treatments,
2We rely on minimal, artificial groups to exclude group-specific stereotypes and a history of conflict (Tajfel
et al., 1971). However, meta-analytical evidence suggests that the average effect size of ingroup favoritism does
not differ in interactions between members from natural vs. artificial groups (Balliet et al., 2014).
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summarized in Table 2.1.
Structural difference between groups Is the MPCR of comparison group
known?
yes no
Own group MPCR µ g = 0.4
Comparison group MPCR µ h = 0.8
LOW-INFO LOW-NOINFO
Own group: MPCR µ g = 0.8
Comparison group: MPCR µ h = 0.4
HIGH-INFO HIGH-NOINFO
Both groups: MPCR µ g = µ h = 0.4 SAME-INFO SAME-NOINFO
Table 2.1: Experimental treatments.
2.2.2 Participants and Procedure
We recruited N = 384 students via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), resulting in 96 groups with four
players each. The experiment was conducted in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants took
part in experimental sessions of 32 players each, with each session being randomly assigned to
one of the experimental conditions. There were two separate rooms, and players in different
rooms were connected via the software. Participants of the same group were seated in the same
room; participants of the respective comparison groups were seated in the other room. Because
there were four groups in each room, participants could infer neither the identity of the other
players in their own group nor the identity of players in their matched comparison group.
Participants received written instructions for the public goods game (see Appendix 2.A).
Additionally, instructions were read aloud to ensure common knowledge. Participants had to
answer questions of understanding before they actually started playing. In the INFO treatments,
participants’ questions also related to the comparison group’s MPCR (same MPCRs in SAME-
INFO and different MPCRs in LOW-INFO/HIGH-INFO, respectively). In NOINFO, questions
related only to the MPCR of the own group.
After the 20 game-playing rounds, participants completed a questionnaire assessing their
perceptions regarding the interaction situation on 7-point-scales (for details, see Appendix 2.B).
We asked participants about their motivations for contributing to their group account. Further,
we elicited the degree to which participants identify with their own group by using three items
(Cronbach’s α = 0.82, Doosje et al. (1995), e.g., “I identify as a member of my group.”). To
assess whether participants consider the comparison group to be sufficiently similar for comparing
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contributions between groups, we elicited their agreement with the statement: “The contributions
of the other group are not comparable to the contributions in my group.” We also assessed
whether participants experience joy (or anger) when their group lies ahead (or lags behind) the
comparison group.
After completing the post-experimental questionnaire, participants received their final payoff
information and were paid in private. Participants earned on average about 18 Euro in sessions
that lasted about 60 - 90 minutes.
2.3 Hypotheses
Social psychological research suggests that comparisons between structurally different groups
may enhance the desire for positive distinctiveness of the own group, i.e., the status of the own
group vis-à-vis the comparison group (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975). When groups
are symmetric and between-group information is available, research on public goods games has
confirmed that individuals desire not to ‘lag behind’ a comparison group (Böhm et al., 2013;
Burton-Chellew and West, 2012; Cárdenas and Mantilla, 2015; Sausgruber, 2009; Tan and Bolle,
2007). This desire, in turn, increases individuals’ willingness to contribute to the provision
of their group’s public good. The desire to obtain positive distinctiveness is thus a potent
motivational force and we expect it to operate regardless of whether individuals have or do not
have information about their structural disadvantages, i.e., their lower return from cooperation
relative to the comparison group. More precisely, individuals in both LOW-INFO and LOW-
NOINFO should increase their contributions when their own group has contributed less than
the comparison group, in an attempt to restore positive distinctiveness. Conversely, the desire
for positive distinctiveness may be reduced when the group has contributed more than the
comparison group, so in this case individuals should decrease their contributions. In the following,
we focus on groups who lag behind their comparison group, because, from a group identity
perspective, lying ‘ahead’ might also boost positive distinctiveness, whereas ‘lagging behind’ is
an unambiguous threat to positive distinctiveness.
Hypothesis 1 (LOW): Individuals in structurally disadvantaged groups increase their
contributions when lagging behind the comparison group in terms of contributions.
For individuals in structurally advantaged groups, i.e., individuals in HIGH-INFO and HIGH-
NOINFO, the comparison group may be a less relevant comparison standard. This is because the
own group typically lies ahead of the comparison group, so individuals may already feel distinct
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in a positive way. Nonetheless, we expect individuals to be motivated by their desire not to lag
behind the comparison group (albeit to a lesser extent).
Hypothesis 1 (HIGH): Individuals in structurally advantaged groups increase their
contributions when lagging behind the comparison group in terms of contributions.
When a comparison group is perceived as different from the own group, this may not only
affect between-group comparisons but may also taint the individuals’ perception of their own
group. According to the theory of ‘optimal distinctiveness’ (Brewer, 1991; Brewer and Weber,
1994), people’s need for positive distinctiveness crucially determines how they attend to social
information. Hence, when comparison groups are perceived as sufficiently structurally similar,
between-group comparison processes should become important. In this case, individuals may
expect to obtain positive distinctiveness by boosting their group identity. By contrast, when the
own group is perceived as structurally disadvantaged, comparison processes between individuals
of the same group should become more important. In LOW-INFO, individuals most likely expect
their own group to perform worse in terms of contributions. As they dislike lagging behind the
comparison group, they may focus more strongly on themselves compared to others within their
group in order to achieve positive distinctiveness, i.e., they focus on personal identity rather than
on group identity. It follows that within-group comparisons should become more salient.3,4
In within-group comparisons, conditional cooperation has been shown to play a crucial role
(Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kelley and Stahelski, 1970). Conditional cooperation is often selfishly
biased, meaning that unfavorable within-group comparisons receive more weight than favorable
within-group comparisons (Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). Thus, we expect individuals who
have information about their group’s structural disadvantage to respond more harshly
particularly to unfavorable within-group comparisons.
Hypothesis 2 (LOW): If individuals have information about the structural disadvantage of
their group, they reduce their contribution more strongly in response to unfavorable within-group
comparisons than if they do not have information about their disadvantage.
3This does not mean that between-group comparisons should become less self-relevant. By contrast, a pre-
condition for a stronger focus on personal identity is that people who receive information about disadvantages in
their group find the group comparison to be self-relevant and dislike lagging behind their comparison group.
4An alternative explanation for the increased salience of within-group comparisons may relate to the selective
accessibility model of social comparisons (Mussweiler, 2003). This model predicts that after an initial assessment
of similarity, individuals engage in a selective search, confirming either similarities or differences: Individuals who
initially expect chances of cooperation to be lower in the own group may attend more strongly to unfavorable
within-group comparisons (to confirm their initial expectation of low cooperation). Note that while within-group
comparisons should become more salient, between-group comparisons should not, because information about a
group’s disadvantage also makes it easier to explain why the own group lags behind the comparison group.
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For structurally advantaged groups, information about the structural advantage reflects
positively on their group’s distinctiveness. Consequently, contrary to disadvantaged groups, we
do not expect individuals to focus on personal identity when receiving information about their
advantages.5 Yet, the structural advantage also makes it more difficult to attribute relative
successes to the own group’s positive distinctiveness alone rather than to external
circumstances. Hence, we expect having information about the own group’s structural
advantage to neither positively nor negatively affect reactions to within-group comparisons.
Hypothesis 2 (HIGH): If individuals have information about the structural advantage of
their group, they do not reduce their contribution more strongly in response to unfavorable within-
group comparisons than if they do not have information about their advantage.
In our design, the key manipulation is to provide (or not to provide) information about the
dimension of similarity, and we expect perceptions of similarity to be affected regardless of
whether individuals have information about structural advantages or structural disadvantages.
A wide array of psychological research shows that perceived similarity is one of the most
important moderators of social comparisons (Ames, 2004; Corcoran et al., 2011). At the same
time, there is also considerable evidence suggesting that people use social information in a
self-serving way, especially when the information is highly self-relevant (Kunda, 1990;
Pyszczynski et al., 1985; Taylor et al., 1996). Hence, particularly if individuals have
information about their structural disadvantage – which may potentially threaten positive
distinctiveness – they may use the information in a self-serving way to argue that groups are
not sufficiently similar for contributions to be comparable between groups. Members of
disadvantaged groups may thus feel that contributions are not comparable (and perhaps ought
not to be compared) between groups, and thus they focus more strongly on how they compare
to others in their team, i.e., their personal identity.6,7 We thus hypothesize that the
individual’s (ex-post) perception that contributions are not comparable between groups should
play a key role with regard to how strongly individuals reduce their contributions in response
5This is also in accordance with models of inequity aversion, where disadvantageous inequities are strictly more
aversive than advantageous inequities (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
6This is not to say that individuals who perceive that groups are not comparable also attend less to between-
group comparison information or that their desire to keep up with the comparison group is hampered (this would
contradict Hypothesis 1). Instead, the argument here is that individuals use information about differences between
groups to maintain a positive self-view when focusing on their personal identity.
7Alternatively, individuals who perceive that contributions are not comparable between groups may simply
focus on within-group comparisons as a result of their selective search for differences rather than for similarities.
In this case, we need to assume that the desire for positive group distinctiveness operates regardless of perceived
similarity, so between-group comparisons are not affected by an individual’s perception that contributions are not
comparable between groups.
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to unfavorable within-group comparisons:
Hypothesis 3 (LOW): If they have information about the structural advantage of their group,
individuals who agree more strongly that contributions are not comparable between groups should
reduce their contributions more strongly in response to unfavorable within-group comparisons.
This relation should be stronger in groups that have information about their disadvantage than
in groups that do not have information about their disadvantage.
Self-serving information processing should be present in disadvantaged but not in advantaged
groups because only information about structural disadvantages threatens the own chances of
achieving positive (group) distinctiveness. For a structurally advantaged group, between-group
comparisons are less self-relevant and less threatening because such a group is continuously
ahead of its comparison group. For this reason, we do not expect an individual’s perception
that contributions are not comparable between groups to predict that an individual will focus
on personal identity.
Hypothesis 3 (HIGH): If they have information about the structural advantage of their own
group, individuals who agree more strongly that contributions are not comparable between groups
should not reduce their contributions more strongly in response to unfavorable within-group
comparisons. This relation should be similar in groups that do not have information about their
advantage.
See Table 2.2 for an overview of our hypotheses.
Hypotheses
H1 (LOW) In disadvantaged groups: Contributions increase when the own group lags
behind the comparison group.
H1 (HIGH) In advantaged groups: Contributions increase when the own group lags
behind the comparison group.
H2 (LOW) Contribution reductions in response to unfavorable within-group comparisons:
LOW-INFO > LOW-NOINFO
H2 (HIGH) Contribution reductions in response to unfavorable within-group comparisons:
HIGH-INFO ≈ HIGH-NOINFO
H3 (LOW) Contribution reductions in response to unfavorable within-group comparisons
are stronger for individuals who agree more strongly that contributions are
not comparable between groups: LOW-INFO > LOW-NOINFO
H3 (HIGH) Contribution reductions in response to unfavorable within-group comparisons
are not stronger for individuals who agree more strongly that contributions
are not comparable between groups: HIGH-INFO ≈ HIGH-NOINFO
Table 2.2: Overview of Hypotheses.
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2.4 Results
On the aggregate level, groups with a low return from cooperation (MPCR µ = 0.4, LOW-INFO
and LOW-NOINFO) show a similar downward trend in cooperation over rounds, whereas groups
with a higher return from cooperation (MPCR µ = 0.8, HIGH-INFO and HIGH-NOINFO) show
only a modest downward trend in contributions, so contributions stay at a much higher level
(see also Figure 2.1 and Appendix 2.C for descriptive statistics). This observation is in line
with previous research showing that a higher MPCR leads to higher contributions, even though
free-riding incentives remain unchanged (Isaac and Walker, 1988).
Figure 2.1: Group-aggregated contribution levels across rounds.
To see how information about between-group differences in returns from cooperation affects
the individual underlying decision processes, we first look at group-aggregates to foreshadow
our main results. Namely, individuals who have information about their group’s structural
disadvantage have the tendency to reduce their contributions more strongly when members
of the own group contribute less than the individual (unfavorable within-group comparisons)
compared to individuals who do not have information about their group’s disadvantage (MWU:
LOW-INFO vs. LOW-NOINFO, mean -3.74 vs. -2.83, Z = 1.85, p = .068; cf. Result 2
(LOW)). If we further restrict analyses to individuals who agree at median-levels or above within
their respective treatment that contributions are not comparable between groups, individuals
who have information about their group’s disadvantage show significantly stronger responses
to unfavorable comparisons compared to individuals who do not have information about their
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group’s disadvantage (MWU: LOW-INFO vs. LOW-NOINFO, mean -5.22 vs. -3.34, Z = 2.62,
p = .008, cf. Result 3 (LOW)).8 This is first evidence that having information about structural
disadvantages makes individuals less tolerant of unfavorable within-group comparisons, i.e., of
within-group free-riding. Further, similarity perceptions seem to play a key role in explaining
stronger responses to within-group free-riding.
To investigate formally whether having information about structural differences in
between-group comparisons, i.e., information about having different MPCRs, affects individual
contribution adaptations in repeated within-group cooperation behavior, we estimate several
mixed-effect models. Our models include random effects to account for dependencies between
paired groups and within groups (due to feedback information after each round), and at the
individual level (due to repeated decisions over rounds). We refer the reader to Appendix 2.D
for the equations of our statistical models. As a dependent variable, we analyze the players’
contribution change from the actual to the previous round (Contribution Change). We analyze
behavior for players with MPCR µ = 0.4 and MPCR µ = 0.8 separately. Thus, players who are
statistically compared face equal incentives across treatments. In Table 2.3, we analyze
behavior in groups with MPCR µ = 0.4 by presenting Models L0-L5 (the prefix “L” indicates
MPCR µ = 0.4). In Table 2.5 in the Appendix, we additionally analyze behavior in groups
with MPCR µ = 0.8 by presenting Models H0-H4 (the prefix “H” indicates MPCR µ = 0.8)
analogously to Models L0-L4.
Our models account for behavioral patterns known from the literature by estimating different
fixed effects. As a measure of conditional cooperation (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001), we use a
dummy variable indicating whether average contributions by group members were lower than
an individual’s contribution in the preceding round (Unfavorable Comparison).9 To measure
the impact of between-group comparisons (e.g., Böhm et al., 2013), we use a dummy variable
indicating whether contributions in the preceding round in the own group were lower than in
the comparison group (Group Behind Comparison Group).10 Moreover, our models include
8Re-estimating this test for individuals who agree at below median-levels in their respective treatment that
contributions are not comparable between groups yields no significant differences to individuals in disadvantaged
groups who do not have information about their disadvantages (MWU: LOW-INFO vs. LOW-NOINFO, mean
-3.26 vs. -2.99, Z = 0.68, p = .529).
9Please note that individuals who contribute zero to the public good can avoid receiving an unfavorable
within-group comparison. This raises a selection issue which might affect our coefficient estimates for Unfavorable
Comparison. If we exclude individuals who contribute zero from our analysis, however, our coefficient estimates
for Unfavorable Comparison are barely affected.
10We do not include a variable Group Ahead Comparison Group, since this variable is almost perfectly collinear
with Group Behind Comparison Group (Spearman’s ρ = -.94). There are only 3 out of 240 periods in LOW-INFO
groups and 3 out of 240 in LOW-NOINFO groups where average contributions are the same as for the group with
higher MPCR (SAME-INFO: 16/240, SAME-NOINFO: 5/240).
2.4. RESULTS 17
treatment dummies to address unexplained heterogeneity between treatments (with LOW-INFO
as the reference category in Models L0-L5; with HIGH-INFO as the reference category in Models
H0-H4). We also include Round as a time trend indicator.
In Models L0 and H0, we include only treatment dummies and the variable Group Behind
Comparison Group to estimate the ‘full’ effect of between-group comparisons on contributions. In
contrast, Models L1 and H1 also control for conditional cooperation and a time trend. Consistent
with studies investigating between-group comparisons in public goods games, we find evidence
for the motivating force of positive group distinctiveness, especially in structurally disadvantaged
groups (Hypothesis 1 (LOW)).
Result 1 (LOW): If the own group is structurally disadvantaged, individuals increase their
contributions when lagging behind the comparison group (βGroup Behind Comparison Group, Model
L0, p < .001, Models L1-L2, p-values < .10, Models L3-L4, p-values < .05, Model L5, p <
.001).
Result 1 (HIGH): If the own group is structurally advantaged, individuals do not
systematically increase their contributions when lagging behind the comparison group
(βGroup Behind Comparison Group, Model H0, p < .10, Models H1-H4, p-values > .10).11
In Models L2 and L3, we analyze how the information about the structural disadvantage,
i.e., about having a lower MPCR, changes players’ reactions to within-group behavior. We
extend Model L1 by adding interactions between Unfavorable Comparison and treatment
dummies. As before, we use LOW-INFO as a reference group, so the coefficient
βUnfavorable Comparison (without treatment interactions) shows how individuals in LOW-INFO
change their contributions in response to unfavorable within-group comparisons. The
treatment interactions, e.g., βUnfavorable Comparison*LOW-NOINFO, further reveal how responses to
unfavorable within-group comparisons in LOW-INFO differ compared to other treatments, e.g.,
LOW-NOINFO. Positively signed interaction coefficients indicate that reductions in response
to unfavorable within-group comparisons are stronger in LOW-INFO compared to the other
treatments. In Model L3, we additionally include a variable indicating whether other group
members contributed more on average than the individual in the preceding round (Favorable
Comparison). We include this variable because it can be interpreted as measuring positive
11We find partial support for Hypothesis 1 (HIGH), when we extend our models by the variable Comparison
Group Minus Group measuring the continuous difference between the comparison groups’ and the own group’s
average contribution (see Table 2.7 and 2.8 in the Appendix, Models L1’-L4’ and H1’-H4’). In particular, we
observe that for individuals in advantaged groups, contributions increase as between-group differences increase
(βComparison Group Minus Group, Models H1’- H4’, all p-values < .05).
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reciprocity, i.e., responses from reciprocating free-riders, while Unfavorable Comparison can be
interpreted as measuring negative reciprocity, i.e., responses to others’ free-riding behavior.12
We conduct analagous analyses for structurally advantaged players in Models H2 and H3.
Consistent with our central hypothesis (Hypothesis 2 LOW), individuals’ sensitivity to
unfavorable within-group comparisons increases if they have information about their own
group’s disadvantage, but not if they have information about their own group’s advantage
(Hypothesis 2 HIGH):
Result 2 (LOW): Individuals who have information about their group’s structural disadvantage
(LOW-INFO) reduce their contributions considerably more strongly in response to unfavorable
within-group comparisons (by 39%, Model L3) than individuals who do not have information
about their disadvantage (LOW-NOINFO) (βUnfavorable Comparison*LOW-NOINFO, Models L2-L3,
p-values < .01).
Result 2 (HIGH): Individuals who have information about their group’s structural advantage
(HIGH-INFO) do not reduce their contributions significantly more strongly than individuals
who do not have information about their advantage (HIGH-NOINFO)
(βUnfavorable Comparison*LOW-NOINFO, Models H2-H4, p-values > .10).
This suggests that particularly if individuals have information about their structural
disadvantage, they become less tolerant of within-group free-riding, so that within-group
cooperation becomes more fragile. Figure 2.2 plots the cumulative distribution of individuals’
average contribution reductions in response to unfavorable within-group comparisons
separately for the treatments LOW-INFO and LOW-NOINFO. The figure supports Result 2
(LOW) by showing that harsh reactions to unfavorable within-group comparisons are more
frequent in LOW-INFO than in LOW-NOINFO. Importantly, contribution reductions in
response to unfavorable within-group comparisons are also stronger in LOW-INFO than in
treatments without structural differences, regardless of whether individuals have information
(LOW-INFO vs. SAME-INFO: βUnfavorable Comparison*SAME-INFO, Models L2-L3, p-values < .05,
reduction difference 25% in Model L3) or do not have information about facing the same
MPCR (LOW-INFO vs. SAME-NOINFO: βUnfavorable Comparison*SAME-NOINFO, Models L2-L3,
p-values < .01, reduction difference 33% in Model L3).
12Individuals contributed the same as the group average in 15% of the cases in LOW-INFO (LOW-NOINFO:
11%, SAME-INFO: 19%, SAME-NOINFO: 17%; HIGH-INFO: 9%; HIGH-NOINFO: 15%), so collinearity
between Favorable Comparison and Unfavorable Comparison is unproblematic (Spearman’s ρ = -.72). Favorable
Comparison significantly increases model fit, so we retain it in Models L4-L5. Dropping it does not change
significance patterns in ways affecting our results.
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Contribution Change
(L0) (L1) (L2) (L3) (L4) (L5)
LOW-NOINFO 0.004 0.120 −0.320 −0.377 −0.493 −1.038
(0.225) (0.218) (0.274) (0.262) (0.318) (0.700)
SAME-INFO 0.210 0.032 −0.305 −0.242 −0.322 −0.811
(0.197) (0.192) (0.237) (0.227) (0.283) (0.633)
SAME-NOINFO 0.221 0.124 −0.290 −0.238 −0.298 −0.982
(0.198) (0.191) (0.238) (0.228) (0.284) (0.632)
Group behind Comparison Group 0.736**** 0.217∗ 0.223∗ 0.265∗∗ 0.278∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.129) (0.130) (0.127) (0.127) (0.162)
Round −0.038∗∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Unfavorable Comparison −4.103∗∗∗∗ −4.970∗∗∗∗ −4.224∗∗∗∗ −3.908∗∗∗∗ −4.263∗∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.302) (0.331) (0.385) (0.914)
Unfavorable Comparison*LOW-NOINFO 1.154∗∗∗ 1.195∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗ 0.872
(0.424) (0.422) (0.484) (1.045)
Unfavorable Comparison*SAME-INFO 0.903∗∗ 0.855∗∗ 0.620 0.443
(0.370) (0.368) (0.419) (0.934)
Unfavorable Comparison*SAME-NOINFO 1.101∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗ 0.719∗ 0.995
(0.369) (0.367) (0.418) (0.935)
Favorable Comparison 0.906∗∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.176) (0.182)
Not Comparable −0.037 0.015
(0.108) (0.127)
Not Comparable*LOW-NOINFO −0.049 −0.082
(0.135) (0.162)
Not Comparable*SAME-INFO −0.047 −0.139
(0.125) (0.145)
Not Comparable*SAME-NOINFO 0.020 −0.029
(0.127) (0.150)
Unfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable −0.412∗∗∗ −0.743∗∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.199)
Unfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable* 0.570∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
LOW-NOINFO (0.210) (0.266)
Unfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable* 0.693∗∗∗∗ 1.111∗∗∗∗
SAME-INFO (0.189) (0.230)
Unfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable* 0.398∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗
SAME-NOINFO (0.190) (0.238)
Interactions with other questionnaire variables are omitted for brevity in this table.
Constant -1.031∗∗∗∗ 1.307∗∗∗∗ 1.629∗∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗ 0.792∗∗ 1.452∗∗
(0.187) (0.228) (0.251) (0.301) (0.344) (0.663)
Observations 5,472 5,472 5,472 5,472 5,472 5,472
Log Likelihood −16,356 −15,870 −15,865 −15,852 −15,840 −15,902
Model Fit Increase (L-Ratio: X2) - 970.7∗∗∗∗ 10.4∗∗ 26.1∗∗∗ 24.4∗∗∗ 176.6∗∗∗∗
∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.3: Mixed-effects models predicting contribution change. Clustering is at the level of
a pair-of-groups, the group, and the individual. LOW-INFO is the reference category. In Models L1-
L5, the model fit does not significantly increase by adding interactions between treatment dummies and
Favorable Comparison (e.g., L-Ratio test against Model L3, X2(3) = 0.26, p = 0.964) or Group Behind
Comparison Group (e.g., L-Ratio test against Model L3, X2(3) = 1.22, p = 0.748). See Appendix Table
2.6, for the corresponding Models L3a and L3b.
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative distribution of individual contribution change in response to unfavorable within-
group comparisons.
In Models L4 and L5, we investigate whether information about structural disadvantages
has a stronger effect on participants who agree that contributions are not comparable between
groups (Not Comparable). We extend Model L3 by interacting Not Comparable with
Unfavorable Comparison and treatment dummies. As before, we use LOW-INFO as a reference
group, so the coefficient βUnfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable reveals – for the treatment
LOW-INFO – the relation between responses to unfavorable within-group comparisons and an
individual’s agreement that contributions are not comparable between groups. The treatment
interactions, e.g., βUnfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable*LOW-NOINFO, further reveal how this
relation differs from LOW-INFO in other treatments. We repeat analogous analyses in Model
H4 for advantaged groups. We find support for Hypothesis 3 (LOW):
Result 3 (LOW): Individuals who agree more strongly that contributions are not comparable
between groups also reduce their contributions more strongly (in LOW-INFO,
βUnfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable, Models L4-L5, p-values < .001) and they reduce their
contributions more strongly if they have information about their structural disadvantage than if
they do not have this information (LOW-NOINFO, βUnfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable*
LOW-NOINFO, Models L4-L5, p < .01).
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Contrary to disadvantaged groups, we find that the perception that contributions are not
comparable between groups does not predict reductions in response to unfavorable within-group
comparisons in advantaged groups, which supports Hypothesis 3 (HIGH):
Result 3 (HIGH): Individuals in structurally advantaged groups who agree more strongly that
contributions are not comparable between groups do not reduce their contributions more strongly
in response to unfavorable within-group comparisons, regardless of whether they have
information or do not have information about their structural advantage (e.g.,
βUnfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable, Model H4, p > .50).
Figure 2.3 corroborates Result 3 (LOW) by showing that individuals with above-median
(modal) agreement (Not Comparable: Median = 7) display much harsher reactions to
unfavorable within-group comparisons than those below the median. Moreover, agreeing that
contributions are not comparable between groups also affects contribution reductions more
strongly in LOW-INFO than in treatments without structural differences, regardless of whether
individuals have information (SAME-INFO, βUnfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable*SAME-INFO,
Model L4-L5, p < .05) or do not have information about facing the same MPCR
(SAME-NOINFO, βUnfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable*SAME-NOINFO, Model L4-L5, p < .001).
Figure 2.4 in the Appendix shows the distribution of the variable Not Comparable for groups
with a lower MPCR (LOW-INFO, LOW-NOINFO, SAME-INFO, SAME-NOINFO) and groups
with a higher MPCR (HIGH-INFO and HIGH-NOINFO). Interestingly, in LOW-INFO the
mode of the variable Not Comparable is 7, whereas in LOW-NOINFO the mode of the variable
Not Comparable is 1. For HIGH-INFO and HIGH-NOINFO groups, there is a similar but less
pronounced shift in distributions. This suggests that the provision of information about
structural differences greatly changes players’ perceptions that contributions are not
comparable between groups. For an overview of descriptive questionnaire data for each
treatment, we refer the reader to Appendix 2.G.
In Model L5, we account for the multiple measures in our questionnaire, which makes it
more likely for differences to be detected by chance (multiple comparisons). We interact each of
the questionnaire measures with Unfavorable Comparison and treatment dummies. For each
questionnaire measure, we can thus infer how responses to unfavorable within-group
comparisons depend on the questionnaire measure and how this relation differs from
LOW-INFO in other treatments. To obtain adjusted p-values for the 42 possible comparisons
(14 questionnaire measures x 3 control treatments), we apply a step-down Dunnett procedure.
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative distribution of individuals’ contribution change in response to unfavorable
within-group comparisons conditional on whether individuals agree that contributions of groups are not
comparable between groups (Not Comparable).
The finding from Result 3 (LOW) (i.e., that an individual’s agreement that contributions are
not comparable between groups explains why this individual reacts more harshly to unfavorable
comparisons in LOW-INFO but not in LOW-NOINFO) is robust to this very conservative
procedure at a 10% level (LOW-NOINFO, βUnfavorableComparison*Not Comparable*LOW-NOINFO,
adjusted p = .092, SAME-NOINFO, βUnfavorableComparison*Not Comparable*SAME-INFO, adjusted p
= .062, SAME-INFO, βUnfavorableComparison*Not Comparable*SAME-NOINFO, adjusted p < .001).
While there are no robust interaction effects for other questionnaire measures, their
assessment still yields interesting insights. By and large, emotional reactions and perceptions in
the decision situation affect contribution adaptations in expected directions: Individuals
experiencing anger (joy) over their group’s poor (good) relative performance decrease (increase)
their contributions more strongly (βAnger = -0.300, βJoy = 0.318, both p-values < .05).
Moreover, individuals who perceive the decision situation as a between-group comparison show
harsher contributions reductions in response to unfavorable within-group comparisons
(βUnfavorable Comparison*Between-Group Comparison = -0.306, p < .10). Perhaps most interestingly,
individuals in LOW-INFO who report more joy when their group lies ahead reduce their
contribution more strongly in response to unfavorable within-group comparisons (Model L5,
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LOW-INFO as reference group, βUnfavorable Comparison*Joy = -0.466, p < .10) in comparison to
individuals reporting more joy in LOW-NOINFO, SAME-INFO and SAME-NOINFO
(βUnfavorable Comparison*Joy*LOW-NOINFO = 0.627, βUnfavorable Comparison*Joy*LOW-NOINFO = 0.720,
βUnfavorable Comparison*Joy*LOW-NOINFO = 0.582, all p-values < .10). This suggests that
individuals in LOW-INFO, who find the between-group comparison to be more self-relevant,
react more harshly to free-riding, potentially in order to motivate group members to ‘stand
together’.
2.5 Discussion
We investigate a pervasive and practically relevant condition of economic peer effects:
comparisons between structurally different groups. Although we confirm the general pattern
that the desire to avoid ‘lagging behind’ a comparison group motivates within-group
cooperation in the public goods game, we report important limitations of between-group
comparisons for fostering within-group cooperation. That is, if group members have
information about the own group’s structural disadvantage, they are more sensitive to how well
their group ‘stands together’. Compared to individuals who do not have information about
their group’s disadvantage, they reduce their contributions more strongly in response to
unfavorable within-group comparisons.
Our data provide some hints on the underlying mechanism. In particular, the extent to
which individuals agree that contributions are not comparable between groups predicts why
some individuals react more harshly than others when faced with unfavorable within-group
comparisons in disadvantaged groups. Notably, this finding is in line with the idea that
individuals often use social comparison information in a self-serving way (Kunda, 1990;
Pyszczynski et al., 1985; Taylor et al., 1996): For individuals in disadvantaged groups, the
between-group comparison is highly self-relevant, because it potentially threatens the own
group’s positive distinctiveness, which is not the case for advantaged groups. In line with this,
perceptions that contributions are not comparable between groups predict contribution
reductions in response to unfavorable within-group comparisons for individuals who have
information about their groups’s disadvantages, but not for individuals who have information
about their group’s advantages. We also find some suggestive evidence that greater joy (when
the own group lies ahead) predicts harsher contribution reductions in response to unfavorable
comparisons, but again only for individuals who have information about their group’s
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disadvantages. Harsher contribution reductions in response to unfavorable comparisons might
thus partly be responses from group members who desire to have the group ‘standing together’
and thereby increasing positive group distinctiveness.13,14
A limitation in identifying the psychological mechanism is that we rely on the individual’s
ex-post perception that contributions are not comparable between groups. This perception may
be subject to ex-post rationalization after playing the game. However, we argue that both
individuals who have information about their group’s disadvantage and individuals who do not
have this information experience their own group continuously making lower contributions than
the comparison group. Consequently, individuals in both treatments could ex-post rationalize
that the groups are different and are thus not comparable. Yet, since information about
differences is provided before the game starts for individuals who have information, but not for
those who do not have information, it is most likely that receiving information about
differences affected individuals’ initial perceptions of similarity and influenced their subsequent
comparison processes.
An important caveat in interpreting our results relates to income differences associated with
structural disadvantages: Providing information about lower returns from cooperation in one
group relative to a comparison group necessarily implies that the former will earn less than
the latter for a given level of contributions. From an inequity aversion perspective (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999), information about income differences stemming from different returns from
cooperation should primarily affect how individuals perceive disadvantageous income differences
stemming from between-group comparisons, but not how they perceive disadvantageous income
differences stemming from within-group comparisons. This is however not supported by our
data. Further, not only information about structural disadvantages but also information about
structural advantages should make income differences between groups more aversive, which is
also not supported by our data. From a psychological perspective, we think that it is nonetheless
13Interestingly, the selective accessibility model (Mussweiler, 2003) also predicts that perceived similarity
crucially moderates how individuals repond to comparison information. In this model, individuals initially assess
whether a comparison standard is similar or not and then they selectively search for information confirming
either similarities or differences. Analogously, in our experiment, receiving information about differing returns
from cooperation may induce a selective focus on what differentiates the own group from the other group, so
individuals become more sensitive to (unfavorable) within-group comparisons. Conversely, advantaged groups
should also respond to favorable comparisons more positively. We do not observe such a boost, so we prefer a
motivational explanation here.
14An alternative explanation might relate to trust. Inequities due to differences in returns from cooperation
may reduce trust and thus explain stronger contribution reductions (Anderson et al., 2008; Greiner et al.,
2012). Our questionnaire measure that comes closest to ‘trust’ is a group’s perceived “general willingness to
contribute”. Yet, contribution reductions in response to unfavorable comparisons do not differ depending on an
individual’s score on this measure between treatments (Model L5, βUnfavorable Comparison*OwnGroupCoop, p >.10,
βUnfavorable Comparison*OwnGroupCoop*LOW-NOINFO, p >.10).
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impossible to disentangle the effects of information about different returns from cooperation from
the effects of information about income differences. It may well be that perceptions of income
differences, not lower returns from cooperation, threaten an individual’s feeling of positive group
distinctiveness and thus induce a focus on personal identity. For our hypotheses, however, it
does not matter whether perceptions of income differences or perceptions of different returns
from cooperation drive the results. Instead, the decisive factor is whether or not being in a
group with lower returns from cooperation threatens positive feelings of group distinctiveness.
Our findings offer a broad scope for extensions. Future research might assess whether
comparisons to structurally different groups are unpleasant per se, e.g., by letting individuals
choose between either a similar or a different comparison group. Further research could also
explore individuals’ motivations or willingness-to-pay for switching to a group which faces
better conditions than the own group. More broadly, we believe that comparisons to different
others have received too little attention in the study of economic peer effects. Yet, research in
this direction could identify important nonlinearities by delineating, for example, when people
contrast away from, rather than conform with, unethical peers.
2.6 Conclusion
If a comparison group is perceived to be different in terms of returns from cooperation, between-
group comparisons may produce undesirable effects of rendering cooperation more fragile. This
study highlights perceived similarity as a previously neglected psychological factor of economic
peer effects between teams, which may be relevant for peer effects in many economic contexts.
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Appendices
2.A Experimental instructions
Please note that instructions for the treatments LOW-INFO and LOW-NOINFO are included
for illustration purposes. Instructions for other treatments and original, untranslated German
instructions are available from the authors upon request.
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Treatment LOW-INFO
General information
Assignment of groups
• Each participant in the experiment will be randomly assigned to either a blue group or
a green group. Both groups will consist of four participants each.
• One blue group and one green group will be randomly assigned to each other.
• You will not know who belongs to your group or who belongs to the other group.
• The partitioning and the assignment of groups will remain unchanged over the course of
the entire experiment. This means that the members of your group as well as the members
of the other group which will be assigned to your group are the same persons during the
entire experiment.
Rounds
• The experiment consists of 20 rounds and the experiment is different for members of the
blue and the green groups.
• Each round has the following stages:
– At the beginning of each round, each participant receives an endowment of 20 points.
– Each participant has the possibility to contribute an integer amount of points
between 0 and 20 to their own group project. Points which a participant does
not contribute to the group project will be kept by that participant.
– Each participant of the own group profits from each contribution to the own
group project.
– For members of the blue group: Each point which is contributed to the project by
members of the own group will be multiplied by 3.2 and redistributed equally
among all participants of the own group. Accordingly, each of the four
participants of the own group receives 0.8 points from each point, which
has been contributed by any member of the own group.
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– For members of the green group: Each point which is contributed to the project
by members of the own group will bemultiplied by 1.6 and redistributed equally
among all participants of the own group. Accordingly, each of the four
participants of the own group receives 0.4 points from each point, which
was contributed by any member of the own group.
– Points which are not contributed to the group project profit only the
participant proper.
The earnings for members of blue groups are calculated as follows:
Earnings for members of the blue group
= kept points + 0.8 x sum of all contributions of all members of the blue group to the
blue group‘s project
The earnings for members of green groups are calculated as follows:
Earnings for members of the green group
= kept points + 0.4 x sum of all contributions of all members of the green group to
the green group‘s project
Example:
Group Blue Green
Member B1 B2 B3 B4 G1 G2 G3 G4
Endowment 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Contribution to the
project
0 20 16 8 16 8 4 20
Sum of contributions
Earnings from the
project
44
0,8 x 44 = 35.2
48
0,4 x 48 = 19.2
Kept 20 0 4 12 4 12 16 0
Earnings 55.2 35.2 39.2 47.2 23.2 31.2 35.2 19.2
Information about the contributions to the project
After completion of each contribution decision you receive the following information:
2.A. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 29
• Average contributions of members of the green group to the green group’s project
• Average contributions of members of the blue group to the blue group’s project
• Your earnings in the round
Payment
• Upon completion of the 20 decision rounds, you will be informed about your final earnings,
i.e., the sum of the 20 per-round earnings, on your computer screen.
• All earned points will be converted and paid in cash according to the following exchange
rate: 10 points = 0.25 Euro.
• Afterwards, each participant will be called separately and earnings will be paid out in
private and anonymously. You will not find out about the earnings of other participants;
likewise, other participants will not find out about your earnings.
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Treatment LOW-NOINFO
General information
Assignment of groups
• Each participant in the experiment will be randomly assigned to either a blue group or
a green group. Both groups consist of four participants each.
• One blue group and one green group will be randomly assigned to each other.
• You will not know who belongs to your group or who belongs to the other group.
• The partitioning and the assignment of groups will remain unchanged over the course of
the entire experiment. This means that the members of your group as well as the members
of the other group which will be assigned to your group are the same persons during the
entire experiment.
Rounds
• The experiment consists of 20 rounds.
• Each round has the following stages:
– At the beginning of each round, each participant receives an endowment of 20
points.
– Each participant has the possibility to contribute an integer amount of points
between 0 and 20 to their own group project. Points which a participant does
not contribute to the group project will be kept by that participant.
– Each participant of the own group profits from each contribution to the own
group project.
– More precisely: Each point, which is contributed to the project by members of
the own group will be multiplied by 1.6 and redistributed equally among all
participants of the own group. Accordingly, each of the four participants
of the own group receives 0.4 points from each point, which has been
contributed by any member of the own group.
– Points which are not contributed to the group project profit only the
participant proper.
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The earnings for members of your group are calculated as follows:
Earnings for members of your group
= kept points + 0.4 x sum of all contributions of all members of your group to the
group’s project
Example:
Group Green Blue
Member G1 G2 G3 G4 B1 B2 B3 B4
Endowment 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Contribution to the
project
0 20 16 8 16 8 4 20
Sum of contributions 44 48
Kept 20 0 4 12 4 12 16 0
Each member of the green group receives earnings from the green group’s project which amount
to 0.4 x 44 = 17.6 points.
Member G1 earns 20+17.6=37.6 points.
Member G3 earns 4+17.6=21.6 points.
Information about the contributions to the project
After completion of each contribution decision you receive the following information:
• Average contributions of members of the green group to the green group’s project
• Average contributions of members of the blue group to the blue group’s project
• Your earnings in the round
Payment
• Upon completion of the 20 decision rounds, you will be informed about your final earnings,
the sum of the 20 per-round earnings, on your computer screen.
• All earned points will be converted and paid in cash according to the following exchange
rate: 10 points = 0.25 Euro.
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• Afterwards, every participant will be called separately and earnings will be paid in private
and anonymously. You will not find out about the earnings of other participants; likewise,
other participants will not find out about your earnings.
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2.B Post-experimental questionnaire
[Open questions]
1. Please explain the motives of your investment decisions in the experiment.
2. Did the contributions of your group differ from the contributions of the other group? If
the answer is yes, how do you explain these differences?
[Behavioral motivations]
Please indicate to what extent the following motives played a role in your investment decisions.
Please read the statements thoroughly and indicate to what extent you agree or disagree. You
choose between 1 “I strongly disagree" and 7 “I agree absolutely".
[Seven-point scales were used for each statement:]
I strongly disagree [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] I strongly agree
1. I wanted to earn as much as possible, independent of what others in my group were earning.
2. I wanted to earn more than my group members.
3. I wanted all of my group members to earn as much as possible, regardless of what members
of the other group earn.
4. I wanted my group to earn more than the other group.
5. I took the investment decisions of the other group as an orientation for my own investments.
6. I interpreted the situation as a competition between groups.
[Group identity elicitation]
1. I feel connected to the other members of my group.
2. I identify as a member of my group.
3. I am happy to be part of my group.
[Interaction situation]
1. I was angry when my group contributed less to the group project than members of the
other group did to their group project.
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2. I was happy when my group contributed less to the group project than members of the
other group did to their group project.
3. I was indifferent about whether my group contributed less to the group project than
members of the other group did to their group project.
4. The other group has contributed more to its group project than my own group has to its
group project.
5. The other group faced better conditions for contributing to its group project than my
group.
6. The contributions of the other group are not comparable to the contributions in my group.
7. In my group, the general willingness to contribute was high.
8. In the other group, the general willingness to contribute was high.
[Demographic questions]
1. Please indicate your age.
2. Please indicate your gender.
3. If you are a student, please indicate your subject.
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2.C Descriptive statistics
Table 2.4 shows an outline of descriptive statistics. Note that Result 2 (LOW), the higher
sensitivity to within-group comparisons in LOW-INFO is also evident from this table: The
contribution change in response to unfavorable within-group comparisons is particularly large in
treatment LOW-INFO, even when we do not account for behavioral patterns known from the
literature. Contribution levels are similar across treatments with MPCR µ = 0.4 and show the
usual decline in contributions known from the literature.
No difference Structural difference
SAME- SAME- LOW- HIGH- LOW- HIGH-
NOINFO INFO NOINFO NOINFO INFO INFO
First round 10.5 9.38 9.96 12.96 10.52 11.21
(7.17) (6.39) (6.65) (6.72) (7.64) (6.77)
Round 1-10 7.57 5.89 7.06 11.75 7.33 10.45
(4.79) (4.09) (4.85) (5.23) (5.15) (5.51)
Round 11-20 4.56 2.54 3.36 9.59 3.69 8.72
(2.72) (2.23) (2.88) (4.29) (2.99) (4.77)
Overall 6.07 4.22 5.21 10.67 5.51 9.57
(3.76) (3.16) (3.86) (4.76) (4.07) (5.14)
Contribution -0.46 -0.47 -0.44 -0.38 -0.50 -0.23
Change (4.44) (4.21) (4.79) (3.69) (5.42) (4.78)
Change: Unfavorable -2.79 -3.34 -2.83 -2.05 -3.74 -2.02
Comparisons (1.28) (1.51) (1.29) (1.32) (1.43) (1.06)
Change: Favorable 1.31 1.27 1.20 1.93 1.52 1.83
Comparisons (1.00) (0.77) (0.61) (1.73) (0.93) (1.12)
Table 2.4: Group-aggregated means and standard deviations in parentheses by treatment.
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2.D Statistical model equations
We use the function lmer in R to estimate our models. The matrix form of our models reads,
y = Xβ + Zb + e,
b ∼ N (0,Σ),
Σ = σ2ΛθΛ
>
θ ,
(2.1)
where y is the n-dimensional dependent variable, n is the number of observations, β is a m-
dimensional fixed effects vector, X is an n x m model matrix, which differs on the specified
model, and e is the n-dimensional error vector with e ∼ N (0, σ2In). Z is the n x q model
matrix for the q-dimensional random effects variable, Σθ is a symmetric variance-covariance
matrix generated by the relative covariance factor, Λθ, which is a q x q block diagonal matrix
depending on the variance component parameter θ. As random effects, we consider nested
random intercepts, so the random effects variable is the vector b = (bp, bpg, bpgi), where p indicates
the pair of groups, g the group, and i the individual. As regards clustering of standard errors,
i.e., the variance-covariance matrix of the random intercepts Λθ, we do not specify a particular
correlation structure, but let the function lmer estimate correlations using its default procedure
(similar to exchangeable). If we directly specify an explicit variance-covariance structure (e.g.,
exchangeable, AR(1)) or assume random slopes for the variable Round, our significance patterns
remain unchanged.
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Our dependent variabe y is the Contribution Change and defined as cp,g,i,t−cp,g,i,t−1, where
cp,g,i,t is the contribution in round t of individual i in group g in the pair of groups p. The
variable xUnfavorable Comparisonpgit , for example, equals 1 if cp,g,i,t−1 − c¯p,g,−i,t−1 > 0 and equals 0
otherwise, where c¯p,g,−i,t−1 is the mean contribution of the three other members of i’s group in
round t− 1.
For the sake of brevity, we do not write out equations for every estimated model, but focus
on L1-L4. Model L1 is
ypgit =β0 + xRoundpβRound + xUnfavorable ComparisonpgitβUnfavorable Comparison+
xLOW-NOINFOpβLOW-NOINFO + xSAME-INFOpβSAME-INFO + xSAME-NOINFOpβSAME-NOINFO+
xGroup behind Comparison GrouppgitβGroup behind Comparison Group+
zpbp + zpgbpg + zpgibpgi + epgit.
(2.2)
The model L2 is
ypgit =β0 + xRoundpβRound+
xLOW-NOINFOpβLOW-NOINFO+
xSAME-INFOpβSAME-INFO+
xSAME-NOINFOpβSAME-NOINFO+
xUnfavorable ComparisonpgitβUnfavorable Comparison+
xGroup behind Comparison GrouppgitβGroup behind Comparison Group+
xUnfavorable Comparisonpgit ∗ xLOW-NOINFOpgβUnfavorable Comparison*LOW-NOINFO+
xUnfavorable Comparisonpgit ∗ xSAME-INFOpβUnfavorable Comparison*SAME-INFO+
xUnfavorable Comparisonpgit ∗ xSAME-NOINFOpgβUnfavorable Comparison*SAME-NOINFO+
zpbp + zpgbpg + zpgibpgi + epgit.
(2.3)
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The model L3 is
ypgit =β0 + xRoundpβRound+
xLOW-NOINFOpβLOW-NOINFO+
xSAME-INFOpβSAME-INFO+
xSAME-NOINFOpβSAME-NOINFO+
xUnfavorable ComparisonpgitβUnfavorable Comparison+
xFavorable ComparisonpgitβFavorable Comparison+
xGroup behind Comparison GrouppgitβGroup behind Comparison Group+
xUnfavorable ComparisonpgitxLOW-NOINFOpgβUnfavorable Comparison*LOW-NOINFO+
xUnfavorable ComparisonpgitxSAME-INFOpβUnfavorable Comparison*SAME-INFO+
xUnfavorable ComparisonpgitxSAME-NOINFOpgβUnfavorable Comparison*SAME-NOINFO+
zpbp + zpgbpg + zpgibpgi + epgit.
(2.4)
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The model L4 also includes data of the questionnaire variable xNotComparable which we
center at the grand mean, so it equals xraw-Not Comparablepgi − x¯Not Comparable, where
raw − NotComparable is the raw response data in {1,2,...,7}. In model L5, we also center all
questionnaire variables at their grand mean.
The model L4 is
ypgit =β0 + xRoundpβRound+
xLOW-NOINFOpgβLOW-NOINFO+
xSAME-INFOpβSAME-INFO+
xSAME-NOINFOpβSAME-NOINFO+
xUnfavorable ComparisonpgitβUnfavorable Comparison+
xFavorable ComparisonpgitβFavorable Comparison+
xGroup behind Comparison GrouppgitβGroup behind Comparison Group+
xNot ComparablepgiβNot Comparable+
xUnfav. Comparisonpgit ∗ xLOW-NOINFOpgβUnfav. Comparison*LOW-NOINFO+
xUnfav. Comparisonpgit ∗ xSAME-INFOpβUnfav. Comparison*SAME-INFO+
xUnfav. ComparisonpgitxLOW-NOINFOpgxNot Comparablepgi
βUnfav. Comparison*LOW-NOINFO*Not Comparable+
xUnfav. ComparisonpgitxSAME-INFOpxNot Comparablepgi
βUnfav. Comparison*SAME-INFO*Not Comparable+
xUnfav. ComparisonpgitxSAME-NOINFOpgxNot Comparablepgi
βUnfav. Comparison*SAME-NOINFO*Not Comparable+
zpbp + zpgbpg + zpgibpgi + epgit.
(2.5)
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2.E Mixed-effect models H0-H4 with MPCR µ = 0.8
We plot the respective models in Table 2.5. For a description of the models, please see the section
"Results" in the main text.
Dependent variable:
Contribution change
(H0) (H1) (H2) (H3) (H4)
Round −0.056∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗ −0.050∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Unfavorable Comparison −3.358∗∗∗∗ −3.440∗∗∗∗ −2.359∗∗∗∗ −2.477∗∗∗∗
(0.220) (0.309) (0.449) (0.477)
HIGH-NOINFO −0.111 −0.210 −0.282 −0.139 −0.102
(0.232) (0.218) (0.291) (0.316) (0.326)
Not Comparable 0.061
(0.111)
Group behind Comparison Group 0.457∗ 0.376 0.378 0.314 0.336
(0.276) (0.260) (0.260) (0.273) (0.274)
Favorable Comparison 1.667∗∗∗∗ 1.642∗∗∗∗
(0.374) (0.378)
Unfavorable Comparison*HIGH-NOINFO 0.165 0.040 0.157
(0.438) (0.456) (0.486)
Unfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable 0.049
(0.166)
Not Comparable*HIGH-NOINFO −0.095
(0.148)
Unfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable*HIGH-NOINFO 0.117
(0.228)
Constant −0.359∗∗ 1.800∗∗∗∗ 1.836∗∗∗∗ 0.556 0.526
(0.180) (0.305) (0.320) (0.460) (0.463)
Observations 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824
Log Likelihood −5,498.383 −5,387.234 −5,387.163 −5,377.743 −5,376.648
Akaike Inf. Crit. 11,010.760 10,792.470 10,794.330 10,777.490 10,783.300
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 11,049.330 10,842.050 10,849.410 10,838.080 10,865.930
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.5: Mixed-effects models showing Result 1-3 (HIGH) from the main text.
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2.F Additional analyses
In the main text, we present mixed-effect models with random intercepts that account for
dependencies between pairs of groups, groups, and individuals. In Table 2.6, we extend Model
L3 from the main text (replotted here from Table 2.3 for convenience) by either interacting
treatment dummies and Group behind Comparison Group (Model L3a) or interacting treatment
dummies and Favorable Comparison (Model L3b). Coefficients for the interactions between
Unfavorable Comparison and treatment dummies remain qualitatively and quantitatively
robust and significantly different from the reference category LOW-INFO, thus corroborating
Result 2 in the main text. Note that Model L3b is plagued by multicollinearity, which inflates
variance: A maximum variance inflation factor (max VIF ) larger than 10 is strongly indicative
of multicollinearity (here, max VIF (Model L3b) = 12.91 > 10, max VIF (Model L3) and max
VIF (Model L3a) < 10). We extend Models L1-L4 and H1-H4 from the main text by the
variable Comparison Group Minus Group in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8. These extensions show
that how far a group is behind the comparison group is an important predictor of
contributions, but leaves the significance patterns of other variables virtually unchanged.
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Dependent variable:
Contribution Change
(L3) (L3a) (L3b)
Round −0.023∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.023∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
LOW-NOINFO −0.377 −0.484 −0.375
(0.263) (0.471) (0.565)
SAME-INFO −0.242 0.204 −0.395
(0.227) (0.352) (0.434)
SAME-NOINFO −0.238 0.191 −0.378
(0.228) (0.353) (0.439)
Unfavorable Comparison −4.224∗∗∗ −4.172∗∗∗ −4.332∗∗∗
(0.331) (0.333) (0.440)
Group behind Comparison Group 0.265∗∗ 0.714∗∗ 0.265∗∗
(0.127) (0.326) (0.127)
Favorable Comparison 0.906∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗ 0.761∗
(0.176) (0.176) (0.426)
Unfavorable Comparison*LOW-NOINFO 1.195∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗∗ 1.194∗
(0.423) (0.426) (0.655)
Unfavorable Comparison*SAME-INFO 0.855∗∗ 0.767∗∗ 1.008∗
(0.369) (0.372) (0.522)
Unfavorable Comparison*SAME-NOINFO 1.052∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ 1.191∗∗
(0.367) (0.370) (0.525)
Group behind Comparison Group*LOW-NOINFO 0.090
(0.488)
Group behind Comparison Group*SAME-INFO −0.647∗
(0.387)
Group behind Comparison Group*SAME-NOINFO −0.612
(0.386)
Favorable Comparison*LOW-NOINFO 0.010
(0.639)
Favorable Comparison*SAME-INFO 0.210
(0.506)
Favorable Comparison*SAME-NOINFO 0.190
(0.511)
Constant 0.727∗∗ 0.403 0.837∗∗
(0.302) (0.373) (0.418)
Observations[individuals|groups|pairs of groups] 5,472[288|72|48] 5,472[288|72|48] 5,472[288|72|48]
Log Likelihood −15,852 −15,849 −15,852
Akaike Inf. Crit. 31,734 31,734 31,739
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 31,833 31,853 31,858
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.6: Additional mixed-effects models showing the robustness of Result 2 (LOW) from the main
text.
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Dependent variable:
Contribution Change
(L1’) (L2’) (L3’) (L4’)
Round −0.064∗∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Unfavorable Comparison −4.118∗∗∗∗ −4.961∗∗∗∗ −4.102∗∗∗∗ −3.773∗∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.305) (0.333) (0.387)
LOW-NOINFO 0.140 −0.293 −0.337 −0.444
(0.265) (0.315) (0.262) (0.319)
SAME-INFO −0.182 −0.500∗ −0.368 −0.449
(0.242) (0.280) (0.231) (0.287)
SAME-NOINFO 0.048 −0.359 −0.279 −0.336
(0.234) (0.275) (0.228) (0.284)
Not Comparable −0.034
(0.108)
Favorable Comparison 0.950∗∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.177)
Group behind Comparison Group 0.364∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗ 0.311∗∗
(0.139) (0.140) (0.127) (0.127)
Comparison Group Minus Group 0.038∗∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Unfavorable Comparison*LOW-NOINFO 1.133∗∗∗ 1.130∗∗∗ 0.924∗
(0.426) (0.423) (0.484)
Unfavorable Comparison*SAME-INFO 0.854∗∗ 0.802∗∗ 0.559
(0.373) (0.368) (0.419)
Unfavorable Comparison*SAME-NOINFO 1.085∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 0.661
(0.371) (0.367) (0.418)
Unfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable −0.420∗∗∗
(0.157)
LOW-NOINFO*Not Comparable −0.046
(0.135)
SAME-INFO*Not Comparable −0.049
(0.125)
SAME-NOINFO*Not Comparable 0.022
(0.127)
Unfavorable Comparison*LOW-NOINFO*Not Comparable 0.571∗∗∗
(0.210)
Unfavorable Comparison*SAME-INFO*Not Comparable 0.710∗∗∗∗
(0.189)
Unfavorable Comparison*SAME-NOINFO*Not Comparable 0.409∗∗
(0.190)
Constant 2.071∗∗∗∗ 2.378∗∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗∗ 1.239∗∗∗
(0.333) (0.349) (0.339) (0.377)
Observations 5,472 5,472 5,472 5,472
Log Likelihood −15,864.860 −15,859.910 −15,848.010 −15,835.500
Akaike Inf. Crit. 31,753.710 31,749.810 31,728.020 31,718.990
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 31,833.000 31,848.930 31,833.740 31,877.570
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 2.7: Mixed-effects models L1’-L4’ from Result 1 (LOW) from the main text.
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Dependent variable:
Contribution Change
(H1’) (H2’) (H3’) (H4’)
Round −0.112∗∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Unfavorable Comparison −4.020∗∗∗∗ −4.102∗∗∗∗ −2.882∗∗∗∗ −3.007∗∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.336) (0.497) (0.528)
HIGH-NOINFO −0.121 −0.186 −0.132 −0.092
(0.375) (0.429) (0.350) (0.360)
Not Comparable 0.065
(0.123)
Favorable Comparison 1.475∗∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗∗∗
(0.431) (0.434)
Group behind Comparison Group 0.715∗∗ 0.716∗∗ 0.397 0.410
(0.311) (0.310) (0.286) (0.287)
Comparison Group Minus Group 0.094∗∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.043∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
Unfavorable Comparison*HIGH-NOINFO 0.148 0.075 0.205
(0.476) (0.476) (0.506)
Unfavorable Comparison*Not Comparable 0.063
(0.176)
HIGH-NOINFO*Not Comparable −0.121
(0.165)
Unfavorable Comparison*HIGH-NOINFO*Not Comparable 0.123
(0.241)
Constant 4.075∗∗∗∗ 4.104∗∗∗∗ 1.826∗∗ 1.802∗∗
(0.565) (0.571) (0.711) (0.720)
Observations 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824
Log Likelihood −5,380.368 −5,380.321 −5,375.202 −5,374.062
Akaike Inf. Crit. 10,780.740 10,782.640 10,774.400 10,780.120
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 10,835.820 10,843.240 10,840.510 10,868.260
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗∗p<0.001
Table 2.8: Mixed-effects models H1’-H4’ from Result 1 (HIGH) from the main text.
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2.G Questionnaire data
No difference Structural difference
SAME- SAME- LOW- HIGH- LOW- HIGH-
NOINFO INFO NOINFO NOINFO INFO INFO
Group Comparison [BM5] 2.8 2.7 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.8
Identity [GI1-3] 3.2 3.1 2.6 2.4 4.2 4.3
Anger [IS1] 4.2 4.2 4.6 3.8 3.4 3.5
Joy [IS2] 4.6 4.6 3.8 4.2 5.4 4.4
Not Comparable [IS6] 3.8 3.8 3.3 4.0 5.4 5.0
OtherBetterCond [IS7] 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.0 6.0 2.0
OwnCoop [IS8] 3.2 2.8 2.1 4.7 2.3 4.5
Table 2.9: Means for the most interesting questionnaire variables by treatment (Likert-Scale {1,2,..,7}).
BM5 abbreviates "Behavioral Motivations, Question 5", analogously GI to the "Group identity
elicitation" and IS refers to questions about the "Interaction situation".
Table 2.9 shows that perceptions of the interaction situation differ considerably between
treatments. Our elicitation of group identity differs largely depending on whether the own
group has a high MPCR or not. In addition, individuals in LOW-INFO seem to be less angry
when their group lags behind a comparison (variable Anger), but also happier when their
group lies ahead (variable Joy). Presumably this is because individuals have information about
the comparison group’ s ’better’ conditions (as can also be seen from the variable
OtherBetterCond). The perception of whether groups are not comparable differs between
LOW-INFO and LOW-NOINFO. Perhaps more intriguingly, looking the histograms in Figure
S2.4, we see that NotComparable even differs between LOW-INFO and HIGH-INFO,
suggesting that this perception might be partly self-serving.
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(a) LOW-INFO. (b) LOW-NOINFO.
(c) HIGH-INFO. (d) HIGH-NOINFO.
(e) SAME-INFO. (f) SAME-NOINFO.
Figure 2.4: The absolute frequencies of different levels of agreement {1,2,..,7} to the statement "The
contributions of the other group are not comparable to the contributions in my group".
Chapter 3
The driving forces behind information
acquisition in social decisions
3.1 Introduction
In times of mass media, social media, and digitalization, we are surrounded by multiple sources of
information. People may not only decide which information to follow, but also which information
to acquire in the first place. Consider, as an example, the phenomenon of climate change denial.
Although scientifically-acknowledged evidence on climate change is available, many people are
reluctant to become involved with this information, regardless of their ability to understand
scientific facts (Kahan et al., 2012) or hints on social media (Bakshy et al., 2015). Previous
accounts explain such information avoidance by people’s desire to maintain positive beliefs about
themselves (Bem, 1972; Mazar et al., 2008; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017), e.g., that they
would have acted differently had they known better. Experiments have shown that people avoid
information which might confront them with the potentially adverse effects of their own actions
(Kuang et al., 2007; Larson and Capra, 2009; Conrads and Irlenbusch, 2013; Grossman, 2014).
When avoiding certain information, people also prevent themselves from being able to inform
others. For example, sociological in-depth interviews in a Norwegian fishery village suggest that
although most people are aware of climate change, they hesitate to gather further information
about the issue and mention it in front of others, partly to manage how others think of them
(Norgaard, 2006). People might thus avoid information more strongly if it affects not only what
they think of themselves but also what others think of them (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Battigalli
and Dufwenberg, 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009).
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In this paper, we focus on information acquisition in the context of prosocial behavior.
Empirical evidence suggests that business leaders and politicians sometimes pretend ignorance
as an excuse for their anti-social behavior (McGraw, 1991; Luban, 1999; Kadish et al., 2016).
Similarly, evidence from the lab shows that ignorant individuals receive less punishment for a
given anti-social behavior (Bartling et al., 2014).1 However, the drivers of information
acquisition in the context of prosocial behavior are not yet fully understood. We therefore
investigate systematically how people acquire information (i) if it affects their prosocial
appearance in front of others and (ii) if there are monetary incentives to appear prosocial. To
this end, we use an extended dictator game. Dictators decide on a transfer from their
endowment to an anonymous recipient. Prior to deciding, dictators can acquire social
comparison information, i.e., information about the transfers of previous dictators.2 In
particular, they can choose between transfer information from previous dictators with an
equally high endowment or from dictators with a lower (higher) than their own endowment.
The dictator may expect that the previous dictator with a lower (higher) endowment made a
lower (higher) transfer than the one with the same endowment. A dictator who takes the
previous dictator as a reference for the own transfer (in absolute terms) may thus strategically
choose the comparison information. As a first treatment variation, we vary whether the
acquired transfer information is private or whether the transfer information (but not the
endowment of the previous dictator) is made public. This allows to disentangle information
acquisition when it is merely motivated by affecting the own fairness perceptions and when it is
also motivated by affecting the fairness perceptions of others and thus the own prosocial
appearance. As a second treatment variation, we vary whether dictators can be punished by
recipients. This allows investigating how information acquisition changes when we increase the
(monetary) incentives for appearing prosocial.
We find that the share of individuals who avoid information from previous dictators with
an equally high or higher endowments and rather acquire information from previous dictators
with a lower endowment increases by more than 50% (from 23% to 38% on average) when the
acquired transfer information is made public and no longer private. Interestingly, the information
1More generally, people often excuse low prosocial behavior due to information about external circumstances
(Linardi and McConnell, 2011), risks in giving (Haisley and Weber, 2010; Exley, 2016), their responsibility
(Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; Falk and Szech, 2014; Bartling et al., 2015) or the ‘worthiness’ or race of
donation recipients (Fong and Luttmer, 2011; Fong and Oberholzer-Gee, 2011; Spiekermann and Weiss, 2016).
If possible, many people also avoid demands for prosocial behavior (Dana et al., 2006; Dellavigna et al., 2012;
Damgaard and Gravert, 2013; Knutsson et al., 2013; Adena and Huck, 2016; Andreoni et al., 2017).
2A broad literature now demonstrates that people are more willing to transfer money to anonymous others
if others do so, too (Cason and Mui, 1998; Frey and Meier, 2004; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009; Krupka and Weber,
2009; Shang and Croson, 2009).
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avoidance we observe is independent of whether or not recipients can punish dictators. Hence, we
provide evidence that the desire to appear prosocial to others motivates information avoidance,
but less so increased monetary incentives to appear prosocial.
As an additional contribution, our paper sheds light on ‘sorting’, i.e., about what the act of
information acquisition reveals about an individual’s prosocial motivation and behavior. If
there is ‘sorting’ by information acquisition, those who avoid information suggesting high
transfers should also be less prosocially motivated per se, i.e., they would also make lower
transfers than non-avoiders had they received the same information. If, by contrast, there is no
sorting, those who avoid information suggesting high transfers make lower transfers merely due
to the different information they receive. A better understanding of sorting is important to find
out whether, e.g., climate change denial predicts individual differences in environmental
concerns and behavior, or whether it simply reflects a person’s lack of information. Former
laboratory studies have investigated sorting (Fong and Oberholzer-Gee, 2011; Conrads and
Irlenbusch, 2013; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017), but did not find clear-cut results.
Importantly, the design of previous studies did not allow observing whether or not avoiders
would have exhibited different behavior, were they exposed to different information. Our
information acquisition procedure (see Experimental Design for details) allows for such
observations. We present first clean evidence on ‘sorting’, namely that information avoidance
predicts lower prosocial behavior and thus heterogeneity in prosocial motivation, independent
of the received information.
3.2 Experiment
3.2.1 Participants and Procedure
We recruited our participants via the MTurk US online labor market.3 Subjects participated in an
extended online dictator game. We programmed the experiment using the software SosciSurvey.
We collected all data during weekdays in May and June 2016 and randomly assigned treatments
to different days. The software randomly assigned participants to either the role of the ‘dictator’
or the ‘recipient’ (Player A or B in the instructions), so dictators and recipients arrived at
our game using the same advert on MTurk. This procedure ensures credibility of the study as
3MTurk workers pay as much or more attention to instructions compared to regular student subject pools
unless experiments last very long (Goodman et al., 2013; Hauser and Schwarz, 2016). Many classic experimental
economics findings have been replicated on MTurk (Horton et al., 2011; Suri and Watts, 2011), and online dictator
games have proven particularly insightful (Fong and Luttmer, 2011; Amir et al., 2012; Ockenfels and Werner, 2012;
Raihani et al., 2013; Raihani and McAuliffe, 2014; Jordan et al., 2015).
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opposed to an ex-post matching procedure, where MTurk workers might find out that, for a given
advert, everybody receives the role of the dictator. Instructions ensured the anonymity of MTurk
workers. Participants earned a $1 participation fee solely for taking part in the experiment.
After completion of the game, participants filled in a questionnaire, asking for age, gender, and
experience with similar games. A message accompanying the payment of additional payoffs
informed participants about transfer and punishment decisions (where applicable). The average
payoff earned during the game in addition to the participation fee was $1.85 for dictators and
$1.01 for recipients. Stakes in our online experiment were similar to laboratory experiments.
Dictators took between 5 to 10 minutes to complete the experiment, resulting in a minimum
hourly wage of $17.11 (including participation fee). Altogether, our data base consists of the
decisions of 411 independent pairs of dictators and recipients.4
3.2.2 Experimental Design
Participants find out whether they have been assigned the role of dictator or the role of recipient
before the game starts. Dictators receive an endowment of $2. As in a standard dictator game,
they can transfer a share of this endowment to a passive recipient, that is, choose a transfer
in [$0.00, $0.01, . . . , $2.00]. Different from a standard dictator game, only the dictator knows
her precise endowment, but not the recipient. Recipients only know that the dictator has an
endowment of either $1, $2, or $4, and that dictators know about this information asymmetry.
We introduce this information asymmetry, such that recipients cannot infer the relative share
implied by their dictator’s transfer. Due to this ambiguity, information about what is appropriate
is likely to be more important.5 Dictators proceed through two decision stages: the information
acquisition stage and the transfer stage.
In the information acquisition stage, dictators choose among multiple sources of social
comparison information. We designed our information choice procedure to allow inferences on
the motivation behind choices. In the information acquisition stage, the dictators have to
choose from which previous dictator, hence-forth comparison dictator, they will receive
information about his or her transfer. In Choice 1, dictators choose between transfer
4Of the 1079 recruited participants 153 dropped out and 100 were excluded by the program because they did
not answer the control questions correctly within three trials. The share of participants who dropped out or were
excluded did not vary systematically across treatments (Chi-Square-Test, X2 = 1.67, p = 0.643). These numbers
are similar to other MTurk studies (e.g. Jordan et al., 2015). In addition, we had to exclude 4 observations due
to an error in the matching procedure (three recipients were accidentally matched to the same dictator).
5See Ockenfels and Werner (2012) for a dictator game with asymmetric information about the stake size and
Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993) for an ultimatum game. Dictators often allocate an equal split of the lowest possible
endowment next to an equal split of their own endowment.
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information of a comparison dictator with a low endowment ($ 1) and transfer information of a
comparison dictator with a medium endowment ($ 2, equal to their own endowment).6 In
Choice 2, dictators choose between transfer information of a comparison dictator with a
medium endowment ($2) and transfer information of a comparison dictator with a high
endowment ($4). Importantly, in each of the two choices, dictators can choose to receive
transfer information of a comparison dictator with the same endowment as their own ($2) to
find out what others did when they were in the same situation as they are (diagnostic
information search). In Choice 1, the alternative to the diagnostic information is a dictator
with a low endowment. Choosing this information may be motivated by appearing prosocial, as
it is more likely to result in a lower transfer information for comparison. In Choice 2, the
alternative is a dictator with a high endowment. Subjects motivated to appear prosocial may
avoid this alternative, as it is likely to result in a higher transfer information for comparison.7
Thus, dictators’ decisions in the two choice tasks results in one of the four possible
(combinations of) sources of information: low($1)-medium($2), medium($2)-medium($2),
medium($2)-high($4), and low($1)-high($4). Choosing low-medium results in receiving transfer
information from comparison dictators with the lowest possible endowments in both choices,
and thus most likely contains information suggesting low prosocial behavior. By contrast,
choosing medium-medium is most likely associated with diagnostic motives to update the own
fairness perceptions. After dictators have decided on Choice 1 and Choice 2, one of their two
choices is randomly determined to be relevant. Dictators then receive the transfer information
of the chosen comparison dictator. In the subsequent transfer decision stage, dictators decide
on their transfer to their recipient.8
Implementing a procedure with two choice tasks and randomly determining which task
becomes relevant has two major advantages. First, it yields a greater statistical power to
distinguish motivated choices from purely random choice of a participant not at all interested
in social comparisons (standard economic preferences). Second, the procedure generates
observations of dictators who differ in their information choice, but nonetheless receive the
same transfer information. For example, dictators choosing low-medium, medium-medium, or
6We randomized the order of the alternatives for each of the two choices.
7Selecting high may also have the diagnostic content of upward comparisons. That is, people may perceive
others with a higher endowment as upper benchmarks for their own behavior. This interpretation is in line with
a broad psychological literature which associates upward comparisons with diagnostic, self-assessment motives
(Taylor et al., 1996; Corcoran et al., 2011).
8The transfer information reveals either an equal split of the comparison dictator’s endowment or a transfer
of zero, both with equal probability. We collected the transfer decisions of comparison dictators in a previous
experiment, where recipients faced the same information asymmetry regarding the dictator’s endowment.
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medium-high may all receive transfer information of a comparison dictator with medium
endowment with some probability. This allows to test whether dictators who chose different
sources, but receive the same information, differ in how they follow this information. In
particular, we can investigate, for instance, whether dictators choosing low-medium and
dictators choosing medium-medium transfer different amounts, when both receive the same
transfer information of a comparison dictator with medium endowment. This procedure allows
investigating ‘sorting’, i.e., studying whether dictators who seek information about low
transfers act less prosocially per se, regardless of the information they actually receive.
3.2.3 Treatments
Our four treatments systematically vary how the acquired information affects fairness perceptions
(and thus prosocial appearance) and payoffs. In all four treatments, the recipient knows that the
own dictator has an endowment of either $1, $2, or $4. It is also common to all treatments that
the recipient does not know that the dictator makes information acquisition choices. In treatment
PRIVATE-BASE, only the dictator - and not the recipient - receives the transfer information of
the comparison dictator. The recipient only learns how much money the own dictator transfers.
This treatment introduces self-image motives in information acquisition by informing only the
dictator about how the own transfer compares to that of another individual.
In the PUBLIC-BASE treatment, both the dictator and the recipient receive the transfer
information of the comparison dictator. Hence, the revealed information becomes public and can
affect not only the dictator’s belief about what is appropriate (as in PRIVATE-BASE), but also
the recipient’s belief. As recipients are unaware that the dictators made information acquisition
choices, they cannot infer motives from the received comparison information. Furthermore,
recipients can only evaluate the transfer information in absolute terms because they only know
that the endowment of the comparison dictator is either $1, $2, or $4, just like they only know
that the endowment of their own dictator is either $1, $2, or $4. This treatment additionally
makes the social information relevant for the recipient’s fairness perceptions and thus for the
dictator’s prosocial appearance.
In an additional treatment dimension, we provide recipients with the opportunity to engage
in costly punishment of their dictator to investigate how the desire to appear prosocial to avoid
negative payoff consequences affects the dictators’ information choices. In PUBLIC-PUN
recipients receive the transfer information of the comparison dictator, as in PUBLIC-BASE,
and they find out how much their own dictator has transferred. Afterwards, they receive an
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additional endowment of $1, which they can keep or invest to punish their own dictator. For
each cent invested in punishment, three cents are deducted from the dictator’s payoff.9
Dictators also receive an additional endowment of $1 to hold inequity considerations fixed
across treatments.
To complete our 2x2 experimental design, treatment PRIVATE-PUN is equivalent to
PUBLIC-PUN, except that recipients do not find out that dictators receive transfer
information of a comparison dictator. This treatment allows identifying differences in dictators’
transfers between PRIVATE-PUN and PUBLIC-PUN. Further, different from PUBLIC-PUN,
dictators can seek information to assess what is appropriate without affecting the recipient’s
punishment decisions. We summarize the main features of the four treatments in Table 3.1.
Recipient learns about the
dictator’s. . .
Recipients
can
Dictator is exposed
to
possible
endowments
choice btw.
sources of
transfer
information
punish
dictators
information
affecting
monetary
incentives
$1, $2, or
$4
information for
comparison
appearance
to recipient
to appear
prosocial
PRIVATE-BASE yes no no no no no
PUBLIC-BASE yes no yes no yes no
PRIVATE-PUN yes no no yes no yes
PUBLIC-PUN yes no yes yes yes yes
Table 3.1: Overview of experimental treatments in our 2x2 design.
3.3 Hypotheses
We deduce our hypotheses from self- or social signaling models where agents signal their
prosocial motivation via their actions (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim,
2009; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017). We demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium,
where, if agents update their fairness perceptions due to previous dictator’s transfers, their
information acquisition will be indicative of their prosocial motivation. Among the people who
care about fairness, the more prosocially motivated types will acquire information suggesting
high prosocial behavior and choose high transfers, whereas the less prosocially motivated types
will acquire information suggesting low prosocial behavior and choose low transfers. We show
that, if social information is made public (as in our PUBLIC treatments) and it thus more
strongly affects fairness perceptions than if it is private information, people can enhance their
9We labelled units invested in punishment Deduction Cents in the instructions.
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prosocial appearance for a given action by acquiring information suggesting low prosocial
behavior. If a punishment option is available to recipients (PUN treatments), by contrast,
agents can enhance their prosocial appearance only by acquiring information suggesting high
prosocial behavior and engaging in high prosocial behavior.
3.3.1 The Model
Following closely the models of Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006),
we assume that people care about being prosocial and about being perceived as prosocial. Agents
are prosocially motivated to the extent v, i.e., which is their social type drawn from a distribution
g(v) and not known to an observer. Further, the agents all equally care about their prosocial
appearance E(v|a) to the extent µ, i.e., their expected social type inferred by an observer (e.g.,
the dictator’s recipient or an imaginary spectator) who can only access the information i and
their action a. Before agents choose their action, they can choose between sources of social
information i ∈ {iL,iH} , where iL is information suggesting a low transfer and iH is information
suggesting a high transfer, i.e., the normative action. A prosocial action a comes at cost ca and
agents choose between a low transfer, i.e., aL, and a high transfer, the normative action aH.
Following Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), we assume that fairness perceptions f(a,i) depend not
only on people’s action, a, but also on the distance of their own action to the fairness norm aH,
say a - aH. We extend their model by assuming that, in addition, fairness perceptions f(a,i)
also depend on the distance of their own action to that of comparison standards, a – i. People
weigh the impact of the acquired comparison standard i on fairness with p and the impact of
the (injunctive) fairness norm iH on fairness with 1−p, where p < 1/2.10 The preferences of the
decision-maker are U (a,i) = v f(a,i) + µE(v | a,i) – ca.
Based on this model, we can derive our hypotheses. We show in the Appendix 3.A that there
is a separating equilibrium with threshold v∗ . In this equilibrium, agents below the threshold,
i.e., the less prosocially motivated agents, acquire information suggesting low transfers iL and
choose a low transfer aL, whereas the more social types acquire information suggesting high
transfers iH and behave accordingly by choosing aH. 11
10The resulting fairness perceptions are similar to models of guilt aversion Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007),
where recipients’ expectations (and thus guilt) depends on comparison standards and a fairness norm. Preferences
involving payoff comparisons also assume that comparison standards affect utility (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000).
11Since individuals choosing sources suggesting low transfers iL have a lower prosocial motivation v than those
choosing sources suggesting high transfers iH , they should also make lower transfers than those choosing sources
suggesting high transfers, if only information suggesting high transfers were available.
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Hypothesis 1: Individuals with low prosocial motivation choose a source of information
suggesting low transfers and make lower transfers than individuals choosing sources of
information suggesting high transfers.
In the treatments PUBLIC-BASE and PUBLIC-PUN, social information affects not only
the own but also other people’s fairness perceptions. In particular, making social information
public makes the social information relevant for the recipient’s fairness perceptions and will thus
increase the impact of social information on the agent’s fairness perceptions f(a,i), i.e., increase p.
An increase in p leads to an increased equilibrium threshold v∗ and thus a higher share of agents
acquiring information suggesting low transfers iL. This is because, in equilibrium, the image of
making a low transfer E(v|a = aL, i = iL) becomes more favorable as the social information
makes low transfers relatively less unfair, i.e., f(a = aL, i = iL) > f(a = aL, i = iH).
Hypothesis 2: Dictators more often choose a source of information suggesting low transfers
when social information is made public, i.e., in treatments PUBLIC-BASE and PUBLIC-PUN,
compared to the private information treatments PRIVATE-BASE and PRIVATE-PUN,
respectively.
The availability of a punishment option by the recipient may increase the incentive to appear
prosocial, i.e., increase µ. In equilibrium, an increase in µ leads to a decrease in the threshold v∗
and thus a lower share of agents acquiring information suggesting low prosocial behavior. This
is because, in equilibrium, the prosocial appearance of making a high transfer is better than the
prosocial appearance of making a low transfer E(v |a = aH,i = iH) > E(v |a = aL, i = iL).
Hypothesis 3: The availability of a punishment option is expected to decrease the number of
dictators choosing information suggesting low prosocial behavior, i.e., in treatments
PRIVATE-PUN and PUBLIC-PUN, compared to treatments PRIVATE-BASE and
PUBLIC-BASE, respectively.
3.4 Results
Information Choice
As a first step, we examine which sources of social comparison information dictators acquire.
If dictators were indifferent and chose sources of information at random, they should choose
each of the four different combinations with equal probability of 25% . In contrast, a significant
deviation from a share of 25% provides evidence for systematic choice of the corresponding
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source. In all treatments, we observe choice behavior different from random choice (Chi-Square
tests, all p-values < 0.001, n = 105 in PRIVATE-BASE, n = 103 in PUBLIC-BASE, n = 102
in PUBLIC-PUN, n = 101 in PRIVATE-PUN).12
Dictators can choose the source low-medium to more likely receive information about lower
transfers of their comparison dictator, which make own transfers appear more prosocial. In line
with Hypothesis 2, Figure 3.1A shows that when the received transfer information of the
comparison dictator becomes public information (PUBLIC-BASE and PUBLIC-PUN), close to
40% of dictators choose the low-medium source, which is significantly more frequent than
suggested by chance (Binomial tests: 38 of 103 in PUBLIC-BASE, p = 0.008 and 40 of 102 in
PUBLIC-PUN, p = 0.002). In contrast, when recipients do not receive the transfer information
of the comparison dictator, the number of dictators choosing low-medium does not exceed the
chance level (Binomial tests: 27 of 105 in PRIVATE-BASE, p = 0.910 and 20 of 101 in
PRIVATE-PUN, p = 0.252). In direct support of Hypothesis 2, the number of low-medium
choices significantly increases under public information as compared to private information
settings (PRIVATE-PUN vs. PUBLIC-PUN, Chi-Square test, X2 = 9.19, p= 0.002;
PRIVATE-BASE vs. PUBLIC-BASE, Chi-Square test, X2 = 3.02, p = 0.082).13 Result 1 sums
up the evidence for Hypothesis 2.
Result 1: Dictators systematically choose the source of information suggesting low prosocial
behavior (low-medium) when the acquired information is made public. In both treatments,
PUBLIC-BASE and PUBLIC-PUN, a similarly high percentage (close to 40%) chooses
low-medium.
In partial support of Hypothesis 3, the number of low-medium choices does not increase
significantly when recipients have a punishment opportunity, both under private and public
information (PRIVATE-BASE vs. PRIVATE-PUN, Chi-Square test, X2 = 1.02, p = 0.312;
PUBLIC-BASE vs. PUBLIC-PUN, Chi-Square test, X2 = 0.12, p = 0.732), but increases only
relative to the baseline (PRIVATE-BASE vs. PUBLIC-PUN, Chi-Square test, X2 = 4.30, p =
0.038).
12Demographics are well-balanced across treatments (see Appendix 3.B).
13See also Appendix Table 3.3, Model 2 (logit regression with demographic controls),
bPUBLIC-PUN vs. PRIVATE-PUN = 1.00, SE = 0.33, p = 0.003 and bPUBLIC-BASE vs. PRIVATE-BASE = 0.64, SE
= 0.32, p = 0.044, respectively.
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Figure 3.1: A Proportion of dictators that chose information from previous dictators with low
endowment in Choice 1 and medium endowment in Choice 2 (low-medium), by treatment. B Mean
transfers with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for each treatment, shown separately for dictators
choosing information from previous dictators with low endowment in Choice 1 and medium endowment
in Choice 2 (low-medium) or equally high or higher endowments (medium-medium or medium-high).
Result 2: Dictators do not choose the source of information suggesting low prosocial behavior
(low-medium) more often when a punishment option is introduced (PRIVATE-PUN vs.
PRIVATE-BASE, PUBLIC-PUN vs. PUBLIC-BASE).
Dictators also choose the source medium-medium more often than suggested by chance
(25%) in three treatments (Binomial tests: 44 of 105 in PRIVATE-BASE, p < 0.001, 41 of 103
in PUBLIC-BASE, p < 0.001; 45 of 101 in PRIVATE-PUN, p < 0.001). Considerably fewer
participants (about one quarter) also choose medium-high but this is never different from
chance (27 of 105 in PRIVATE-BASE, 20 of 103 in PUBLIC-BASE; 32 of 101 in
PRIVATE-PUN, and 27 of 102 in PUBLIC-PUN, Binomial tests, all p-values above 0.135).
The sources medium-medium and medium-high may be associated with diagnostic motives to
find out what is appropriate. Only a few participants choose low-high (5% in all treatments; 6
of 105 in PRIVATE-BASE, 4 of 103 in PUBLIC-BASE; 4 of 101 in PRIVATE-PUN, and 8 of
102 in PUBLIC-PUN). For this reason, we restrict our attention to the other three information
choices.
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Transfers
Next, we examine whether dictator transfers vary by information choice. Since transfers do not
differ significantly between dictators choosing the sources medium-medium and medium-high
(pooled, $0.61 vs. $0.56, Z = -0.76; p = 0.438, for each treatment p > 0.169), we pool those
observations.14 In support of Hypothesis 1, dictators who choose information suggesting low
prosocial behavior, i.e., low-medium, transfer about 26% less than dictators choosing
medium-medium or medium-high (mean $0.44 vs. $0.59, Permutation test, Z = 2.89, p =
0.004, see also Figure 3.1B). Notably, this difference is most pronounced in the PUBLIC-BASE
treatment, where the acquired information affects fairness perceptions and thus prosocial
appearance, but monetary incentives for prosocial appearance do not confound inferences
about a participant’s prosocial motivation (Permutation test: $0.36 vs. $0.59, Z = 2.11, p =
0.033).15 This suggests that, when the received information becomes public, especially
individuals low in prosocial motivation select information for prosocial appearance.
Based on the evidence presented so far, we cannot pin down whether low -medium dictators
are less prosocially motivated per se, that is, whether they make lower transfers irrespective of
the transfer information they receive from their comparison dictator. Alternatively, low-medium
dictators might also transfer less to the recipients simply because they are more likely to receive
information about lower transfers, which makes their own low transfers appear more prosocial.
Our information choice procedure addresses this concern directly: If dictators choose the source
low -medium, they may with some probability receive the same information as those who choose
the source medium-medium or the source medium-high, namely, the transfer information of a
comparison dictator with medium endowment ($2, as their own endowment). We now examine
how transfers differ by information choice conditional on receiving transfer information of a
comparison dictator with medium endowment, i.e., without confounds due to the endogenous
selection into the information environment. Transfers do not differ between dictators choosing
medium-medium and medium-high (Permutation test: $0.61 vs. $0.55, Z = -0.73, p = 0.471,
for each treatment p > 0.309). Yet, in support of Hypothesis 1, dictators choosing low -medium
transfer less than dictators choosing medium-medium or medium-high (Permutation test: mean
14The psychological literature associates both, ‘lateral’ comparisons (medium-medium) and ‘upward’
comparisons (medium-high), with diagnostic or ‘self-assessment’ motives Taylor et al. (1996).
15Dictators choosing low-medium also transfer less compared to the pool of all other dictators who choose a
different a different source of information (Permutation tests: mean $0.44 vs. $0.57,Z = 2.57 p = 0.009). Further,
they also transfer less compared to dictators choosing medium-medium (Permutation tests: all treatments pooled:
$0.44 vs. $0.61, Z = 3.21, p = 0.001; PUBLIC-BASE, $0.36 vs. $0.59, Z = 1.99, p = 0.044) and they transfer
less compared to medium-high dictators (Permutation tests: all treatments pooled, $0.44 vs. $0.56 , Z = 1.90, p
= 0.055; PUBLIC-BASE, $0.36 vs. $0.59, Z = 1.72, p = 0.087).
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$0.45 vs. $0.60, Z = 2.14, p = 0.032, see also Figure 3.2). Again, the difference between low-
medium dictators and others is most pronounced if social information becomes public, but there
are no monetary incentives to appear prosocial (PUBLIC-BASE, $0.35 vs. $0.59, Z = 1.68, p =
0.097).16
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Figure 3.2: A Proportion of dictators that chose information from previous dictators with low
endowment in Choice 1 and medium endowment in Choice 2 (low-medium), by treatment. B Mean
transfers with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for each treatment, shown separately for dictators
choosing information from previous dictators with low endowment in Choice 1 and medium endowment
in Choice 2 (low-medium) or equally high or higher endowments (medium-medium or medium-high).
OLS regressions with robust standard errors yield further support for Hypothesis 1 (see
Appendix Table 3.4, Models 1-6). Regardless of whether we control for the revealed transfer
information, treatment dummies, or demographics, we observe that dictators choosing
low-medium always transfer significantly less than others (Appendix 3.D, Table 3.4, blow-medium
= -0.15, SE = 0.06, p = 0.014; also significant in Model 1-5). Result 3 sums up the evidence
for Hypothesis 1.17
Result 3: Dictators choosing social comparison information suggesting low prosocial behavior,
i.e., low-medium, transfer less than dictators who choose information suggesting high prosocial
behavior, i.e., medium-medium or medium-high. Dictators choosing information suggesting low
prosocial behavior also transfer less if (by chance) they receive the same information as dictators
who choose information suggesting high prosocial behavior.
16We can also focus on observations where dictators receive the information that a comparison dictator with
medium endowment transferred an equal split, which is a clear signal about what is fair. Dictators choosing
medium-medium or medium-high do not differ in their transfer behavior ($0.67 vs. $0.78, Z = 1.08, p = 0.292),
but they transfer significantly more at a 10% -level than low-medium dictators (Permutation test: $0.52 vs. $0.69,
Z = 1.81, p = 0.070; PUBLIC-PUN, $0.42 vs. $0.80, Z = 2.09, p = 0.039).
17In line with former studies (e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2009), dictators tend to increase their transfers when
the revealed transfer information is an equal split of the endowment rather than zero (Appendix 3.D, Table 3.5,
Model 6, bFair = 0.21, SE = 0.06, p < 0.001, Model 1-5 also significant), regardless of the acquired information.
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Lastly, looking at aggregate outcomes, our data is in line with former studies where recipients
can punish dictators (for example, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004)). About 25.7% of the recipients
in PRIVATE-PUN punished and, if they punished, they assigned on average 25.4 out of 100
punishment points (SD = 20.8). About 30.6% of the recipients in PUBLIC-PUN punished and,
if they punished, they assigned about 27.1 points (SD = 27.3). The average punishment behavior
did not differ significantly between PRIVATE-PUN and PUBLIC-PUN (6.54 vs. 8.14, Z = 0.71,
p = 0.483). Transfers are higher in PRIVATE-PUN than in PRIVATE-BASE (Permutation
test, $0.48 vs. $0.64, Z = -2.35, p = 0.019), so dictator transfers respond to the incentive of
monetary punishment. Transfers in PUBLIC-PUN are not significantly higher than transfers
in the baseline treatment PRIVATE-BASE and PUBLIC-BASE (Permutation tests, PRIVATE-
BASE vs. PUBLIC-PUN, $0.48 vs. $0.51, Z = -0.41, p = 0.681, PUBLIC-BASE vs. PUBLIC-
PUN, Permutation test, $0.49 vs. $0.51, Z = -0.19, p = 0.847). Transfers in PRIVATE-PUN
are higher than in PUBLIC-PUN (Permutation test, $0.64 vs. $0.51, Z = -2.10, p = 0.036).18
A plausible explanation for this difference is that dictators in PUBLIC-PUN can more easily
excuse their low transfers when the comparison dictator has made a low transfer. This is not
possible for dictators in PRIVATE-PUN, because here recipients are unaware of the dictator’s
social information. In line with this explanation, dictators in PUBLIC-PUN transfer less than
dictators in PRIVATE-PUN, if we compare only dictators that received information about a zero
transfer (Permutation test, $0.61 vs. $0.39, Z = 2.36, p = 0.018). We sum up the findings in
Result 4.
Result 4: In line with previous studies, recipients’ punishment opportunity increases
transfers, when social comparison information is private (PRIVATE-PUN). When social
comparison information is public, dictators use information about comparison dictator’s low
transfers to excuse own low transfers, so transfers do not increase relative to the baseline
(PUBLIC-PUN vs. PRIVATE-BASE).
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We demonstrate that the desire to appear prosocial guides information acquisition. When the
acquired information becomes public, we find that many individuals choose the source of social
18In both cases, the BASE and the PUN environment, selecting low-medium causally mediates the decrease in
transfers (95% confidence intervals from 10,000 simulations: PRIVATE-BASE vs. PUBLIC-BASE, [-0.04, 0.00],
p = 0.070; PRIVATE-BASE vs. PRIVATE-PUN, [-0.06, -0.01], p = 0.009). Yet, we hypothesize that low-medium
dictators have less prosocial motivation per se, which introduces unobserved pre-treatment confounders and may
result in biased estimates.
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comparison information suggesting low prosocial behavior (i.e., low-medium), i.e., they prefer
comparison dictators with lower endowment over comparison dictators with higher endowments
and thus more likely receive a lower comparison standard. We interpret this as evidence for the
motive of appearing prosocial to recipients, which is stronger under public rather than private
information since the information can also affect the recipient’s fairness perceptions (Battigalli
and Dufwenberg, 2007; Falk et al., 2008; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Heintz et al., 2015).
Our results thus extend the literature on information avoidance, where the received information
of the dictator always remains private information.19 Thus, information acquisition is not only
motivated by a desire to appear prosocial to oneself (Grossman and van der Weele, 2017), but
also by appearing prosocial to others.
In line with the prediction of our adapted self- or social-signaling model, dictators who
choose a source of information suggesting low prosocial behavior transfer significantly less than
dictators interested in other sources (about 30% less than dictators choosing information
suggesting high prosocial behavior). By making our information choice procedure probabilistic,
subjects with different information choice motives receive the same information with some
probability, i.e., transfer information from a comparison dictator with the same endowment as
their own, we can compare dictator transfers conditional on receiving the same information.
We find that, even when receiving the same information, people acquiring information
suggesting low prosocial behavior make lower transfers than those acquiring information
suggesting high prosocial behavior. We interpret this as evidence for the lower prosocial
motivation of dictators acquiring information suggesting low prosocial behavior.20
Somewhat intriguingly, our findings address two very different perspectives on the literature
on social preferences. One perspective, based on early advances in public goods studies and
dictator games, suggests that heterogeneity in preferences for cooperation and giving explains
the heterogeneity in social decisions. Another perspective raises concerns about whether subjects
merely care about their image. This perspective is based on studies showing how prosocial
19Note that even in the willful ignorance setting (Dana et al., 2007), it is not possible to exclude that the desire
to appear prosocial to others contributes to information avoidance since recipients know that the dictator might
have been ignorant about the adverse consequences of his or her action.
20Importantly, our information choice procedure refines existing methods to measure heterogeneity in prosocial
motivation in information acquisition. While the information avoidance literature has addressed the issue of
“sorting” , the result are mixed (Larson and Capra, 2009; Fong and Oberholzer-Gee, 2011; Conrads and Irlenbusch,
2013; Grossman and van der Weele, 2017). These mixed results may have occurred because previous studies
compared behavior under exogenously imposed information to behavior under information acquisition. As noted
by Fong and Oberholzer-Gee (2011), this approach has methodological limitations. Researchers cannot observe
an individual’s counterfactual information choices under exogenous information and thus they must assume that
information choices are i.i.d. across subjects and do not correlate with unobserved characteristics (e.g., prosocial
motivation).
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behavior in dictator games can be easily reduced by manipulating subtle cues of normative
behavior (citations above and others, e.g. Bardsley (2008)). In showing how both heterogeneity
in preferences and the desire to appear prosocial interact in information acquisition, the evidence
presented here reconciles both perspectives.
Finally, our experiment also provides a cautious note for the design of policies involving social
comparisons. Based on previous research in behavioral economics, a policy maker may deem it
wise to make information about other’s energy consumption, donations or paid taxes publicly
available to foster socially desirable behavior (Schultz et al., 2007; Allcott, 2011). Yet, in our
experiment, making social information public can also decrease overall transfers (PRIVATE-PUN
vs. PUBLIC-PUN). This suggests that the proposed policy could under certain circumstances
also have a detrimental effect. Individuals might selectively look to others with a high energy
consumption, e.g., managers or politicians. Unfortunately, particularly these individuals are low
in prosocial motivation and might take the information as evidence to excuse their low prosocial
behavior, e.g., to support their belief that a high energy consumption cannot be avoided.
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Appendices
3.A The Model
Our solution concept follows previous approaches by Bodner and Prelec (2003), Bénabou and
Tirole (2006), Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), and, especially, (Grossman and van der Weele,
2017), who present a model of information acquisition and willful ignorance. Loosely speaking,
the agent cares about how he is perceived by himself and by others, both of which he can only infer
from his past actions. While the own “true” prosocial motivation v guides the own actions (i.e.,
the preferences are available to the “decision-maker-self” ), this information is disregarded or not
available when the agent (the “observer-self”) reflects about his prosocial appearance (i.e., when
the observer self integrates the own prosocial appearance E(v | a,i) into the agent’s utility).
The observer-self evaluates the decision-maker’s actions just like an outside observer, e.g., an
imagined spectator or the recipient, and thus infers the agent’s prosocial motivation relying only
on the agent’s actions. Thus, he cannot use information about the decision maker’s strategy, e.g.,
the transfer had he acquired different information, to infer the agent’s type. We assume that µ
> 0, so the desire to appear prosocial positively affects prosocial behavior. Further, we assume
that the cost-increase due to choosing aH over aL is strictly larger than the maximal image gain,
so (aH – aL) c > µ. This excludes situations where any action could be sustained in pooling
equilibriua due to image concerns alone (see Benabou and Tirole (2006)). Fairness perceptions
f(a,i) = p f (a - i) + (1 - p) f (a - aH) depend on the distance of the own action to a salient norm
and the social information, where p ∈ (0, 0.5) governs the impact of the social information on
fairness. Fairness is measured by f and, as Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), we assume that f is
symmetric and strictly concave in a - aH with its maximum at a = aH (analogously for f (a -
i)). The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The agent’s social type v element [0,1] is drawn by nature from the distribution g(v) at
the start of the game. g(v) is commonly known.
2. The agent chooses whether to acquire information source iL or iH , where iL < iH .
3. The agents choose whether to make a low prosocial action aL ≥ 0 or the normative action
aH, where aL < aH.21
21Note that we do not require that aL = iL.
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4. The observer self processes the agent’s transfer and the acquired information, and updates
beliefs about the agent’s social type. Subsequently, payoffs realize.
In what follows, we focus on separating equilibria, with a cutoff-value v∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
types with a prosocial motivation v < v∗ acquire iL and choose the action aL and types with
a prosocial motivation v ≥ v∗ acquire iH and choose the action aH. We denote the observer-
self’s belief about the agent’s type, i.e., the agent’s image, when acquiring information i and
choosing the action a with ϕia. Beliefs on the equilibrium path are ϕiLaL =
∫ v∗
0 vg(v)dv/G(v
∗)
and ϕiHaH =
∫ 1
v∗ vg(v)dv/(1 − G(v∗)), so ϕiHaH > ϕiLaL for any v∗. Off the equilibrium path, we
assume that beliefs are weakly increasing in a. Further, ϕiLaL ≥ ϕiHaL and ϕiHaH ≥ ϕiLaH . We later
show that these beliefs are reasonable using the pD1 refinement as defined in, e.g., Grossman
and van der Weele (2017) and Andreoni and Bernheim (2009).
Now we establish conditions such that, given their chosen information, agents do not deviate
from the equilibrium path. Given that an agent has chosen iL, he weakly prefers aL over aH
if v ≤ ((aH − aL)c − µ(ϕiLaH − ϕiLaL))/(f(aH , iL) − f(aL, iL)) ≡ vL, where vL > 0, since we
assumed (aH – aL) c > µ. Given that an agent has chosen iH, he weakly prefers aH over aL if
v ≥ ((aH − aL)c− µ(ϕiHaH − ϕiHaL))/(f(aH , iH)− f(aH , iL)) ≡ vH .
Agents above or at the threshold v∗ (who choose (iH, aH)) do not deviate to choosing (aL,
iH), if v∗ > vH. Since f(aH,iH) > f(aL,iL) > f(aL,iH), this holds true since we assumed that
ϕiLaL ≥ ϕaLiH . As a result, the agents with lower prosocial motivation that would not prefer aH
over aL given iH rather choose iL than iH in the first place.
Agents below the threshold v∗ (who choose (iL, aL)) do not deviate to choosing aH, if v∗ >
vL. The inequality v∗ > vL holds true since f(aH,iH) > f(aH,iL) > f(aL,iL) and we assumed that
ϕiHaH ≥ ϕiLaH . As a result, the agents with higher prosocial motivation that would not prefer aL
over aH given iL rather choose iH than iL in the first place.
In equilibrium, the more prosocially motivated agents should choose the information
suggesting high transfers and make high transfers (iH, aH), whereas the less prosocially
motivated agents should choose information suggesting low transfers and make low transfers
(iL, aL). For agents to weakly prefer (iH, aH) over (iL, aL), we need that the expected utility of
choosing (iH, aH) is greater or equal than the expected utility of choosing (iL, aL). This is the
case if v ≥ v∗ , where v∗ is defined implicitly by the fixed point equation
v∗ = ((aH − aL)c− µ(ϕiHaH − ϕiLaL))/(f(aH , iH)− f(aL, iL)). Existence follows from continuity of
both sides of this equation. To ease exposition, we assume that types at the threshold who are
indifferent choose (iH, aH).
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We next show sufficient conditions for a threshold v∗ ∈ (0, 1) to exist. The threshold v∗ is
bounded above 0 for any beliefs because we assumed µ < (aH – aL) c ≡ µ. Further, v∗ is bounded
below 1, if µ > ((aH – aL) c - (f(aH , iH) - f(aL, iL)))/(1 – E(v)) ≡ µ, where we use that given
v∗ = 1, ϕiHaH = 1 and ϕ
iH
aH
= E(v). If we assume c ≤ 1, a sufficient condition for µ < µ < µ to
be true, so v∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists, is that (aH – aL) c < f(aH, iH) – f(aL, iL), which holds since we
assumed strict concavity and symmetry of f w.r.t. a – aH and a – i, respectively, and p < 1/2
and µ > 0. Otherwise if c > 1, a sufficient condition for µ < µ < µ, so v∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists, is that
(f(aH, iH) – f(aL, iL))/(E(v) (aH – aL)) > c.
Taken together, the above arguments have shown that an interior separating equilibrium
exists if µ < µ < µ and p< 1/2. In any such equilibrium the type at the cutoff v∗ must be
indifferent between choosing (aH,iH) over (aL,iL), i.e., the payoff difference z between choosing
(aH,iH) over (aL,iL) must equal zero. A sufficient condition to ensure the stability (uniqueness)
of the threshold is that the the total derivative dz of the payoff difference z, with respect to v∗
be positive (positive for all v). This is the case if the image difference between agents choosing
(aH,iH) and agents choosing (aL,iL) does not decrease too strongly in v∗, i.e., if d(ϕiHaH−ϕiLaL)/dv∗
> - (f(aH,iH) - f(aL,iL))/µ. For this to hold we need that the distribution of social types g(v)
is not increasing too steeply anywhere on its domain, e.g., agents with a high type (prosocial
motivation) should not be too frequent relative to agents with a low type (prosocial motivation);
see Benabou and Tirole (2006), pp. 1666-1667, for a thorough discussion of the implications of
different distributions.
Next, we demonstrate the reasonableness of our assumed off-equilibrium beliefs. We use the
pD1 refinement (e.g., as defined by Grossman and van der Weele (2017), p. 182). To pin down
off-equilibrium beliefs, we need to find out which of our types deviate for the largest set of off-
equilibrium beliefs. To this end, we first establish conditions such that types above or at the
threshold deviate from their equilibrium behavior and then establish conditions such that types
below the threshold deviate from their equilibrium behavior. Then, we compare the resulting
expressions to see which of our types deviate for a larger set of off-equilibrium beliefs.
We start with ϕiLaL ≥ ϕiHaL . Agents above or at the threshold deviate if their equilibrium
payoffs are lower than their deviation payoffs, that is, if f(aH , iH)v+µϕiHaH − aHc < f(aL, iH)v+
µϕiHaL−aLc. Hence, they deviate if ϕiHaL > ϕiHaH +[v(f(aH , iH)−f(aL, iH))−(aH−aL)c]/µ ≡ ϕv≥v
∗
aL,iH
.
Agents below the threshold deviate if their equilibrium payoffs are lower than their deviation
payoffs, that is, if f(aL, iL)v + µϕiLaL − aLc < f(aL, iH)v + ϕiHaL − aLc. Hence, they deviate if
ϕiHaL > ϕ
iL
aL
+ [v(f(aL, iL) − f(aL, iH))]/µ ≡ ϕv<v∗aL,iH . Comparing the two expressions, we see that
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ϕv≥v
∗
aL,iH
≥ ϕv<v∗aL,iH , if v ≥ ((aH−aL)c−µ(ϕiHaH−ϕiLaL))/(f(aH , iH)−f(aL, iL)), where the right-hand
side is the same expression as v∗ and thus satisfied in equilibrium. This means that the lower
types deviate for a larger set of off-equilibrium beliefs, so any belief below or equal to v∗ is
reasonable and ϕiHaL = 0 is the lowest belief that can be supported by the pD1 refinement.
Next, we consider ϕiHaH ≥ ϕiLaH . Agents above or at the threshold deviate if their equilibrium
payoffs are lower than their deviation payoffs, that is, if f(aH , iH)v+µϕiHaH − aHc < f(aH , iL)v+
µϕiLaH − aHc. Hence, they deviate if ϕiLaH > ϕiHaH + [v(f(aH , iH)− f(aH , iL))]/µ ≡ ϕv≥v
∗
aH ,iL
. Agents
below the threshold deviate if their equilibrium payoffs are lower than their deviation payoffs,
that is, if f(aL, iL)v + µϕiLaL − aLc < f(aL, iH)v + µϕiHaL − aLc. Hence, they deviate if ϕiLaH >
ϕiLaL + [v(f(aL, iL) − f(aH , iL)) − (aH − aL)c]/µ ≡ ϕv<v
∗
aH ,iL
. Comparing the two expressions, we
see that ϕv≥v
∗
aH ,iL
≥ ϕv<v∗aH ,iL , if v ≥ ((aH − aL)c− µ(ϕiHaH − ϕiLaL))/(f(aH , iH)− f(aL, iL)), where the
right-hand side is the same expression as v∗ and thus satisfied in equilibrium. This means that
the lower types deviate for larger set of off-equilibrium beliefs, so any belief below or equal to v∗
is reasonable and ϕiLaH = 0 is the lowest belief that can be supported by the pD1 refinement.
Note that our separating equilibrium implies Hypothesis 1: Agents acquiring information iL
have a lower prosocial motivation and make lower transfers than agents acquiring iH. Would the
two types both nevertheless receive iH, those choosing iL would nevertheless choose the lower
transfer. Their choice of iL merely helps them to improve their fairness perceptions f(aL,iL) and
prosocial appearance ϕiLaL .
We now turn to the comparative statics which are important to derive Hypotheses 2 and 3.22
Hypothesis 2 implies that if we make social information public and thus increase the impact of the
information on fairness perceptions p, the threshold v∗ should increase, i.e., more agents should
be willing to acquire information suggesting low transfers and make a lower transfer. Under the
assumption that the equilibrium is stable, we analyze the change in v∗ caused by a change in p by
using the total derivative of the payoff difference between choosing (aH , iH) and choosing (aL, iL)
with respect to p and set it to zero, i.e., dzp=0, and solve for dv∗ /dp. The resulting expression
dv∗ /dp = ((f(aH-aH) - f(aL-aH)) v∗ )/(f(aH,iH) - f(aL,iL) + d(ϕiHaH − ϕiLaL)/dv∗) is larger than
0 if and only if d(ϕiHaH − ϕiLaL)/dv∗ > - (f(aH,iH) - f(aL,iL))/µ. This is the same condition
that is required for uniqueness and stability of the threshold and thus satisfied in equilibrium.
Hypothesis 3 also implies that if we introduce punishment and thus increase the payoff-related
image motivation, then the threshold v∗ should decrease. We set the total derivative with
22It is also possible to extend our setup to a situation where, with some probability q, information source
iL yields the same information as information source iH, but different information with probability 1-q, without
affecting the comparative statics.
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respect to µ equal to zero, dzµ=0 and solve for dv∗ /dµ. The resulting expression dv∗ /dµ
= - (ϕiHaH − ϕiLaL)/( f(aH,iH) - f(aL,iL) + µ d(ϕiHaH − ϕiLaL)/dv∗) is smaller than 0 if and only if
d(ϕiHaH −ϕiLaL)/dv∗ > - (f(aH,iH) - f(aL,iL))/µ. Again, this is the same condition that is required
for uniqueness and stability of the threshold and thus satisfied in equilibrium.
3.B Demographic Controls
Age Male Experience
PRIVATE-BASE 33.16 (11.05) 0.59 (0.49) 4.46 (13.62)
PRIVATE-PUN 34.11 (10.94) 0.49 (0.50) 2.86 (10.39)
PUBLIC-BASE 32.91 (9.20) 0.54 (0.50) 1.71 (2.79)
PUBLIC-PUN 32.50 (8.69) 0.56 (0.50) 1.42 (10.03)
K-Sample Perm. Test 0.704 0.557 0.020
Table 3.2: Demographic controls Age is the self-reported age in years; Male indicates whether the
participant self-reports to be male; Experience is the self-reported number of participations in similar
games. In one of three cases, covariates are not balanced. Notably, including this covariate does not
change significance patterns when included in analyses.
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3.C Chosen source of social comparison information
Chosen sources low-medium medium-medium medium-high
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public 0.5241◦ 0.6447∗ −0.0869 −0.1080 −0.4115 −0.5143
(0.3041) (0.3196) (0.2836) (0.2923) (0.3344) (0.3413)
Pun −0.3378 −0.2480 0.1080 0.0436 0.2432 0.1384
(0.3366) (0.3451) (0.2828) (0.2919) (0.3088) (0.3252)
Public*Pun 0.4364 0.3636 −0.7161◦ −0.6368 0.1582 0.2054
(0.4438) (0.4531) (0.4144) (0.4231) (0.4571) (0.4679)
Age 0.0104 0.0220∗ −0.0280∗
(0.0110) (0.0104) (0.0123)
Male 0.3410 −0.3761◦ −0.0798
(0.2276) (0.2113) (0.2337)
Exper 0.0222◦ 0.0064 −0.0725∗
(0.0127) (0.0134) (0.0343)
(Intercept) 0.5001∗∗∗ 0.2564∗∗ 0.5733∗∗∗ 0.2756∗ 0.4648∗∗∗ 0.2123∗
(0.0469) (0.0930) (0.0489) (0.1089) (0.0637) (0.1063)
Treatment effects
PUBLIC-BASE vs. 0.5241◦ 0.6447∗ -0.0869 -0.1080 -0.4115 -0.5143
PRIVATE-BASE (0.3041) (0.3196) (0.2836) (0.2923) (0.3344) (0.3414)
PUBLIC-PUN 0.9605∗∗∗ 1.0083∗∗∗ -0.8030∗∗∗ -0.7448∗∗ -0.2533 -0.3088
vs. PRIVATE-PUN (0.3217) (0.3257) (0.3007) (0.3071) (0.3100) (0.3167)
Log Likelihood -246.2405 -240.5809 -268.9922 -262.6716 -233.6081 -226.0425
Num. obs. 411 408 411 408 411 408
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ◦p < 0.1
Table 3.3: Binomial logit regressions with intercept and robust standard errors predicting the
probability that an individual chooses the sources of social comparison indicated in the column header
as opposed to any other available social comparison. Estimates are based on models with treatment
dummies Public, Pun, Public*Pun as predictors and, if included, with demographic controls Age, Male,
Experience. The Treatment effect BASE (PUBLIC – PRIVATE) tests the null hypothesis that the
coefficient Public=0. The Treatment effect PUN (PUBLIC – PRIVATE) tests the null hypothesis that
the coefficients Public + Public*Pun=0. Pun indicates whether recipients could punish dictators, Public
indicates whether recipients were informed about comparison allocations. Regressions (2), (4), and (6)
exclude three observations from individuals who did not respond to the demographic questions in models
with demographic controls.
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3.D Transfers
Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fair 0.1840∗∗ 0.1976∗∗∗ 0.1849∗∗ 0.1975∗∗∗
(0.0567) (0.0551) (0.0566) (0.0549)
Low-medium −0.1410∗ −0.1502∗ −0.1399∗ −0.1557∗ −0.1319∗ −0.1457∗
(0.0603) (0.0597) (0.0627) (0.0621) (0.0616) (0.0613)
Age 0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0081∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Male −0.0866 −0.0502 −0.0796
(0.0546) (0.0570) (0.0545)
Experience 0.0016 0.0028 0.0022
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Public −0.0307 0.0167 −0.0060 0.0223
(0.0589) (0.0817) (0.0809) (0.0793)
Pun 0.0713 0.0928 0.0966 0.0939
(0.0568) (0.0754) (0.0771) (0.0743)
Public*Pun −0.0610 −0.0457 −0.0647
(0.1123) (0.1113) (0.1095)
(Intercept) 0.5001∗∗∗ 0.2564∗∗ 0.5733∗∗∗ 0.2756∗ 0.4648∗∗∗ 0.2123∗
(0.0469) (0.0930) (0.0489) (0.1089) (0.0637) (0.1063)
R2 0.0537 0.1042 0.0237 0.0685 0.0613 0.1096
Adj. R2 0.0467 0.0872 0.0128 0.0435 0.0437 0.0822
Num. obs. 272 269 272 269 272 269
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ◦p < 0.1
Table 3.4: Predicting transfers when dictators receive transfer information of a comparison
dictator who has the same endowment ($2). OLS regressions with intercept and robust standard
errors predicting dictator transfers when the received transfer information for comparison is from a
comparison dictator who has the same endowment, i.e., medium ($2). Receiving information about
a transfer of zero in PRIVATE-BASE serves as the reference category. Fair indicates whether the
comparison dictator transferred the equal split of that dictators endowment. Low-medium indicates that
the dictator chose the information source low-medium. Estimates are based on models with treatment
dummies Public, Pun, Public*Pun and Low-medium as predictors and, if included, the demographic
controls Age, Male, Experience. Pun indicates whether recipients could punish dictators, Public indicates
whether recipients were informed about the comparison dictator’s transfer. Regressions (2), (4), and (6)
exclude three observations from individuals who did not respond to demographic questions.
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Transfers low-medium medium-medium medium-high
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low Fair 0.1485 0.1786∗
(0.0935) (0.0854)
Medium Zero 0.0379 0.0190
(0.0944) (0.0894)
Medium Fair 0.1666◦ 0.1187 0.1339◦ 0.1792∗ 0.4104∗∗ 0.4054∗∗
(0.0972) (0.0995) (0.0774) (0.0753) (0.1525) (0.1522)
High Zero 0.2059 0.2091
(0.1472) (0.1477)
High Fair 0.1557 0.1567
(0.1367) (0.1360)
Age 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0063∗ 0.0051
(0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0062)
Male 0.0427 −0.1305◦ −0.0680
(0.0671) (0.0736) (0.1066)
Experience 0.0014 0.0041 −0.0035
(0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0135)
Public −0.0233 0.0337 0.0487 0.0661 0.0074 0.0179
(0.1015) (0.0941) (0.1109) (0.1081) (0.1605) (0.1668)
Pun 0.1986 0.1710 0.1426 0.1331 0.0226 0.0090
(0.1218) (0.1170) (0.0935) (0.0905) (0.1525) (0.1567)
Public*Pun −0.0926 −0.1036 −0.0517 −0.0528 −0.1536 −0.1445
(0.1479) (0.1427) (0.1501) (0.1492) (0.2118) (0.2137)
(Intercept) 0.3006∗∗ −0.1978 0.4582∗∗∗ 0.2682◦ 0.4052∗∗ 0.2852
(0.0937) (0.1337) (0.0822) (0.1369) (0.1319) (0.2423)
R2 0.0750 0.2028 0.0347 0.0846 0.0744 0.0863
Adj. R2 0.0279 0.1393 0.0093 0.0413 0.0189 0.0015
Num. obs. 125 123 157 156 107 107
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ◦p < 0.1
Table 3.5: Predicting transfers by chosen source of social comparison information. OLS
regressions with intercept and robust standard errors predicting dictator transfers. We ran separate
regressions for each subset of dictators choosing the source of information comparison indicated in the
column header. Medium Fair (Medium Zero) indicates whether the dictator received information about an
equal split transfer (a zero transfer) of a comparison dictator with a medium endowment ($2). The names
of the other predictors are analogous. Low Zero serves as the reference observation for subjects choosing
low-medium, Medium Zero as the reference observation for medium-medium and medium-high models.
Estimates are based on models with treatment dummies Public, Pun, Public*Pun as predictors and,
if included, the demographic controls Age, Male, Experience. Pun indicates whether recipients could
punish dictators, Public indicates whether the information was made public. Regression (2) excludes
two observations and regression (4) excludes one observation from individuals who did not respond to
demographic questions in models with demographic controls.
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Chapter 4
Social-comparison engineering in
children
4.1 Introduction
Performance evaluations are ubiquitous in today’s social and economic life. Admissions,
promotions, grades, as well as the allocation of various benefits regularly rely on relative
evaluations comparing several candidates. An individual’s performance depends on the rules of
the evaluation procedure and the other persons he or she is compared with, i.e., the comparison
standard. Indeed, a large body of evidence shows that the comparison standard strongly affects
evaluators’ perceptions at school (Marsh and Parker, 1984; Marsh et al., 2000), in university
(Marsh et al., 2000), or at work (Garcia et al., 2010; Clark and Senik, 2010; Babcock et al.,
1996; Prendergast and Topel, 1993). At school, for example, pupils with low- rather than
high-performing peers not only view their own academic performance more positively, but, for
a given level of performance, they are also more likely to receive positive evaluations (Marsh
et al., 2000). Alike, receiving extra care or social benefits may be more likely when others
appear to perform better than oneself.
To receive positive relative evaluations, people may lobby for changes in the rules of the
evaluation procedure (e.g. Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt, 2006) or engage in outright sabotage
(e.g. Carpenter et al., 2010; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011). Alternatively, a strategic selection
of favorable comparison standards, i.e., social-comparison engineering, may be a possible remedy.
By selecting a lower comparison standard, an individual may not only improve his or her chances
of receiving favorable relative evaluations, but, most likely, may also improve the own social image
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(Leary and Baumeister, 2000; Rudolph et al., 2005; Frank, 1985) and personal (economic) well-
being (Marsh et al., 2000; Crocker and Canevello, 2008; Verduyn et al., 2015; Frank, 1985; Clark
and Senik, 2010). For instance, to increase his or her chances of receiving positive evaluations, a
researcher may select a good rather than an excellent faculty to receive higher approval from the
other faculty members and potentially higher chances of promotion. Similarly, pupils or students
may choose which class or sports team to join, or, simply, which classmates to sit next to.
Yet, social-comparison engineering may also come with the downside of creating an internal
conflict between the individual’s preference for a favorable evaluation and the preference for
certain strongly favored comparison standards: For example, researchers may strive to be part
of a highly-respected faculty, and pupils may desire to sit next to ‘the better ones’.
While adults have been found to seek (avoid) situations that will likely lead to favorable
(unfavorable) evaluations (Garcia et al., 2013; Tesser, 1988), research on children’s behavior in
such situations is missing yet. Previous research on children’s behavior solely focused on how
children perform in competitive situations (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Almås et al., 2015)
or how they conform to social expectations, e.g., to manage their reputation (Banerjee, 2000;
Engelmann et al., 2012). Yet, up to now, it is unknown whether and from which age on children
actively shape their comparison standards in relative evaluations, i.e., situations where others
make decisions relevant to them. Also, little is known about the motivational and cognitive
processes supporting children’s ability to shape their comparison standards.1 In this paper, we
therefore investigate experimentally when and how the ability of social-comparison engineering
develops.
To study systematically the development of social-comparison engineering, we let children
from 4 to 9 years of age select their comparison standards in an economic experiment. To create
a performance evaluation of high relevance to children, we employed children’s drawings (Butler,
1989; Fu and Lee, 2007; Chevallier et al., 2012). First, each child made three drawings from
three sample photographs (e.g., tree, house, and bike). Then, for each of the child’s drawings,
each child privately chose one out of the two other drawings to be positioned side by side to
the child’s own drawing. By design, one other drawing was of low accuracy and the other one
was of high accuracy, such that the accuracy of the child’s drawing of the photograph was in
between. To elicit children’s preferences for the other drawings, in the Baseline treatment, the
1There is a large body of developmental research investigating children’s allocations of valuable resources
within social interactions (Sutter et al., 2019). This research suggests that it is rather the underlying motivations
(e.g., selfishness, egalitarianism) than cognitive abilities that cause substantial changes in allocation behavior
during childhood (Almås et al., 2010; Blake et al., 2014; Buttelmann and Böhm, 2014; Fehr et al., 2008).
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child’s choice had no material consequences. In the two other treatments, the child’s drawing
was evaluated relative to the other drawing and this evaluation determined whether or not the
child won a prize.
In the treatment BetterWins, children learned that they would win a prize if the own
drawing was more accurate than the other drawing. Thus, in order to win the prize, the child
had to choose the less accurate other drawing as the comparison standard. In contrast, in the
treatment WorseWins, children learned that they would win a prize if the own drawing was less
accurate than the other drawing. Thus, in order to win the prize, the child had to choose the
more accurate drawing as the comparison standard. The Baseline informs us about children’s
basic preference for either high- or low-accuracy other drawings. When children in Baseline
reveal a preference for the high-accuracy other drawing, BetterWins generates an internal
conflict (because winning the prize required selecting low-accuracy rather than high-accuracy
other drawings), while WorseWins does not. Yet, when children in Baseline reveal a preference
for the low-accuracy other drawing, WorseWins generates an internal conflict (because winning
the prize required selecting high-accuracy rather than low-accuracy other drawings), while
BetterWins does not. Notably, to pin down the extent to which motivational and cognitive
processes explain children’s choices, we also elicited children’s motivation to win, their desire to
be liked by others, and a measure of self-control (inhibitory control in the day-night stroop task
(Gerstadt et al., 1994)).
We find that in Baseline children strongly prefer the high-accuracy other drawing, regardless
of their age. Notably, most children refer to the other drawing’s beauty when explaining their
choice. This suggests that children face an internal conflict in BetterWins, but not inWorseWins.
Strikingly, in BetterWins only children from about 6-7 years of age win the prize in about 79%
of the trials whereas younger children’s behavior does not differ from random choice (49% of the
trials). In WorseWins, by contrast, older and younger children win similarly often and they win
in about 75% of the trials. Further analyses suggest that the age differences found in BetterWins
can best be attributed to children’s improved self-control, which might have enabled them to
overcome their preference for high-accuracy other drawings. We thus present first experimental
evidence that self-control is not only important for individual decision-making, but also for (the
development of) strategic behavior in performance evaluations and, perhaps, social situations
more generally.
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4.2 Experiment
4.2.1 Participants and Procedure
Experimental sessions took place in 7 kindergartens and 6 schools, with a maximum of two
sessions per institution. The sample consisted of N = 172 children. The precondition for
participation was a minimum age of 4 years, 0 months and a maximum age of 9 years, 0
months. Before running the study, we obtained parents’ and/or a legal guardian’s informed
consent and ethics approval from the Ethics Committee of the Department of Economics and
the Social Sciences at the University of Cologne. All methods were performed in accordance
with the relevant guidelines and regulations of the ethics approval. Each session took about 30
minutes and was videotaped. The specific verbal instructions are available in the Appendix
4.C. The experiment took place around March and April 2018.
Children were randomly assigned to one of three between-subjects treatments: Baseline,
BetterWins, and WorseWins. The test sessions were conducted with individual participants by
a group of experimenters, trained after a detailed script. When investigating possible treatment
effects, we pooled participants based on the median age (6.48) into two age groups: younger
children (4.0-6.5 y/o) and older children (6.5-9.0 y/o), with no child aging 6.5 years. The
respective sample sizes were: Baseline: 30 younger children, 27 older children; BetterWins: 27
younger children, 29 older children; WorseWins: 30 younger children, 29 older children. Two
additional younger children were excluded from the analyses because they did not pass the
control questions regarding understanding (see below). We use non-parametric statistical tests,
e.g., Fisher’s exact test and the Mann-Whitney U test. All reported tests are two-tailed.
4.2.2 Experimental Design
We employed a drawing task. In our main treatments, children chose one out of two (pre-selected)
other drawings, which then served as their comparison standard in a relative evaluation of their
own drawing. In particular, children proceeded through the following stages: (1) the drawing
task, (2) questions of motivation and understanding, (3) the choice of other drawings (where
instructions were partly treatment-specific), and finally (4) a self-control task.
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Stage 1: Drawing task
In the drawing task, each child made three drawings from three sample photographs, depicting
objects that were familiar to children and gender-neutral (a tree, a bird, a house, a giraffe, an
owl, a bike, or the Cologne cathedral). Previous research has shown that drawings are typically
of high relevance to children (Butler, 1989; Fu and Lee, 2007; Chevallier et al., 2012). For each
kindergarten or school, children always received the same three randomly assigned photographs.
Children had 3 minutes time to draw each of the photographs. The experimenter instructed
children to draw as accurately as possible while a sandglass was running to keep time. At this
point in time, children did not know about any treatment-specific rules.
Stage 2: Questions of motivation and understanding
The questions about motivation and understanding were asked once children had finished their
drawings. Children were asked questions about (i) their desire to win in competitive games, (ii)
their desire to be good at drawing, and (iii) their concerns about what others think of them
(which we re-phrased for children as the desire to be ‘liked by others’). Children had to indicate
their level of motivation in response to these questions by pulling on a ruler (20cm length).
Thereafter, children were asked questions of understanding concerning the notion of accuracy of
drawings relative to a photograph. For this purpose, children received a folder containing two
drawings of a sample photograph. Children were asked which of the two drawings was more
accurate and which was less accurate in comparison to the photograph. Previous research has
shown that children are able to assess the accuracy of drawings from about 3 years of age (Fu and
Lee, 2007; Chevallier et al., 2012). In the treatments BetterWins and WorseWins (see below),
children then had to point at the drawing that should win according to the rule explained by the
experimenter. If children did not answer correctly for all of the questions of understanding, they
entered another trial. Children went through a maximum of four trials using different materials,
and they were excluded from the sample only if they failed in all four trials.2
Stage 3: Choice of other drawings
Next, children needed to make three subsequent choices. In each of their choices, they had
to choose one of two other drawings. For each of their three own drawings from photographs,
2Note that children’s understanding of the treatment-specific instructions, as indicated by the control questions
(see Appendix 4.A), was very high also among the younger children: In each condition, at least 89% of the children
responded correctly on the first trial and only 2 children had to be excluded because they did not manage to
respond correctly within four trials.
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children received a folder containing the two other drawings of the same photograph. The other
drawings had been drawn by other children prior to the study. The experimenter explained that
these drawings were made by other children and that the other children had the same amount of
time and the same sample photograph to draw from. We pre-selected the other drawings such
that the children’s drawings were of middle accuracy. Importantly, children were only allowed to
inspect the folder once the experimenter had his or her back turned, thus avoiding confounds due
to the direct observation through the experimenter. The experimenter then explained to children
that they would need to pick one of the two other drawings from the folder and lay it next to
their own drawing. Before children actually picked a drawing, the experimenter explained the
treatment-specific rules (see below, Subsection 4.2.3).
Stage 4: Self-control task
After children had chosen the other drawings, children proceeded to the self-control task. In
particular, we administered the day-night task (Gerstadt et al., 1994), which is a stroop task
customized to the targeted age group. Akin to the ‘Marshmallow task’ (see Mischel et al., 1989) or
measures of economic time preferences (for a review see Sutter et al., 2019), it measures the ability
to inhibit conflicting impulses. It has been shown to correlate positively with academic success
and negatively with criminal behavior (Diamond, 2013). Children received a sheet with several
pictures of suns and moons and needed to either inhibit the prepotent response of matching the
word to the objects they see (incongruent trial, e.g., say “sun” whenever seeing a moon) or not
(congruent trial, e.g., say “sun” whenever seeing a sun). For each type of trial, congruent and
incongruent, we recorded how often children said the correct word within a set response time
of 45 seconds (following the procedure used in, e.g., Archibald and Kerns (1999)). We used the
number of correct utterances in the incongruent trial as a measure of children’s level of inhibitory
control.
4.2.3 Treatments
Before children chose one of the other drawings, they learned the rules of the evaluation
procedure. In Baseline, the experimenter told children that s/he will look at the child’s
drawing and the other drawing after children had made a choice. Children received two gold
tokens regardless of which drawing they had chosen from the folder. This treatment indicated
children’s basic preferences independent of any prize-winning incentives and thus allowed
identifying which of the two other treatments would elicit an internal conflict (see also the
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Hypotheses section). Further, in this treatment Stage 3 (Choice of other drawings) preceded
Stage 2 (Questions of motivation and understanding), since children’s understanding was less
important in this treatment.
Contrary to Baseline, in BetterWins and WorseWins, whether or not children won a prize
(i.e., received a positive evaluation) depended on the comparison standard that children selected.
In BetterWins, children won, if the experimenter evaluated their drawing to be more accurate
than the selected other drawing. In WorseWins, children won, if the experimenter evaluated
their drawing to be less accurate than the selected other drawing. If children won the evaluation
process in any of these two treatments, they received three gold tokens. If they did not win, they
received ‘only’ one gold token. Note further that in both treatments, the experimenter always
evaluated the children’s drawing as more accurate only if the child chose the low-accuracy other
drawing. At the end of the experiment, children could use the gold tokens they accumulated over
the experiment to exchange for differing age-appropriate rewards (e.g., a marble, a roundabout,
or a sports ball). In each of the treatments, we also asked children for their (qualitative) reasoning
of why they had chosen a particular other drawing after children had made their last of three
choices of the other drawings.
4.3 Hypotheses
To successfully engage in social-comparison engineering, children need to understand the
potential consequences of social comparisons for their evaluations. For instance, children need
to understand that one can achieve a better evaluation by choosing a lower comparison
standard. While even three year-olds correctly understand and use social comparison
statements, e.g., “My picture is better than yours.” (e.g., Mosatche and Bragonier, 1981),
children develop a basic understanding of the potential consequences of social comparisons for
their evaluations only around late preschool age. Rather young preschool children often do not
change their self-evaluations after experiencing relative failure or negative feedback (Butler,
1989; Ruble et al., 1976, 1980; Pomerantz et al., 1995; Ruble et al., 1994; Sutter and
Glätzle-Rützler, 2015). Only from about 5 years of age, children start to rate their own
performance less positively when another child has performed better than the child her/himself
(Magid and Schulz, 2010; Butler, 1998; Rhodes and Brickman, 2008). Further studies have
shown that older children of about 11 to 12 years of age tend to name classmates or friends as
their comparison standards that enhance their evaluations (Tesser et al., 1984; Altermatt and
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Pomerantz, 2005; Huguet et al., 2001). Somewhat related, research on children’s strategic
reasoning also suggests a development from about 7 years of age. This research investigates, for
instance, whether children are able to think ahead a few moves (Brocas and Carrillo, 2018a,b),
or whether they anticipate others’ deceptive moves (Sher et al., 2014). We thus recruited
children between the ages 4 and 9 to see whether also younger children would be able to select
their comparison standards strategically in an age-appropriate situation.
Social-comparison engineering might be difficult for children (and even for adults) because,
to enhance their relative evaluations, they have to overcome their preference for certain highly
favored comparison standards. Hence, it was of high importance to pin down children’s
preferences over low-accuracy other drawings and high-accuracy other drawings to see where an
internal conflict might occur. In this regard, Frey (1994)’s distinction between basic and
revealed preferences is helpful, which he developed to describe people’s preferences for art.
Basic preferences refer to the “fundamental wishes of people and are taken as exogenously
given” (p. 12), whereas revealed preferences are governed by external (economic or societal)
constraints. In line with this definition, in the treatment Baseline, we aimed at eliciting
children’s basic preferences, that is, their preferences independent of any prize-winning
incentives (i.e., economic constraints).3 Treatment Baseline was thus exploratory as we did not
have clear a priori hypotheses about what children’s basic preference would be. We merely
expected children to exhibit a preference for either low- or high-accuracy other drawings.
Aesthetic considerations (Dutton, 2009), or similarity perceptions (Meer, 2011) might have
played a role in this decision, but neither economic nor psychological theorists have addressed
how aesthetic preferences come about in great detail. We interpret any preference different
from pure random choice discovered in Baseline as an indicator for an internal conflict in one of
the treatments with prize-winning incentives (BetterWins and WorseWins). Choosing against
this preference might be like resisting a temptation (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001; Fudenberg and
Levine, 2006), which might be overcome if motivations to win are sufficiently strong or if
self-control has developed to a certain extent (see below for hypotheses on the psychological
processes). A development in children’s ability for social-comparison engineering, i.e., age
3Of course, we cannot entirely exclude the presence of external constraints, since children make a choice which
is subsequently observed: Children might have desired to “bask in reflected glory” or to liken themselves to “the
better ones” by selecting a high-accuracy other drawings (Cialdini et al., 1976; Cialdini and De Nicholas, 1989;
Collins, 1996). Alternatively, they might have desired to enhance their self-image as a good drawer or winner by
selecting a low-accuracy other drawing (Tesser, 1988). Nevertheless, we contend that the elicited preferences are
as close as we can get to basic preferences, even if they cannot be ‘basic’ in a strict sense. However, to measure
whether or not children faced an internal conflict, it is irrelevant where precisely children’s preferences originated
in or whether they are ‘basic’ in a strict sense.
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differences, should then occur in the treatment where children face an internal conflict, but not
in the treatment where they do not face an internal conflict.4 We sum up our expectations for
the two different cases by differentiating in Hypothesis 1 (H) and Hypothesis 1 (L).
If children exhibit a basic preference for high-accuracy other drawings, children should face
an internal conflict in the treatment BetterWins. Hence, we also expected age differences in
social-comparison engineering, i.e, the ability to win the prize, to occur in this treatment:
Hypothesis 1 (H): In BetterWins, younger children should win less often than older children
(by choosing low-accuracy other drawings as their comparison standard). By contrast, children
in the treatment WorseWins should win similarly often regardless of their age.
If children exhibit a basic preference for low-accuracy other drawings, children should face
an internal conflict in the treatment WorseWins. Hence, we also expected age differences in
social-comparison engineering, i.e, the ability to win the prize, to occur in this treatment:
Hypothesis 1 (L): In WorseWins, younger children should win less often than older children
(by choosing high-accuracy other drawings as their comparison standard). By contrast, children
in the treatment BetterWins should win similarly often regardless of their age.
With respect to the psychological processes, we hypothesized that (i) children’s desire for a
positive evaluation outcome and (ii) their self-control should play a role in children’s developing
abilities for social-comparison engineering. A desire for a better evaluation outcome (i.e.,
winning) might arise either due to extrinsic (reward) or social image (reputation) concerns.
Developmental research shows that a desire for positive evaluations is already present in young
children. An observational study (Stipek et al., 1992) found that already 3-year-olds ‘look
away’ after losing and express joy after winning in competitive and non-competitive tasks.
Further, 4-5-year-old preschoolers (i) inflate their own performance relative to that of others
(Ruble et al., 1994, 1976), and (ii) prefer tasks where they performed better (rather than
worse) than others (Butler, 1998). Also the economic literature studying the development of
competitive preferences in children (e.g. Sutter and Glätzle-Rützler, 2015) suggests that
already children from 3 years expect to belong to the better ones (i.e., strong overconfidence),
which is indicative of their desire to be better than other children and of their desire to earn
rewards. Children from about 4 to 5 years of age are not only motivated to win, but they also
4Particularly among younger children, there might be differences in winning frequencies between the treatment
where children face an internal conflict and the treatment where they do not face such a conflict. Note that however
that in the treatment where children do not face an internal conflict, we cannot tell whether children are engaging
in social-comparison engineering or whether they simply follow their basic preference (elicited in Baseline).
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care about what others think, or equivalently, they want to be liked by others and have a good
reputation. For example, young children share more with other children when peers or
experimenters are watching (Engelmann et al., 2012; Shaw and Olson, 2014; Engelmann et al.,
2013, 2016; Herrmann et al., 2019) than when nobody is watching. Further, they refrain from
showing off, and they engage in flattery behavior (Banerjee, 2000; Banerjee et al., 2010; Fu and
Lee, 2007; Bennett and Yeeles, 1990). The developmental literature thus suggests that even
before children have a deeper understanding of social comparisons, they have a strong desire to
win and care about what others think. Accordingly, even though children’s desires for positive
evaluations might predict their performance to some extent, these desires are unlikely to
explain age differences in social-comparison engineering.
Importantly, we also expected social-comparison engineering to require some level of
self-control because children might need to exert self-control over their own basic preferences
(elicited in Baseline) to achieve positive evaluations. In the psychological literature, the two
most important components of self-control (or self-regulatory abilities) relate to children’s
working memory, i.e., the ability to keep goal-relevant information in mind, and inhibitory
control, i.e., the ability to resist temptations and to not act impulsively (Diamond, 2013).
Inhibitory control has been shown greatly benefit people’s school and health outcomes (Moffitt
et al., 2011; Diamond, 2013). Inhibitory control increases around the age of 4-6 years (Blair
and Razza, 2007), and it improves further in later years (Zelazo and Carlson, 2012; Archibald
and Kerns, 1999). Particularly inhibitory control might contribute to explaining children’s
developing abilities for social-comparison engineering, because they need to resist the
temptation to choose the preferred other drawings. Hence, inhibitory control might explain
age-related differences in children’s winning frequencies in the treatment where they face an
internal conflict, i.e., their ability to select the prize-winning comparison standard. Hypothesis
2 sums up our expectations regarding the psychological processes.5,6
Hypothesis 2: In the treatment where children face an internal conflict, their increasing level
of inhibitory control, but not their desire to win or their desire to be liked by others, should explain
their ability to win by selecting the prize-winning comparison standard.
5Inhibitory control measures facets that are related to time preferences. Mischel et al. (1989)’s seminal study
on the delay of gratification showed that the performance of 4 year old children in the marshmallow task predicted
their social and cognitive competence as adolescents. Further, economic time preferences, like inhibitory control,
increase between the ages 3 and 6 (Sutter et al., 2015), and are also important to predict field behavior, e.g., drug
misuse (Sutter et al., 2013).
6Note that we also elicited children’s desire to be good at drawing as a measure of their motivation to participate
in our task, but we did not expect children’s drawing motivation to vary with age based on previous work, e.g.
by Butler (1989), or explain any of the age differences observed.
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4.4 Results
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Nu
m
be
r o
f C
ho
ice
s f
or
 H
igh
−A
cc
ur
ac
y D
ra
wi
ng
s
4−6.5 y/o 6.5−9 y/o 4−6.5 y/o 6.5−9 y/o 4−6.5 y/o 6.5−9 y/o
Baseline BetterWins WorseWins
0
1
2
3
Figure 4.1: Number of trials in which children chose the high-accuracy other drawing (out of three) as
a function of treatment and age group. The two age groups 4-6.5 y/o and 6.5-9 y/o were constructed
by splitting the sample at the age of 6.5 (median 6.48). Circles show individual observations and violins
show rotated histograms. Diamonds represent medians and boxes represent the interquartile ranges, i.e.,
the range between the 25th and the 75th percentile.
Figure 4.1 shows the distributions and medians of the number of choices (out of 3) for the
high- vs. low-accuracy other drawings as a function of treatment and age group.7 The figure
shows that, in the Baseline treatment where the selection of the other drawing had no material
consequences, children exhibited a clear preference for the high-accuracy other drawing (4-6.5
years old: mean 2.17 (out of 3 trials, i.e., 72% of the trials), SD = 0.99; Fisher’s test against
chance, p = .016; 6.5-9 years old: mean 2.30 (77%), SD = 1.14; Fisher’s test against chance:
p < .001). This preference was regardless of children’s age (Mann-Whitney U test as for the
difference between age groups: Z = -0.87, p = .399, r = 0.11, Spearman’s rank correlation
between number of high-accuracy drawings and age, ρ = .018, p =0.893). Result 1 sums up the
findings regarding children’s basic preferences.
7Note that for illustration purposes, two age groups 4-6.5 years old and 6.5-9 years old were constructed by
splitting the sample at the age of 6.5 (median 6.48), with no child aging exactly 6.5 years. In our statistical
analyses below, we report non-parametric tests between different age groups and complementing rank correlation
tests using age as a continuous variable.
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Result 1: Regardless of their age, children exhibited a strong preference for high-accuracy other
drawings in the Baseline treatment.
Given the clear preference for the high-accuracy other drawing in Baseline, in line with
Hypothesis 1 (H), children should experience no internal conflict in WorseWins, where their own
drawing had to be less accurate to win the prize, i.e., choosing high-accuracy other drawings
made them win the prize. In contrast, in BetterWins, a preference for the high-accuracy other
drawing conflicted with choosing the prize-winning action, i.e., a low-accuracy other drawing. In
line with this assumption, in WorseWins children predominantly chose the high-accuracy other
drawing, regardless of their age (4-6.5 y/o: mean 2.20 (73%), SD = 1.03; Fisher’s test against
chance: p = .009; 6.5-9 y/o: mean 2.17 (72%), SD = 0.97; Fisher’s test against chance: p
= .008; Mann-Whitney U test as for the difference between age groups: Z = -0.31, p = .771,
r = 0.04, Spearman’s rank correlation between winning frequencies and age, ρ = .103, p =
0.445). By contrast, in line with Hypothesis 1 (H), in BetterWins, when an internal conflict
was likely, children’s performance increased with age and their behavior substantially differed
from Baseline and WorseWins. Notably, younger children faced difficulties in choosing the prize-
winning comparison standard: They chose both the high-accuracy and the low-accuracy other
drawing similarly often in BetterWins (mean 1.52 (51%), SD = 1.16, Fisher’s test against chance:
p = .180). In contrast, older children only rarely chose the high-accuracy other drawing in this
condition (mean 0.62 (21%), SD = 1.02; Fisher’s test against chance: p = .009).8 In direct
support of Hypothesis 1 (H), younger children won less often than older children in BetterWins
(Mann-Whitney U test as for the difference between age groups: Z = 3.12, p = .001, r = 0.42,
Spearman’s rank correlation, ρ = 0.344, p =.009), and there was no similar age increase in the
treatment WorseWins (Mann-Whitney U test as for the difference between age groups: Z =
-0.31, p = .771, r = 0.04, Spearman’s rank correlation between winning frequencies and age,
ρ = 0.018, p =.893). Also in support of Hypothesis 1 (H), younger children won less often in
BetterWins (mean 1.48 (49%), SD = 1.16) than in WorseWins (mean 2.20 (73%), SD = 0.97;
Mann-Whitney U test as for the difference in winning frequencies: Z = 2.45, p = .015, r =
0.33), whereas older children won equally often in BetterWins (mean 2.38 (79%), SD = 1.02)
and WorseWins (mean 2.17 (72%), SD = 0.97; Z = -1.24, p = .232, r = 0.16). Thus, younger
children faced greater difficulties to achieve positive evaluations in social-comparison situations,
8Nevertheless, both younger and older children showed a choice behavior significantly different from that in
Baseline, and chose the low-accuracy other drawing that maximized prizes significantly more often compared to
Baseline (4-6.5 y/o: Z = 2.15, p = .033, r = 0.29; 6.5-9 y/o: Z = 4.55, p < .001, r = 0.61). This indicates that
even though younger children faced great difficulties in choosing the prize-winning comparison standard, their
behavior was affected by the prize-winning incentives to some extent.
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particularly when there was an internal conflict. Children’s qualitative reasoning, which we
assessed after their choices, further supported our interpretation of children’s choice behavior.
Children in Baseline referred to the beauty of the high-accuracy other drawing (without making
a comparison statement) as the dominant reason for their choice (in 39% of the cases). Children
in the treatments with prize-winning incentives, in contrast, referred more to the quality of the
other drawing relative to their own drawing (in 57% of the cases in WorseWins and in 50% of
the cases in BetterWins; for detailed results, see Appendix 4.B). Result 2 sums up the findings
regarding Hypothesis 1 (H).
Result 2: When children faced an internal conflict in BetterWins, older children won
significantly more often than younger children (by choosing a low-accuracy other drawing). By
contrast, children won similarly often regardless of their age group, if they did not face an
internal conflict (in WorseWins).
Next, we investigated the psychological processes which might explain the age differences
found in children’s social-comparison engineering in BetterWins. We did not find any
meaningful differences between younger and older children in the motivation to win (12.2 vs.
10.5, respectively), and the motivation to be liked by other children (14.0 vs. 13.6, respectively)
(Mann-Whitney U tests as for the difference between age groups, all p-values > .10,
Spearman’s rank correlation between the motivations and age, ρ ≈ 0, p-values > .10). Yet, we
did find an age-related difference in children’s inhibitory control as indicated by their
performance in the age-appropriate day-night stroop-task (4-6.5 y/o: mean 26, SD = 9; 6.5-9
y/o: mean 39, SD = 8; Mann-Whitney U test as for the difference between age groups: Z =
4.71, p < .001, r = 0.63, Spearman’s rank correlation between inhibitory control and age, ρ =
.620, p-values < .001). Based on these observations, we investigated whether older children’s
increased level of inhibitory control, their desire to win, or their desire to be liked by others
explained their higher likelihood to win, when there was an internal conflict in BetterWins. To
this end, in Table 4.1, we report several multi-level linear probability models predicting
children’s likelihood to win in a given trial (out of three). All our models account for the
dependencies at the level of children’s daycare facilities and across children’s trials.
In Model 1, we only include children’s age group as a dummy variable indicating whether or
not children were 6.5 to 9 years old. In this model, we again find support for the age difference
documented in previous non-parametric tests (b6.5-9 y/o = 0.299, SE = .097, p = .002). In Model
2, we do not account for children’s age group, but only include their motivation to win, their
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Win
(1) (2) (3)
6.5-9 y/o 0.299∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗
(0.097) (0.121)
Motivation to win 0.011 0.009
(0.008) (0.011)
Motivation to be liked by others −0.007 0.006
(0.008) (0.010)
Inhibitory control 0.009∗ −0.014∗
(0.005) (0.008)
6.5-9 y/o* Motivation to win 0.006
(0.014)
6.5-9 y/o*Motivation to be liked by others −0.020
(0.014)
6.5-9 y/o*Inhibitory control 0.029∗∗
(0.012)
Constant 0.494∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.052) (0.080)
Observations 168 168 168
Log Likelihood −95.535 −108.522 −113.354
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 4.1: Linear probability models predicting children’s likelihood to win in treatment BetterWins.
motivation to be liked by others, and their inhibitory control. This model sheds light on the
extent to which the motivational and cognitive variables explained children’s likelihood to win.
In Model 2, inhibitory control, but not children’s motivation to win or their motivation to be
liked by others, systematically predicted their likelihood to win (bMotivation to win = 0.011, SE
= .008, p = .143, bMotivation to be liked by others = −.007, SE = 0.008, p = .339, bInhibitory control
= .009, SE = 0.005, p = .057). Model 3 extended Model 2 by also accounting for children’s
age. In particular, we interacted children’s age group (whether or not they were 6.5-9 years
old) with their desire to win, their desire to be liked by others, and their inhibitory control,
respectively, and thus estimated how the relationships between our motivational and cognitive
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variables differ by age. The younger children (4-6.5 y/o) were the reference category in this
model, so the coefficient on Inhibitory control measured the extent to which higher inhibitory
control increased the likelihood to win in younger children (analogously for Motivation to win
and Motivation to be liked by others). The interaction between age group and Inhibitory control,
by contrast, measured the extent to which higher inhibitory control increased the likelihood to
win in older children (6.5-9 y/o) (analogously for Motivation to win and Motivation to be liked
by others). Interestingly, supporting Hypothesis 2, we find that while the motivation to win and
the motivation to be liked by others did not explain children’s likelihood to win in either younger
or older children (all coefficients’ p-values > .10), higher inhibitory control significantly increased
the likelihood to win in older children (bInhibitory control*6.5-9 y/o = .029, SE = .012, p = .015).9
Result 3: When there was an internal conflict in BetterWins, older children’s, but not younger
children’s, increasing level of inhibitory control explained their ability to choose the prize-winning
comparison standard.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Our findings suggest that the ability to strategically select social comparison standards in order
to achieve positive evaluations, even against the own basic preferences, develops in middle
childhood. In our experiment, children of all ages showed a strong preference for choosing other
drawings of high accuracy when there was no evaluation (Baseline). Likewise, if the choice of
other drawings was followed by an evaluation in which the child won a prize if their own
drawing was less accurate than the chosen drawing (WorseWins), children of all ages managed
to win the prize similarly often. From just looking at this comparison, however, it remains
unclear whether children simply followed their preferences or indeed strategically chose the
high-accuracy other drawing in this condition. The more telling treatment is the one in which
children faced the evaluation in which they would win a prize for their drawing being the more
accurate drawing (BetterWins). Here, children had to inhibit their basic preference for other
drawings of high accuracy in order to receive a positive evaluation. Only older children (6.5-9
y/o) were able to engineer the social-comparison situation when facing an internal conflict,
outperforming younger children (4-6.5 y/o).
We also investigated the mechanism underlying children’s social-comparison engineering:
9The reported statistical patterns remain unchanged, if we use children’s age (in years) instead of their age
group as a variable.
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While the responses in children’s motivation to win or to be liked by others did not
substantially vary by age, children’s inhibitory control increased significantly between 4 and 9
years of age. Further, increased levels of inhibitory control in the older children, but not in the
younger children, explained children’s increasing ability to select the prize-winning comparison
standard. This finding suggests that inhibitory control needs to have developed to a sufficient
degree such that it can support successful social-comparison engineering.
These findings have broad implications for our understanding of the developmental processes
underlying social-comparison engineering as well as children’s ability to strategically affect others’
payoff-relevant evaluations. Previous research has shown that self-control is important for mental
and physical health or academic success (Moffitt et al., 2011; Blair and Razza, 2007; Diamond,
2013) as well as for individual decision-making, e.g., in the marshmallow task or gambling tasks
(Mischel et al., 1989; Garon, 2016). Our results broaden this perspective and suggest that self-
control is also important for (the development of) acting strategically in social situations, and,
more generally, when facing payoff-relevant evaluations.
To conclude, we provide clear evidence that social-comparison engineering undergoes a
significant development. The ability to inhibit conflicting impulses provides children with the
opportunity to strategically shape social comparisons made by others, and thus, to increase
their success and, potentially, also their well-being.
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Appendices
4.A Children’s answers to questions of understanding
Age group [4.0y-6.5y) [6.5y, 9y]
Treatment Base BW WW Base BW WW
N 30 27 30 27 29 29
Male 53% 56% 53% 44% 48% 55%
Q: 1st Trial 100% 89% 80% 96% 97% 76%
Q: 2nd Trial - 89% 97% 100% 100% 100%
Q: 3rd Trial - 96% 100% - - -
Q: 4th Trial - 100% - - - -
Table 4.2: Percentage of children who correctly answered all the control questions of understanding
(Questions 5-7 in the Verbal Instructions). Two additional kids aged 4.5 and 6.2 failed at all trials and
are excluded.
4.B Reasons for children’s choices
Treatment Baseline WorseWins BetterWins
Choice of other drawing High-accuracy High-accuracy Low-accuracy
n 23 14 14
Reasons
„it‘s beautiful“ 39.1% 21.4% 14.3%
„it looks more like the photo“ 30.4% 57.1%
„it looks like mine“ 21.7%
„mine is better“ 50.0%
„this yields more tokens“ 21.4% 21.4%
Table 4.3: Children’s responses when asked for their reasons of why they chose a drawing after they
had chosen their last other drawing. Answers were categorized by pre-specified categories. Reasons for
choices of other drawings were too low to classify for the forllowing cases: Baseline, low-accuracy drawings
(n=9); WorseWins, low-accuracy drawings (n=7); and BetterWins, high-accuracy drawings (n=7).
 Drawings from photographs 
Greeting 
 
Hello [name of the child]! I am [name of confederate, typically a female student of 
psychology or education who received a training to complete the interview].  
We will soon play games where you can earn tokens. 
First, we will draw, and then we will play the games with the tokens.  
You can later exchange your tokens for one of the following prizes. [show prizes] 
Try your best, so you earn lots of tokens! 
 
Draw 
Now we will draw. On the whole, we will make three drawings. You will later need the 
drawings in the games, where you can win the tokens. 
 
Look, here is a pencil, a binder, a paper and a photograph. When I tell you, you draw the 
photograph. Take care that your drawing looks like the photograph. We know it’s not easy, 
but try your best.  
 
You have three minutes. You start when I turn the sandglass and the time is over when all 
sand has run down the sandglass.  
Some rules: Tracing is forbidden. You may not only use this pencil and no rubber. Do you 
have any questions?  
 
You can now start to draw the photograph.  
It’s not about being done first. Take care that your drawing looks like the photograph.  
 
® [turn the sandglass]  
[after 1 minute] Now one minute has passed. You still have two minutes.  
[after 2 minutes] Now two minutes have passed. You still have one minute.  Now your drawing 
should be finished soon. 
[nach 3 Minuten] Please put your drawing into your binder.  
[no comments or praise at this point!] 
 
[hand out new paper and new photograph] 
Now you receive a new paper and a new photograph to draw from. 
As I told you before, you will need the drawings for the games where you can earn the tokens.  
You can now start drawing. 
  
Again, the time will be over when all sand has run down the sandglass.    
And remember to take care that your drawing looks like the photograph. 
[3 drawings in total, continue at ®] 
 
We are done with drawing. [continue with the games] 
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4.C Instructions
 Treatment BetterWins 
Part 1: Questions of understanding 
We will soon play the games where you can earn the tokens. Before we start, there are some 
questions. Look, here you have a ruler [printed on paper]. You can use it to show me how 
much you want something.  
 
If you make the ruler very short, you do not want something very much.  
If you make the ruler very long you, you want something very much. 
[show very short 1cm, show very long 19cm] 
The longer you make the ruler, the more you want something. 
 
1. How much do you want to be good at drawing? 
2. How much do you want to win in games, where other kids are also participating?  
3. How much do you want that others like you a lot?  
 
Now we are playing the first game. I will show you a folder. This folder has two drawings in 
it which other kids drew who are not from your group. 
[open the folder containing the drawings] 
® The other kids tried to draw this photograph.  
4. What do you think, which of the two drawings should win a prize?  
5. Which of the two drawings looks more like the photograph? 
6. Which of the two drawings looks less like the photograph? 
7. Let’s make a rule:  
The drawing wins the prize that looks MORE like the photograph. Which 
drawing has to win the prize?  
[If question 5-7 were correct, continue with Part 2] 
[If not, please correct (as below) and pull out new folder with new photograph and ask questions 5-7; repeat until 
child has seen a maximum of four folders] 
This drawing looks more like the photograph. This drawing wins the prize. 
Now we will do the same with this folder. Again, this folder has two drawings in it that were 
drawn by other kids who are not from your group. [continue above at ®] 
 
Part 2: Choosing between drawings 
Now we will play the game where you can win the tokens. You will receive one folder for 
each photograph that you drew. 
[show, but do NOT open folder!] 
The folder has two drawings in it which other kids drew who are not in your group. The other 
kids tried – just like you – to draw such that their drawing looks like the photograph. The 
other kids also had three minutes.  
Before we start: You may only look at the drawings in the folder when I have turned around. 
After this you have to close folder again. 
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 Now it’s about this folder. This means it’s about THIS photograph [point]. This is YOUR 
drawing of the photograph. 
 
® When I turn around, then you will lay ONE drawing from the folder NEXT TO your 
drawing.  
 
When you are done, I will decide, whether your drawing looks more like the photograph or 
whether the other drawing which you laid next to your drawing looks more like the 
photograph.  
If I decide that your drawing looks more like the photograph, you win THREE tokens. 
If I decide that your drawing looks less like the photograph, you win ONLY ONE token. 
Alright? Afterwards, the two drawings will be put on this board here. 
So, I am now turning around. Please lay ONE drawing of the other kids next to your drawing.  
Have you closed the folder? [turn back again] 
[Only if the child chooses the drawing that looks less like the photograph, the drawing of the child is evaluated as 
looking “more like the photograph”] 
[Positive:] Well, your drawing looks more like the photograph. Here you have three tokens.  
 [Negative:] Well, the other drawing looks more like the photograph. Here you have one token. 
 [the chosen drawing will be attached to the board together with the child’s drawing] 
Now we will do the same with the other folders. This is the second folder. This means it’s 
about THIS photograph. This is YOUR drawing of the photograph. [continue above at ® ] 
[repeat until all three folders complete] 
Why did you choose this drawing? 
Very well done, you have already earned some tokens!  I think your drawings are great. 
 
Do you have questions regarding your drawings or the drawings from the folders?  
Do you have questions about what I said regarding your drawings or the drawings from the 
folders?  
[Who? An older child that is good at drawing; explain evaluations as part of the game and the rules]  
Now there is a different game where you can win tokens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 CHAPTER 4. SOCIAL-COMPARISON ENGINEERING IN CHILDREN
 Treatment WorseWins 
For WorseWins, two paragraphs were different from BetterWins:  
Part 1, Question 7 “The drawing wins the prize that looks LESS like the photograph”  
Part 2: Choosing between drawings (grey area) is now: 
When I turn around, then you will lay ONE drawing from the folder NEXT TO your drawing.  
 
When you are done, I will decide, whether your drawing looks more like the photograph or 
whether the other drawing which you laid next to your drawing looks more like the 
photograph.  
If I decide that your drawing looks more like the photograph, you win ONE token.  
If I decide that your drawing looks less like the photograph, you win THREE tokens.  
Alright? Afterwards, the two drawings will be put on this board here. 
So, I am now turning around. Please lay ONE drawing of the other kids next to your drawing.  
Have you closed the folder? [turn back again] 
[Only if the child chooses the drawing that looks less like the photograph, the drawing of the child is evaluated as 
looking “more like the photograph”] 
[Positive:] Well, the other drawing looks more like the photograph, here you have three tokens. 
 [Negative:] Well, your drawing looks more like the photograph, here you have one token. 
 
Treatment Baseline 
Different from BetterWins, for Baseline, Part 1, Question 7 was not asked. Further, Part 1: 
Questions of understanding was asked only after Part 2: Choosing between drawings had been 
completed not to confound children’s baseline preference.  
Part 2: Choosing between drawings (grey area) is now:  
 When I turn around, then you will lay ONE drawing from the folder NEXT TO your 
drawing.  
When you are done, I will look closely at your drawings and the other drawing which you laid 
next to your drawing. 
Alright? Afterwards, the two drawings will be put on this board here. 
So, I am now turning around. Please lay ONE drawing of the other kids next to your drawing.  
Have you closed the folder? [turn back again] 
[Only if the child chooses the drawing that looks less like the photograph, the drawing of the child is evaluated as 
looking “more like the photograph”] 
 
[Feedback:] Here you have two tokens. 
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 Part 3: Sun-moon task 
Now we will play the last game.  
[pull out sheet with suns and moons and control sheet] 
 
Look here you have a sheet. Look, there is this picture. If you see this picture, I want that you 
say “sun”.  
[point at sun in the upper left corner]  
Can you repeat the right word for the picture? 
Here you see a different picture. If you see this picture, I want that you say the word “moon”. 
[point at moon in the upper left corner]  
Can you repeat the right word for the picture? 
 [repeat this procedure until the child has identified both pictures correctly.  
If the child did not succeed after four trials, do not play the game.]  
Your task is to say as often as possible the correct words for the pictures. You begin in the 
upper row. In each row you then move from left to right. Then you continue one row below.  
If you are done with the sheet, you once again start in the upper left. 
        [show sequence by pointing] 
 
When I say „GO“, you have 45 seconds. Alright? “GO“ 
 
Look here you have a last sheet. Look, there is this picture. If you see this picture, I want that 
you say “moon”.  
[point at sun in the upper left corner]  
Can you repeat the right word for the picture? 
Here you see a different picture. If you see this picture, I want that you say the word “sun”. 
[point at moon in the upper left corner]  
Can you repeat the right word for the picture? 
 [repeat this procedure until the child has identified both pictures correctly.  
If the child did not succeed after four trials, do not play the game.]  
Your task is to say as often as possible the correct words for the pictures. The sequence is as 
before. 
        [show sequence by pointing] 
 
When I say „GO“, you have 45 seconds. Alright? “GO“ 
 
We are done. It was great how you participated. Thank you so much! You earned 6 tokens in 
this last game. Now you can choose your prize.  
 
You will receive the prize and your folder with the drawings only when all children have 
finished. 
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Chapter 5
The desire to set an example
Do people cooperate more if they have social influence?
5.1 Introduction
A recent meta-study (Bradley et al., 2018) demonstrated that people are more likely to cooperate,
when they feel observed by others, so potentially their social image is at stake. However, when
people feel observed by others, they might also realize that their decisions will provide social
information for others. Social information is known to influence diverse social decisions, such
as donations or public goods contributions (Chen et al., 2010; Frey and Meier, 2004; Shang and
Croson, 2009). Hence, people might anticipate the social influence of their decision on others’
decisions and thus perceive an opportunity to ‘set an example’ for others. For instance, if an
individual engages in a local social project, he or she might be motivated by the idea of inspiring
others to also more strongly engage in their social projects. Previous studies on cooperation
have investigated situations where people could set an example for others, e.g., for another group
(Chaudhuri and Graziano, 2006), or for their own group (‘leading-by-example’, e.g., Güth et al.,
2007). In these studies, however, people faced monetary incentives to set an example. Hence, it is
still an open question whether or not humans more generally desire to set an example for others,
i.e., also in the absence of monetary incentives, which is interesting for our understanding of social
learning and the evolution of cooperation (e.g., Boyd et al., 2011; Tabellini, 2008). In addition,
for charitable organizations or local governments aiming to encourage prosocial behavior, it is
important to understand why people set an example for others. Possibly, people’s desire to set
an example arises merely due to their prosocial motivations, e.g., due to their preference for
fostering efficient outcomes (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002). In this case, to appeal to people’s
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desire to set an example, it might suffice to make their contributions public, so their decisions can
influence others’ social information. Alternatively, based on the ‘focusing theory’ of social norms
(Cialdini et al., 1991), people’s desire to set an example might arise only when the normative
aspects of a decision situation become sufficiently salient, so people’s self-image as a prosocial
person is at stake (Bem, 1972; Leary and Baumeister, 2000; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011). From
this perspective, to appeal to the desire to set an example, people’s attention should be focused
on injunctive norms, e.g., by giving them an option to personally recommend to others what
should be done. In previous studies (Gächter et al., 2012; Arbak and Villeval, 2013), inferences
about the psychological motives for setting an example were complicated by monetary incentives,
and they focused on correlations between measures of prosocial motivation and contributions.
In this paper, I therefore investigate experimentally whether or not - and why - people set an
example for others’ cooperation decisions in the absence of monetary incentives for doing so.
In the experiment, participants had social influence on others’ cooperation decisions, so
they could set an example for others without monetary incentives. Participants were either
assigned to ‘first-teams’ or to ‘follower-teams’ to play a two-player public goods game. Each
player in a first-team provided information about his/her contributions for the players of
his/her own ‘follower-team’. To exclude monetary incentives for setting an example for
follower-teams, each team played its own public goods game independently of the other teams.
To vary whether or not a first-team player had social influence on his or her follower-team’s
contribution decisions, follower-team players either had the social information available before
they made their contribution decisions (Infl treatments), or only after they had made binding
contribution decisions (NoInfl treatments). The NoInfl treatments thus controlled for social
image motives due to mere observability of the first-team player’s contribution (Bradley et al.,
2018). To vary the salience of injunctive norms (and thus self-image motives to appear
prosocial), first-team players either had an opportunity to write a recommendation about what
their respective follower-team players should contribute (Rec treatments), or they did not have
such an opportunity (NoRec treatments).
The findings in this study highlight that, if first-team players had social influence and could
write a recommendation, first-team players contributed significantly more to their team’s public
good than first-team players who did not have social influence and could (or could not) write a
recommendation. Additionally, they also reported a higher motivation to set an example. By
contrast, for first-team players who had social influence but could not write a recommendation,
there was no increase in contributions relative to the NoInfl control treatments. People’s desire
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to set an example thus depended on the salience of injunctive norms, which, in turn, activated
their desire for positive self-image as prosocial persons.
As a second contribution, this paper sheds light on the impact of social information on
‘conditional cooperation’, i.e., the tendency to contribute if others do so (Kelley and Stahelski,
1970; Fischbacher et al., 2001), which is important to understand how policy makers can
employ social information to increase cooperation. In particular, the design allows investigating
how the social information provided by first-team players affected contributions of the
follower-teams that received the information. One might expect that social information about
high (or low) contributions should simply increase (or decrease) follower-team player’s beliefs
about their co-player’s contributions and thus also their contributions. Yet, I document that
follower-team players were more likely to follow high first-team player contributions than they
were to follow low first-team player contributions. This suggests that, in addition to affecting
people’s beliefs, the social information might have focused people on the normative aspects of
the decision situation (Cialdini et al., 1991; Krupka and Weber, 2009), making it more
attractive to follow high (normative) contributions.
5.2 Previous Literature
Presious research in the public goods literature focused on leading-by-example in a sequential
public goods game (Güth et al., 2007; Levati et al., 2007; Arbak and Villeval, 2013; Eckel and
Wilson, 2007; Gächter et al., 2012; Potters et al., 2007; Rivas and Sutter, 2008, 2011; Gächter
and Renner, 2018; Gürerk et al., 2018). In the leading-by-example setting, there are monetary
incentives to set an example: Cooperation is the money-maximizing behavior, if a leader believes
that his or her group members are conditional cooperators. Research investigating social learning
in public goods games or other games focused on the effect of advice on the cooperation decisions
of subsequent ‘laboratory generations’ (Chaudhuri and Graziano, 2006; Schotter and Sopher,
2003, 2006). Also in these studies, there were monetary incentives for giving advice, since a
large share of people’s monetary payoffs depended directly on the payoffs of the subsequent
‘laboratory generations’ that received their advice. In fact, most of the literature on advice
focuses on the effects of incentivized advice (e.g., Kuang et al., 2007; Danilov et al., 2013). In
a notable exception, Schram and Charness (2015) investigated the effect of moral advice on
dictator game giving, where the particular advice given could not decrease or increase people’s
monetary payoffs. Yet, the players who gave advice in the Schram and Charness (2015) study
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did not make any decisions themselves, so, contrary to the present study, they did not have social
influence on others via their own economic decisions.
There is also a literature on the impact of social information in donation settings (Croson
and Shang, 2008; Frey and Meier, 2004; Krupka and Croson, 2016; Shang and Croson, 2009). In
these studies, individuals simply received social information which originated in the donations of
previous individuals who were unaware that their decisions would later provide information for
others. Perhaps most closely related to the present study, Reinstein and Riener (2012) presented
a donation game, where players were aware that their donations would provide information for
others. Before the experiment started, participants went through a meet-and-greet-stage, so
people’s social image outside the lab became salient. The donations were highest in a treatment
where people had their identity and information about their donations revealed. Yet, the authors
did not find any significant differences with respect to their relevant control conditions, possibly
because people’s social image outside the lab became too salient, because social influence itself
was weak in their setting, or simply because the study had a small sample size of N = 24 per
treatment. Previous studies thus did not isolate people’s desire to set an example for others
independent of monetary incentives for doing so, and they did not differentiate experimentally
between different motives for doing so – which is the goal of the present study.
5.3 Experiment
5.3.1 Participants and Procedure
The data was collected via the online platform Amazon Mechanical Turk during weekdays. Note
that a recent meta-study (Bradley et al., 2018) on the effect of mere observability on prosocial
behavior has revealed rather weak observability effects, especially in online settings. Using an
online setting is thus helpful to avoid that strong social image motives due to mere observability
divert people’s attention from the opportunity to set an example. To ensure that participants
read and understood the instructions, participants had to answer three control questions correctly
in order to be allowed to participate and receive payments. Participants could further make use of
a payoff calculator with sliders. For each question, subjects needed to mark the correct statements
from a set of four or five statements. The first question addressed subjects’ understanding of
the public goods game, the second addressed their understanding of the game setup and the
third addressed their understanding of the belief elicitation procedure. The sample consists of
1440 participants, resulting in 120 independent observations, i.e., 120 first-team players and 240
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follower-team players, for each of the four treatments.1
5.3.2 Experimental Design
Participants were randomly matched into different teams to play the public goods game.
Within each team, participants played a simultaneous two-player public goods game. Each
player received an endowment of $1.00, of which he or she could contribute a multiple of 10
Cents to his or her team’s common project. Each Cent contributed was multiplied by 1.5 and
distributed equally among the two players. The marginal-per-capita-return (MPCR) to
cooperation was thus set rather high (0.75) which should ensure that cooperative behavior was
(perceived as) the norm. Empirically, a high MPCR facilitates cooperation, even though
free-riding incentives remain unchanged (Isaac and Walker, 1988).
To create a situation where some players can have social influence on others, players were
either assigned to the ‘first-team’ (labeled Pair A in the instructions) or to one of two ‘follower-
teams’ (labeled Pair B or Pair C in the instructions). The setup thus consisted of one first-team
and two follower-teams. Players in the first-team played first and, subsequently, the players of
the two follower-teams played. To exclude monetary incentives to set an example, each team
played its own game separately from the other teams and thus could not directly affect the
monetary payoffs in other teams. One player in the first-team provided information for the two
players of one follower-team, and the other player in the first-team provided information for
the two players of the other follower-team. Each first-team player thus had ‘exclusive’ social
influence over two follower-team players. This should ensure that first-team players perceived
their contribution to be sufficiently influential and that conflicting information from a co-player
could not weaken a first-team player’s social influence. To further ensure that first-team players’
contributions indeed affected follower-team players’ contributions, players of the same follower-
team were informed that they would both receive the same information from the same player in
the first-team, and first-team players knew this. Hence, the social information that the first-team
players provided became public knowledge, giving the first-team players an opportunity to boost
conditional cooperation in follower-teams (Fischbacher et al., 2001). To further exclude any form
of ‘social competition’, i.e., the desire to be more prosocial than others (e.g. Böhm et al., 2013),
the first-team players were only informed about the contributions of their own follower-team
players and not about the contributions of the other follower-team. Alike, follower-team players
1Of the 2287 recruited participants, 389 dropped out and 458 were excluded by the program because they did
not answer correctly one of the control questions within three trials. Importantly, the number of participants who
dropped out or were excluded did not vary significantly by treatment (Chi-Square test, X2 = 2.80, p = 0.423).
110 CHAPTER 5. THE DESIRE TO SET AN EXAMPLE
of the same team did not receive information about the contributions of the other follower-team.
5.3.3 Treatments
The 2x2 treatments varied (i) whether or not the first-team players had social influence (Infl
treatments) or not (NoInfl treatments), and (ii) whether first-team players could (voluntarily)
write a recommendation about what should be done (Rec treatments) or not (NoRec treatments).
The Infl/NoInfl variation allows isolating the effect of having social influence on the desire
to set an example separately from social image motives or any other confounding motives that
might occur if people know their decisions will be made available to others. In the treatments
Infl-Rec and Infl-NoRec, the follower-team players receive information about their first-team
player’s contribution before they make their contributions to their team’s project. Hence, first-
team players have social influence on their follower-team players’ decisions via their contribution
decisions. By contrast, in the treatments NoInfl-Rec and NoInfl-NoRec, the follower-team players
receive the information about their first-team player’s contribution only after they have already
finished playing their team’s public goods game, i.e., after they have made binding contribution
decisions. These treatments thus control for social image motives, e.g., due to the feeling of
being observed by the follower-team players.
The Rec/NoRec variation allows isolating the impact of the salience of injunctive norms
on people’s desire to set an example. In the treatments Infl-NoRec and NoInfl-NoRec, first-
team players merely provide information about their contribution and an opportunity to write
a recommendation for their follower-team is not mentioned. As a result, injunctive norms are
not particularly salient. By contrast, in Infl-Rec, each first-team player can voluntarily write “a
recommendation about what the players in [his or her follower-team] should contribute”. This
manipulation thus makes first-team players think about what should be done, e.g., the injunctive
norm to make a high contribution. In the NoInfl-Rec treatment, first-team players also had an
opportunity to voluntarily write a recommendation. Yet, first-team players knew that their
contribution and their recommendation (if provided) was displayed to follower-team players only
after they had already finished making their decisions.2 Hence, like darkness makes salient the
lack of observability (Zhong et al., 2010), this treatment might make salient the irrelevance of
first-team player’s decision for follower-team player’s decisions.
To control for the effect of the treatments on beliefs, I also elicited players’ beliefs. The
2In the treatment NoInfl-Rec, first-team players’ recommendation is labelled “comment about what the players
in [his or her follower-team] should have contributed” to make clear that it cannot technically affect their follower
team players when they make their contribution decisions.
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belief elicitation took place only after the players had made their contribution decisions to avoid
confounding players’ contribution decisions (Blanco et al., 2014). In all treatments, first-team
players and follower-team players guessed the average contributions of all first-team players.
Further, first-team players in the treatments Infl-NoRec and Infl-Rec had social influence on their
follower-teams’ decisions, so it was important to find out how participants expected first-team
player contributions to affect follower-team player contributions. To this end, first-team players
and follower-team players each guessed the average contributions of players in follower-teams
for the cases of receiving information about a 0, 50, and 100 Cents contribution by first-team
players. First-team players in the treatments NoInfl-NoRec and NoInfl-Rec did not have social
influence on their follower-teams’ decisions. Accordingly, in these treatments, first-team players
and follower-team players each guessed the average contribution of all follower-team players
without conditioning on information about different contribution levels.
In the belief elicitation, players could only submit multiples of 10 Cents as guesses and these
guesses were compared to the actual average contribution rounded to the nearest multiple of 10
Cents of the respective data collection days. Players’ guesses were incentivized by a simplified
quadratic scoring rule: If their guess was exactly equal to the (rounded) average contribution,
their payoff was $2.00, if their guess was in a range of +/− 20 Cents of the (rounded) average
contribution, their payoff was $1.00. Otherwise, if their guess was outside the range of +/−
20 Cents, their payoff was $0.75. This procedure is simple to understand, e.g., compared to a
Binarized Scoring Rule (Hossain and Okui 2013), and minimizes background risk, i.e., the risk of
receiving a low amount (Selten, Sadrieh, and Abbink 1999). Further, the incentives for making
an exact guess were very high (receiving $2 instead of $1), so it is implausible that risk-aversion
made players deviate from their ‘true’ guesses.
5.3.4 Post-experimental questionnaire
To investigate the psychological processes behind players’ decisions, I elicit their motivations
using a post-experimental questionnaire with 7-point scales. First-team players’ motivation to
set an example for follower-team players was measured as their agreement to the statement, “I
wanted that the players in [my follower-team] follow my example.”. For follower-team players, I
elicited their perception of injunctive norms, i.e., whether they agree that “The players in [the
first-team] should set an example for [the follower-team players]”. I further elicited first-team
player’s perception of responsibility (e.g., “I did not feel responsible for the players in [my follower-
team]). Follower-team players indicated whether first-team players should feel responsible for
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follower-team players. In addition, I elicited player’s motivation for fostering an efficient outcome
(“I wanted that everyone gets a higher [payoff].”). Lastly, I also elicited players’ interest in finding
out how much their co-player contributed to their team’s project, and their interest in finding
out how much their follower-team contributed, to assess their involvement in the game.
5.4 Hypotheses
First-team players
I consider two principal motives that might explain why people desire to set an example for
others, even if there are no monetary incentives for doing so.
Firstly, based on prosocial motivations alone, having social influence on others might lead
people to act more cooperatively, thereby aiming to spread cooperation. This might happen
if people have a preference for fostering efficient outcomes not only in their own team, but
also in their follower-team (Charness and Rabin, 2002).3 However, two crucial prerequisites
for prosocial motivations (e.g., social preferences) to explain people’s desire to set an example
are that (i) first-team players extend their social considerations to their follower-teams, and (ii)
first-team players believe that follower-team players follow their contribution behavior. Note
that the first prerequisite is not directly testable, so Hypothesis 1 (below) focuses on the second
prerequisite which can be inferred from participants’ elicited beliefs.
Hypothesis 1: Contributions of first-team players who have social influence but could not write
a recommendation should increase, but only if they have sufficiently strong beliefs that their
contributions lead follower-teams to follow their own contributions.
Secondly, based on the ‘focusing theory’ of normative conduct (Krupka and Weber, 2009;
Cialdini et al., 1991), people might desire to set an example by making a high contribution,
but only when the normative aspects of decision situation become salient. Social norms might
draw people’s attention to their prosocial identity and self-image as prosocial persons, i.e., people
evaluate their own decision relative to the social norm and take their behavior as a signal for their
prosocial motivation (Bem, 1972; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011; Leary and Baumeister, 2000). First-
team players can voluntarily write a recommendation about what follower-team players should
contribute, which should make people think about injunctive norms, e.g., that one should make
3Also under inequity aversion, for instance, agents perceive the public goods game like a coordination game.
Thus, inequity averse first-team players might want to spread equitable cooperative outcomes in their follower-
team by making a high contribution in their own team (provided that they have sufficiently optimistic beliefs
about their co-players’ contribution). Similarly, guilt averse players might want to avoid being responsible for
letting down their follower-team’s expectation.
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a high contribution in their situation. In the Infl-Rec treatment, first-team players have social
influence on their follower-team players’ decisions, so the opportunity to write a recommendation
should make it more likely that first-team players perceive a strong injunctive norm to make
a high contribution. As a result, a larger number of first-team players might perceive it as
socially desirable to set an example, so first-team players’ (self-reported) motivation to set an
example and their contributions should increase. Conversely, in the treatment NoInfl-Rec, the
opportunity to write a recommendation should make salient the irrelevance of their decision
for others’ decisions. In turn, even though players might think about the injunctive norm to
make a high contribution, they might perceive that making a high contribution is not necessarily
important in their situation, so the own image as a prosocial person is not as much at stake.
Hypothesis 2 sums up the expectations due to the salience of injunctive norms and the resulting
self-image motives:
Hypothesis 2: First-team players who have social influence and can write a recommendation
should make higher contributions than first-team players who do not have social influence and can
write a recommendation, and they should also make higher contributions than first-team players
who do not have social influence and cannot write a recommendation.
Follower-team players
Follower-team player contributions might be affected by first-team players who have social
influence in at least two ways. Firstly, if first-team players make a high contribution,
follower-team player’s beliefs about the average contributions in their follower-team might
increase due to descriptive norm effects, i.e., players infer what (they believe) is typically done
from the social information (Bernheim, 1994; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Krupka and Weber,
2009; Schultz et al., 2007). Combined with people’s tendency to contribute as much as they
believe others do, i.e., conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al., 2001), cooperation might
thus increase. Secondly, complementing the first possibility, the social information provided by
first-team players might lead to ‘focusing’ effects (Cialdini et al., 1991; Krupka and Weber,
2009). That is, the social information itself might draw follower-team players’ attention to the
normative aspects of the decision situation, e.g., to what should be done. For example, Krupka
and Weber (2009) found that providing dictators with social information increased the amount
shared in a dictator game compared to a situation without social information, even if dictators
received information about other dictators’ selfish behavior. Similarly, Cialdini et al. (1991)
found that a single piece of litter in otherwise clean environment led to less subsequent littering
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than an entirely clean environment, suggesting that the single piece of litter made salient the
anti-littering norm. Hence, in the present setting, if the mere provision of social information
draws follower-team player’s attention to the normative aspects of the decision situation, the
social information provided should lead follower-teams to more likely follow (normative) high
contributions than (counter-normative) low contributions. As a result, contributions might
increase in treatments where first-team players have social influence compared to if first-team
players do not have social influence, i.e., where decisions cannot be affected by the actual social
information received.
Hypothesis 3: Follower-team players should be more likely to follow high first-team player
contributions than low first-team player contributions, if their first-team players have social
influence.
5.5 Results
First-team players
First, I examine whether first-team players expected their contributions to influence
follower-team players. If first-team players did not expect any social influence of their own
contributions on follower-team players’ contributions, then it would be difficult to explain why
they nevertheless should have wanted to set an example. In treatments where first-team players
had social influence (Infl-NoRec and Infl-Rec), I elicited first-team players’ beliefs about
follower-team players’ average contributions conditional on three different contribution levels
(0, 50, and 100 Cents). Interestingly, on average, first-team players who had social influence
expected higher first-team player contributions to positively influence follower-team
contributions, regardless of whether first-team players could write a recommendation (see Table
5.1).
Information about first-team player’s contribution 0 Cents 50 Cents 100 Cents
First-team players’ belief about follower-team
players’ average contributions in...
Infl-NoRec 23 Cents 51 Cents 72 Cents
Infl-Rec 27 Cents 47 Cents 69 Cents
Table 5.1: First-team players’ beliefs about their social influence on follower-team players’ contributions
conditional on three elicited contribution levels.
Hence, first-team players believed that higher own contributions lead to higher follower-team
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contributions, which is a precondition for prosocial motivations to affect the desire to set an
example (Hypothesis 1).
Next, I investigate how first-team players in the different treatments made use of their
opportunity to set an example. I do not find support for Hypothesis 1: First-team players who
had social influence but could not write a recommendation (Infl-NoRec) did not contribute
significantly more than first-team players who did not have social influence and could not write
a recommendation (NoInfl-NoRec) (Permutation test, Infl-NoRec vs. NoInfl-NoRec, mean 59
Cents vs. mean 56 Cents, Z = -0.57, p = 0.583). First-team players who had social influence
but could not write a recommendation (Infl-NoRec) also did not contribute significantly more
than first-team player who did not have social influence and could write a recommendation
(NoInfl-Rec) (Permutation test, Infl-NoRec vs. NoInfl-Rec, 59 Cents vs. 52 Cents, Z = -1.34, p
= 0.185). Hence, even though first-team players who had social influence but could not write a
recommendation believed that higher contributions increase follower-team player contributions,
they did not make significantly higher contributions.
Result 1: First-team players who had social influence but could not write a recommendation did
not contribute significantly more than first-team players who did not have social influence and
could not write a recommendation (Infl-NoRec vs. NoInfl-NoRec) or first-team players who did
not have social influence and could write a recommendation (Infl-NoRec vs. NoInfl-NoRec).
By contrast, in support of Hypothesis 2, first-team players who had social influence and could
write a recommendation (Infl-Rec) contributed significantly more than first-team players who
did not have social influence and could write a recommendation (Permutation test, Infl-Rec vs.
NoInfl-Rec, mean 65 Cents vs. 52 Cents, Z = -2.41, p = 0.016), and they also contributed more
than first-team player who did not have social influence and could not write a recommendation
(Permutation test, Infl-Rec vs. NoInfl-NoRec, mean 65 Cents vs. 56 Cents, Z = -1.67, p = 0.098).
First-team players who had social influence and could write a recommendation also contributed
more than first-team players who had social influence and could not write a recommendation, but
this was not significant (Infl-Rec vs. NoInfl-NoRec, mean 65 Cents vs. 59 Cents, Z = -1.13, p
= 0.268). Figure 5.1 shows the distributions and the medians of first-team players’ contribution
levels: First-team players who had social influence and could write a recommendation, had a
higher median (70) than first-team players in each of the other treatments (50, each). Further,
the share of first-team players who contributed 100 Cents (0 Cents) was rather high (low) in the
Infl-Rec treatment compared to the other treatments. In support of Hypothesis 2, thus, first-
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team players only made higher contributions, if they had social influence and the opportunity to
write a recommendation made salient injunctive norms.
Result 2: First-team players who had social influence and could write a recommendation
contributed more than first-team players who did not have social influence and could write a
recommendation (Infl-Rec vs. NoInfl-Rec) or could not write a recommendation (Infl-Rec vs.
NoInfl-NoRec).
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Figure 5.1: Violin plots showing the rotated distributions and medians of first-team player’s
contributions for each treatment.
Next, I investigate first-team players’ motivations as stated in the post-experimental
questionnaire. In doing so, I can find out how first-team players who had influence and could
write a recommendation (Infl-Rec) perceived their decision situation and test how their
perception differed from (i) the perception of first-team players who did not have social
influence (NoInfl-NoRec, NoInfl-Rec), and (ii) the perception of first-team players who also had
social influence but could not write a recommendation. Potentially, players who had social
influence and could write a recommendation about what follower-team players should
contribute were more likely to focus on injunctive norms and thus reported a stronger
motivation to set an example (supporting Hypothesis 2). In line with this reasoning, first-team
players who had social influence and could write a recommendation reported a higher
motivation to set an example than first-team players who did not have social influence and
could write a recommendation (Infl-Rec vs. NoInfl-Rec, 5.70 vs. 4.51, Z = -4.16, p < .001) or
could not write a recommendation (Infl-Rec vs. NoInfl-NoRec, 7-point-scale, 5.70 vs. 4.73, Z =
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-3.52, p < .001). Importantly, first-team players who had social influence and could write a
recommendation also reported a higher motivation to set an example than first-team players
who had social influence and could not write a recommendation (Infl-Rec vs. Infl-NoRec,
7-point-scale, 5.70 vs. 4.96, Z = -2.74, p = .006).4
With regard to the other questionnaire variables, first-team players who had social influence
and could write a recommendation reported significantly stronger feelings of responsibility and
a stronger interest in their follower-team players’ behavior compared to first-team players who
did not have social influence and could write a recommendation (NoInfl-Rec) or could not write
a recommendation (NoInfl-Rec) (Permutation tests, all p-values < .05). However, the
first-team players who had social influence and could write a recommendation did not report
stronger feelings of responsibility for their follower-team players, a higher interest in their
follower-team players’ behavior, or a stronger desire to foster efficient outcomes compared to
first-team players who had social influence but could not write a recommendation (Infl-Rec vs.
Infl-NoRec, all p-values > .10). Thus, while other questionnaire measures also affected the
perceptions of first-team players who had social influence and could write a recommendation
(Infl-Rec), the particularly high contributions in this treatment are best attributed to
first-team players’ increased motivation to set an example.
Result 3: If first-team players had social influence and could write a recommendation, they
reported a higher motivation to set an example compared to first-team players who did not have
social influence (Infl-Rec vs. NoInfl-NoRec, Infl-Rec vs. NoInfl-Rec) and compared to first-team
players who had social influence but could not write a recommendation (Infl-Rec vs. Infl-NoRec).
Norm perceptions
Next, I report evidence about player’s norm perceptions to be able to better interpret the
follower-team player’s behavior. Interestingly, the maximum contribution of 100 Cents was the
most frequent recommendation about what follower-team players should do (59 of 103
recommendations in Infl-Rec, 40 out of 72 recommendations in NoInfl-Rec). Hence, the
maximum contribution was most likely also what participants considered the injunctive norm.
To infer whether participants expect first-team players to set an example from a normative
4A mediation analysis suggests that the stronger motivation to set an example for follower-team players
also led to higher contributions as compared to the other treatments: Controlling for all other questionnaire
measures, assignment to the treatment Infl-Rec predicted a higher motivation to set an example than in other
treatments (bInfl−Rec = 0.499, SE = 0.178, p = .005), higher levels of which in turn predicted higher contributions
(bexample = 4.301, SE = 0.880, p < .001 (indirect effect, E[contribution | example(Infl-Rec = 1)] – E[contribution
| example(Infl-Rec = 0)] = 2.133, CI95 [0.56,4.08], p = .006).
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perspective, I can look at follower-team players’ self-reported agreement that first-team players
should set an example in the post-experimental questionnaire. Notably, follower-team players’
perception that first-team players should set an example was near maximum agreement in
treatments where first-team players had social influence, and higher than in treatments where
first-team players did not have social influence (7-points-scale, means: Infl-Rec, 5.64,
Infl-NoRec, 5.84, NoInfl-Rec, 3.97, NoInfl-NoRec, 4.00, all pairwise comparisons between Infl
and NoInfl treatments, p < .001).5
Result 4: First-team players’ recommendations suggest that they perceive an injunctive norm to
contribute the full amount of 100 Cents. Alike, follower-team players reported strong agreement
that first-team players should set an example, if first-team players had social influence (Infl-Rec
and Infl-NoRec).
Follower-team players
In the following, I average across the contributions of each follower-team (the level of
independent observation) to analyze the social influence of first-team players’ contributions on
follower-team players’ contributions. If first-team players had social influence, descriptive norm
effects would suggest that higher (lower) first-team player contributions should translate into
higher (lower) follower-team player contributions. Looking at mere correlations, the first-team
players’ and their follower-team’s average contributions were significantly correlated in both
treatments where first-team players had social influence (Infl-NoRec, ρ = .58, p < .001,
Infl-Rec, Sparman’s ρ = .30, p < .001; see also Appendix 5.A for regressions). To see how
follower-team players expected the social information to affect beliefs, I elicited follower-team
player’s beliefs about their co-player’s contributions levels conditional on different contribution
levels by first-team players (0, 50, and 100). In line with descriptive norm effects, on average,
follower-team players expected higher first-team player contributions to coincide with higher
follower-team player contributions (see Table 5.2).
5Note that first-team players were not asked whether they themselves thought that they should set an example,
since such an elicitation might confound their reports about their motivation to set an example.
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Information about first-team player’s contribution 0 Cents 50 Cents 100 Cents
Follower-team players’ belief about follower-team
players’ average contributions in...
Infl-NoRec 30 Cents 53 Cents 77 Cents
Infl-Rec 27 Cents 47 Cents 70 Cents
Table 5.2: Follower-team players’ beliefs about the social influence of first-team players’ contributions
on follower-team players’ contributions conditional on three elicited contribution levels.
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Figure 5.2: Violin plots showing the rotated distributions and medians of follower-team player’s
contributions for different information about contribution levels of first-team players. Only the
contribution levels of 0, 50 and 100 are shown as these make up about 75% of the first-team player
contributions, whereas the remainder of the data is scattered evenly across the remaining contribution
levels.
As can be seen in Figure 5.2, however, follower-team players’ behavior differed markedly
from mere descriptive norm effects. The figure shows how the distribution of follower-team
player contributions varies with the contribution information received in treatments with social
influence (Infl-NoRec and Infl-Rec). Notably, when receiving information about a zero
contribution of their first-team player, the distribution of follower-team player contributions in
the treatments with social influence (Infl-NoRec and Infl-Rec) was not skewed towards zero
contributions and it did not differ significantly to the distribution of follower-team
contributions in treatments without social influence (NoInfl-NoRec and NoInfl-Rec)
(Infl-NoRec, information: 0 Cents, mean contribution 48 Cents; NoInfl-NoRec, overall mean
contribution 57 Cents; Infl-Rec, information: 0 Cents, mean contribution 59 Cents; NoInfl-Rec,
overall mean contribution 57 Cents, Kolomogorov-Smirnov tests comparing the distributions,
all p-values > .378).6 Hence, follower-team players hesitated to follow low contributions. This
6The high contributions of follower-teams who receive information about a 0 Cents contribution in Infl-Rec
can in part be attributed to recommendations which are inconsistent with behavior: Eight first-team players
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is indicative of Hypothesis 3, i.e., the social information ‘focused’ participants on the normative
aspects of the decision situation, so they refrain from imitating ‘counter-normative’ behavior.
Also in line with ‘focusing’ effects, when receiving information about a 100 Cents contribution
of their first-team player, the distribution of follower-team players’ contributions is highly
skewed, with the vast majority of follower-team players contributing 100 Cents. In this case,
the distribution of follower-team player contributions in treatments with social influence
(Infl-NoRec and Infl-Rec) differs substantially from the distribution of follower-team player
contributions in treatments without social influence (NoInfl-NoRec and NoInfl-Rec)
(Infl-NoRec, information: 100 Cents, mean contribution 85 Cents; NoInfl-NoRec, overall mean
contribution 57 Cents; Infl-Rec, information: 100 Cents, mean contribution 75 Cents;
NoInfl-Rec, overall mean contribution 57 Cents; Kolomogorov-Smirnov tests comparing the
distributions, all p-values < .004). Result 5 sums up the findings supporting Hypothesis 3.7
Result 5: If first-team players had influence (Infl-Rec and Infl-NoRec), follower-team players
were more likely to follow high contributions than they were to follow low contributions.
Next, I compare follower-team contributions across different treatments to see whether first-
team players who had social influence positively influenced follower-team player contributions in
the aggregate. Follower-team players whose first-team players had social influence but could not
write a recommendation made higher contributions than follower-team players whose first-team
players did not have social influence and could not write a recommendation (Permutation test,
Infl-NoRec vs. NoInfl-NoRec, mean 64 Cents vs. 57 Cents, Z = -2.01, p = .045, see also Figure
5.3) and they also made higher contributions compared to follower-team players whose first-team
players did not have social influence and could write a recommendation (Infl-NoRec vs. NoInfl-
Rec, 64 Cents vs. 57 Cents, Z = -1.88, p = .061). Hence, in Infl-NoRec, follower-team players’
contributions increased even though the contributions of their first-team players who provided
the information did not increase relative to treatments where first-team players did not have
social influence (cf. Result 1 and Figure 5.1). The increase might thus result from ‘focusing
contributed 0 Cents, but recommended a 100 Cents contribution; resulting in average follower-team contributions
of 67 Cents. Yet, note that the remaining follower-team players that received information about a 0 Cents
contribution in Infl-Rec also contributed 52 Cents on average and contributions were similarly high (48 Cents) in
Infl-NoRec, i.e., where follower-team players do not receive any (inconsistent) recommendations.
7Regression analyses in the Appendix 5.A also support Result 5. The share of follower-team players that
contributed exactly the same amount which their first-team player contributed, i.e., who “follow” their first-team
players, was significantly larger in treatments where first-team players had social influence than in treatments
where they did not have social influence (e.g., comparing Infl-Rec vs. NoInfl-Rec, binformation∗NoInfl−Rec =
-0.026, SE = .010, p = .012, Infl-Rec vs. NoInfl-NoRec, binformation∗NoInfl−NoRec = -0.032, SE = .010, p =
.002). Note that in the NoInfl-Rec and NoInfl-NoRec treatments, follower-team contributions can coincide with
their first-team player contributions only by chance.
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effects’ (Hypothesis 3), i.e., the social information made salient the normative aspects of the
decision situation.
Follower-team players whose first-team players had social influence and could write a
recommendation also made higher contributions than follower-team players whose first-team
players did not have social influence and could write a recommendation (Infl-Rec vs.
NoInfl-Rec, 65 Cents vs. 57 Cents, Z = -2.13, p = .034), and they also made higher
contributions than follower-team players whose first-team players did not have social influence
and could not write a recommendation (Infl-Rec vs. NoInfl-NoRec, 65 Cents vs. 57 Cents, Z =
-2.26, p = .024, see also Figure 5.3). While follower-team players’ contributions were relatively
high in Infl-Rec, contributions might not have increased further, e.g., compared to Infl-NoRec,
due to ceiling effects, or because some of the first-team players’ recommendations contain
additional information. Result 6 sums up the findings on aggregate follower-team contributions.
Result 6: Follower-team players’ contributions increased significantly if first-team players had
social influence (Infl-Rec and Infl-NoRec) as compared to if they did not have social influence
(NoInfl-Rec and NoInfl-NoRec).
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Figure 5.3: Violin plots showing the rotated distributions and medians of follower-team player’s
contributions for each treatment.
5.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper investigates whether or not people desire to set an example for others, if there
are no monetary incentives for doing so. Players of one team (‘first-team’ players) played the
122 CHAPTER 5. THE DESIRE TO SET AN EXAMPLE
public goods game and the decisions in their team could affect the social information available
to others who independently played their own public goods game in so-called ‘follower-teams’.
Each first-team player either had social influence over his or her follower-team (treatments Infl-
NoRec and Infl-Rec) or did not have social influence (treatments NoInfl-NoRec and NoInfl-
Rec). Further, to vary the salience of injunctive norms and thus of people’s self-image as a
prosocial person, first-team players either could additionally write a recommendation about
what follower-team players should do (treatments Infl-Rec and NoInfl-Rec) or they could not
do so (treatments Infl-NoRec and NoInfl-NoRec). If first-team players had social influence
but could not write a recommendation (Infl-NoRec), prosocial motivations alone might explain
higher contributions. Yet, even though first-team players in this treatment on average believed
to have social influence, their contributions did not increase significantly. Only when first-team
players had social influence and could write a recommendation (Infl-Rec), they contributed
significantly more than first-team players who did not have social influence on their follower-
team players’ contributions and could (or could not) write a recommendation (NoInfl-Rec and
NoInfl-NoRec). This suggests that merely having social influence did not suffice to increase
contributions. Instead, only if people’s attention was drawn to injunctive norms (Cialdini et al.,
1991), thereby activating people’s desire for prosocial identity and positive self-image (Bem,
1972; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011; Leary and Baumeister, 2000), people set an example for others
by making higher contributions.
Further analyses help substantiate the suspected psychological mechanism. While first-team
players who had social influence and could write a recommendation (Infl-Rec) did not report
a stronger motivation for fostering an efficient outcome than first-team players who had social
influence but could not write a recommendation, they did report a stronger motivation to set an
example for their follower-team players. Most likely, the increased motivation to set an example
thus arose because first-team players were made aware of the injunctive norms, so their self-image
as a prosocial person was at stake. Hence, this study highlights the importance of people’s desire
for positive self-image as a prosocial person for explaining why people set an example for others.8
In addition, this paper documents interesting findings regarding the impact of social
information on ‘conditional cooperation’ (Kelley and Stahelski, 1970; Fischbacher et al., 2001):
The availability of social information in treatments where first-team players had social
influence led to increased contributions in follower-teams compared to treatments where
8Note that also a desire to act consistently with their own recommendation, e.g., to avoid cognitive dissonance
(Konow, 2000), or a desire for social approval from follower-team players might have motivated contributions. Yet,
these explanations ultimately also entail self-image concerns that are closely related to normative expectations.
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first-team players did not have social influence. The follower-team players’ high contributions
can be attributed to their inclination to follow high but not low first-team players’
contributions. The follower-team players thus did not only follow the contribution information
they received, as mere descriptive norm effects would suggest (Bernheim, 1994; Cialdini and
Goldstein, 2004; Krupka and Weber, 2009). Rather, in addition, there were ‘focusing’ effects,
i.e., the social information made the normative aspects of the decision situation more salient, so
people hesitated to follow counter-normative contribution examples.9 This explanation is also
consistent with the findings of one of the most widely cited dictator-game study on social
influence (Krupka and Weber, 2009). The authors found increases in dictator game giving in
treatments with social information compared to a control without social information, where
participants received information about selfish behavior by previous dictators. Similarly, a
recent field experiment in a firm found increases in donations when employees were informed
that a share of only about 5% of them typically donate compared to a control without social
information (Sanders, 2017).
The finding of rather high contributions in follower-teams are intriguing in the view of
‘selfish-biases’ in conditional cooperation. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) found that people
cooperate conditionally, but contribute slightly less than others. Similarly, in the
leading-by-example setting, ‘followers’ of the leader typically reciprocate only partly by making
lower contributions than their leader. An explanation for this apparent divergence is that
follower-team players evaluated the social information from a normative perspective, whereas in
the other settings free-riding incentives were more salient. Further, compared to Fischbacher
and Gächter (2010), the marginal-per-capita-return to cooperation (MPCR) in the present
study was relatively high (0.75 compared to 0.4). Perhaps, thus, biases in conditional
cooperation might also favor cooperation, if cooperation appears sufficiently attractive.
From a policy perspective, the findings of the present study imply that – to appeal to people’s
desire to set an example and increase cooperation – merely making their contributions public
does not suffice. Instead, in addition, injunctive norms need to be made salient, e.g., by having
people make personal recommendations about what others should do. Further, the evidence that
normative behaviors (high contributions) were easier to spread than counter-normative behaviors
(low contributions) might explain why norms – be they ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – have proven ‘sticky’
and difficult to change in the past (as is the case for corruption, e.g., (Becker et al., 2016)).
9If first-team players had social influence, the maximum contribution was the first-team player’s most frequent
recommendation, and follower-team players strongly agreed that first-team players should set an example.
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Appendices
5.A Regressions analyzing social influence
To analyze more closely how the social information affected the follower-team players’ behavior, I
analyze (i) their contributions, and (ii) the share of follower-team players who contribute exactly
the same amount which their first-team player contributed, i.e., the share of ‘followers’. Notably,
an increase in the share of ‘followers’ might also occur by chance due to the higher frequency of
high compared to low contribution. To account for this possibility, I control for social information
in treatments where first-team players did not have social influence, so the social information was
not available when making the decision and any correlation can occur only by chance. To this
end, I use a linear regression that aggregates follower-team player’s contributions across teams
(see Table 5.3). As dependent variables, I use the average contribution of players of the same
follower-team (Model 1), and the share of ‘followers’ per team, that is, the share of follower-team
players of the same team who contribute exactly the amount which their first-team player did, i.e.,
0%, 50%, or 100% (Model 2). As independent variables, I control for the treatment dummies and
a continuous variable info with the information about contribution level of the follower-team’s
first-team player (which is divided by 10 to obtain the impact of a 10 Cents increase). I interact
treatment dummies and the information about the first-team player’s contribution level to detect
between-treatment differences in behavior. I use the treatment Infl-Rec as a reference category.
Model 1 confirms the expected impact of social information on contributions in treatments where
first-team players had social influence, e.g., a 10 Cents increase in first-team player’s contributions
led to roughly a 2 Cents increase in contributions in follower-teams (bInfo = 2.09, SE = 0.62,
p < .001). In Model 2, I find that for each 10 Cents-increase in the information received by a
first-team player, there is roughly a 5% increase in the share of followers if first-team players
had social influence and could write a recommendation (Infl-Rec, bInfo = 0.049, SE = .008, p
< .001), which is significantly larger than the increase that occurs by chance due to the higher
frequency of high compared to low contributions in treatments without social influence (e.g.,
comparing Infl-Rec vs. NoInfl-Rec, bInfo*NoInfl-Rec = -0.026, SE = .010, p = .012, Infl-Rec vs.
NoInfl-NoRec, bInfo*NoInfl-NoRec = -0.032, SE = .010, p = .002). Estimates for Infl-NoRec
are very similar to that of Infl-Rec (estimated from Model 2, Infl-NoRec, bInfo = 0.047, SE =
.008, p < .001).
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Contributions Followers
(1) (2)
Info 2.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.01)
Infl-NoRec −12.51∗ 0.04
(6.31) (0.08)
NoInfl-NoRec 8.47 −0.05
(6.15) (0.07)
NoInfl-Rec 7.78 −0.12
(5.95) (0.07)
Info*Infl-NoRec 2.18∗ −0.00
(0.87) (0.01)
Info*NoInfl-NoRec −2.57∗∗ −0.03∗∗
(0.86) (0.01)
Info*NoInfl-Rec −2.42∗∗ −0.03∗
(0.84) (0.01)
(Intercept) 51.02∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗
(4.63) (0.06)
R2 0.13 0.30
Adj. R2 0.12 0.29
Num. obs. 480 480
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ◦p < 0.1
Table 5.3: Linear regressions showing the impact of social information on conditional cooperation in
the follower-teams (average contributions in Model1, share of followers in Model 2).
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Infl-Rec (Infl-NoRec without hints on recommendation): 
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NoInfl-Rec (NoInfl-NoRec without hints on comment): 
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Infl-Rec and Infl-NoRec (adapted in the NoInfl treatments) 
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